原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译:三变ps 转载请注明出处
论坛地址:http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-475719-1-1.html

The Deployment of THAAD

萨德的部署



Since 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense has considered deploying THAAD in South Korea,8 but until recently,Seoul has been reluctant to proceed with the system. South Korean officials raised concerns about the cost of hosting THAAD; uncertainty about THAAD’s effectiveness against the North Korean threat; and South Korea’s existing plan to develop an indigenous missile defense system. Seoul also may have been concerned that THAAD would contribute to the U.S.-allied regional ballistic missile defense network—which it seemed averse to join because of longstanding frictions with Japan—and, perhaps most importantly, may have been reluctant to antagonize China due to their close economic ties.

自2014年以来,美国国防部一直在考虑在韩国部署“萨德”,但直到最近,首尔一直不愿部署这一系统。韩国官员对运行萨德系统的成本、萨德系统是否能有效遏制遏制朝鲜威胁表示担忧,并且韩国已经有发展国产导弹防御系统的计划。首尔方面也担心萨德系统会被纳入美国主导的区域弹道导弹防御系统——由于与日本长期存在的摩擦,韩国似乎不愿加入该组织——而且,或许最重要的是,由于中韩两国经济关系密切,韩国可能不愿意与中国对抗。

The increased security threat posed by continued North Korean missile development, however, changed Seoul’s calculus on THAAD. Hours after North Korea’s February 2016 satellite launch testing ballistic missile technology, South Korea said it would pursue formal talks with the United States about the system.In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in a joint statement the alliance decision to proceed with the deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea by late 2017, at an estimated cost of $1.6 billion.

然而,朝鲜持续不断的导弹试射导致的与日俱增的安全威胁,改变了韩国在部署萨德系统上的考量。2016年2月,在朝鲜通过发射卫星测试弹道导弹发射技术几小时后,韩国表示将就部署萨德系统与美国进行正式会谈。2016年7月,美国国防部和韩国国防部在一份联合声明中宣布,美韩联盟决定在2017年底前在韩国部署“萨德”系统,估计耗资16亿美元。

In March 2017, the United States began delivery of the first major THAAD components, amid U.S. and South Korean defense officials’ calls for an accelerated deployment schedule in response to increased North Korean missile launches and additional nuclear tests.On April 26, U.S. Forces Korea began delivering major THAAD components to the deployment site and installing them, including the X-band radar, launchers, and interceptors. A week later, U.S. Forces Korea announced that THAAD “is operational and has the ability to intercept North Korean missiles and defend the Republic of Korea.”As of the writing of this report, U.S. and South Korean officials have confirmed the THAAD battery is at initial operating capability with two launchers installed, in addition to the X-band radar and other equipment.

2017年3月,美国开始交付首个THAAD的关键部件,当时美国和韩国国防部官员呼吁加快部署进度,以应对朝鲜逐渐增加的导弹发射实验和核试验。2017年4月26日,驻韩美军开始向部署地点运送主要的THAAD组件——包括x波段雷达、发射器和拦截器——并进行安装。一周后,美国驻韩部队宣布萨德“可以运行,并有能力拦截朝鲜的导弹,保卫大韩民国”。在撰写这份报告时,美国和韩国官员已经确认,萨德的电源系统已经具备初试运行能力,并且除了x波段雷达和其他设备外,两套发射器也已经完成安装。

二 China’s Stated Concerns about THAAD

中国对萨德系统的担忧

China has consistently expressed its strong opposition to THAAD since the initial February 2016 announcement of formal talks between South Korea and the United States. On the day of the announcement, Beijing summoned the South Korean ambassador to China to formally protest the move. Hours after the July 2016 decision to deploy THAAD, Beijing demarched the U.S. and South Korean ambassadors to China to lodge a formal protest and convey its strong disapproval. Beijing has also undertaken an aggressive public campaign to denounce the deployment through official statements and state-run media.

自2016年2月韩国宣布与美国就萨德系统进行正式会谈起,中国一直对此表示强烈反对。在这一消息宣布的当天,中国政府召见了韩国驻华大使,对此举提出正式抗议。2016年7月韩国决定部署“萨德”的几个小时后,北京方面照会了美国和韩国驻华大使并提出正式抗议,对部署萨德表示强烈反对。中国政府还发动了一场声势浩大的公关攻势,通过官方声明和官方媒体谴责萨德的部署。

In the months since the decision to deploy the system was announced, Beijing’s opposition to THAAD has been a consistent theme in official statements, as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone has spoken out against it more than 50 times. Beijing appeared to be intensifying its anti THAAD campaign as the system moved closer to deployment, reflected in the uptick in foreign ministry remarks and heightened rhetoric of Chinese media commentary as well as rising economic retaliation against certain segments of South Korea’s economy. In addition to its own remarks, Chinese officials have issued multiple joint statements with their Russian counterparts expressing opposition to THAAD.

在韩国决定部署萨德系统之后的几个月里,反对萨德系统的部署中国官方声明的一贯主题,因为仅仅中国外交部就发表了50多次声明。随着萨德系统部署的临近,北京方面似乎在加大反对“萨德”的力度,这反映在外交部相关声明的增加和中国媒体评论的高调言论,以及对韩国某些经济领域报复的加剧。除了自己的声明外,中国官员还与俄罗斯一起发表了多次联合声明,对部署“萨德”表示反对。

Beijing’s stated concerns about THAAD include the following:

北京的担忧主要包括以下几个方面:

THAAD’s X-band radar weakens China’s nuclear deterrence: In February 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “The coverage of the THAAD missile defense system in the ROK, especially the monitoring scope of the X-band radar, goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula. It will reach deep into the hinterland of Asia, which will ... directly damage Chinese strategic security interests.” Several Chinese missile defense experts argue that the radar could detect most Chinese missile tests in northeast China and strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles in the western part of the country targeted at the United States. According to Li Bin, a professor at China’s Tsinghua University, the X-band radar allows the United States to detect the radar signature from the back of the warhead and could discern between a real Chinese warhead and a decoy, which would “[undermine] China’s nuclear deterrent capability.”

1 萨德的x波段雷达削弱了中国的核威慑力量:2016年2月,中国外交部长王毅说,“在韩国部署的萨德反导系统,特别是x波段雷达的监测范围,远远超出了朝鲜半岛的防御需求。”它将深入到亚洲腹地,那里将……直接损害中国的战略安全利益。几位中国的反导导弹专家认为,x波段雷达可以探测到中国东北地区的大多数导弹试验,以及位于中国西部地区的,瞄准美国的洲际弹道导弹。根据中国清华大学教授李斌的说法,x波段雷达让美国可以探测到弹头背面的雷达信号,并能分辨出真实弹头和诱饵弹,这将“削弱中国的核威慑能力”。

THAAD provides only minimal defense against North Korean missiles and therefore must be targeted at China: Chinese experts and media commentaries (as well as some in South Korea who oppose THAAD) also argue that THAAD is designed to intercept high-altitude missiles, which would be ineffective against North Korea’s short- and tactical-range missiles that would likely be employed against South Korea. An October 2016 People’s Daily editorial authored by “Zhong Sheng”* asserts that given THAAD’s radar range of 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and minimum intercept altitude of 40 kilometers (25 miles), and accounting for the “geographic environment of the Korean Peninsula,” the system is not a genuine “response to the North Korean threat.”

2萨德对朝鲜的导弹的防御很有限,因此目标肯定是中国:中国专家和媒体评论(以及韩国的一些反对萨德的人)还认为萨德旨在拦截高空导弹,而朝鲜如果攻击韩国用的只是短程战术导弹,萨德并起不了什么作用.2016年10月《人民日报》一片署名“钟声”的社论声称,鉴于萨德雷达的探测范围为2000公里(1243英里),最小拦截高度为40公里(25英里),考虑到“朝鲜半岛的地理环境”,这个系统并不是真正的“对朝鲜威胁的回应”。

THAAD causes instability on the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a regional arms race: In an October 2016 speech to the UN, Ambassador Wang Qun, Director-General of the Arms Control Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “The deployment of global missile defense systems by the U.S. ... will impede the nuclear disarmament process, trigger [a] regional arms race, and escalate military confrontation. Particularly the deployment of the THAAD system ... will in no way ... realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.”36 Other Chinese media commentaries and experts have echoed these concerns and argued that the THAAD deployment will lead to further escalation of tensions and military buildup.37 One month after the announced deployment in July 2016, Fan Gaoyue, a retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior colonel and former researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Science, argued the system will most benefit North Korea by providing a justification for developing new missiles and speeding up development of its nuclear weapons program, among other things.

3. 萨德导致朝鲜半岛的不稳定,并将引起地区军备竞赛:在2016年10月联合国的一次演讲中,中国外交部军控司司长王群大使说,“美国部署全球导弹防御系统……”将阻碍核裁军进程,引发区域军备竞赛,并使军事对抗升级。特别是部署萨德系统……决不会...实现朝鲜半岛无核化,维护半岛和平稳定。其他中国媒体评论和专家也表达了同样的担忧,他们认为,萨德的部署将导致紧张局势以及军事竞赛进一步升级。2016年7月,韩国宣布部署萨德系统之后,樊高月—— 退休的中国人民解放军(PLA)大校兼前中国人民解放军军事科学院研究员——认为,部署萨德最有利于朝鲜,这为其发展新型导弹和加快其核武器项目建设等等提供了很好的借口。

三 China’s Economic Coercion and Other Measures Directed against South Korea
In response to South Korea’s decision to install THAAD, the Chinese government launched an aggressive public campaign of economic retaliation. Since the July 2016 announcement that the THAAD system would be deployed in South Korea, China blocked market access of South Korean goods and services in a range of sectors, including:

三 中国针对韩国的经济制裁和其他措施
作为对韩国决定安装“萨德”的回应,中国政府进行了坚决的的经济报复行动。自2016年7月宣布萨德系统将部署在韩国以来,中国在多个领域阻止了韩国商品和服务的市场准入,包括一下几个方面:

• Entertainment: Shortly after the THAAD announcement, several events featuring South Korean pop music(K-pop) and actors were suspended or cancelled without any explanation. China Central Television(CCTV), a state-owned TV channel, reported that the government’s broadcast regulator had banned the airing of South Korean TV shows, another popular cultural export, effective September 2016. A performance by a South Korean soprano was cancelled in January 2017.South Korean video games were also caught in the dragnet: in March 2017, Chinese regulators stopped granting South Korean online videogames regulatory approvals, essentially banning their sale in China.

1 娱乐业:在宣布“萨德”入韩后不久,韩国流行音乐(K-pop)和韩国演员的几场活动被暂停或取消,没有任何解释。中国中央电视台(CCTV)——中国国有电视台——报道说政府的广播监管机构从2016年9月开始禁播韩剧——另一个韩国出口的流行文化。一位韩国女高音歌唱家的表演在2017年1月被取消。韩国的视频游戏也被牵扯进来:2017年3月,中国监管机构停止了对韩国在线视频游戏的审批,实质上禁止了其在中国的销售。

• Consumer products: In January 2017, Chinese regulators banned the sale of some South Korean products, including certain types of air purifiers, high-tech toilet seats, and cosmetics, citing safety concerns. South Korean exports of food products to China fell 5.6 percent year-on-year in March 2017 as a consequence of retaliatory actions, but exports of South Korean cosmetics jumped in January and February, underscoring their immense popularity in China.Chinese sales of South Korean carmakers Hyundai and Kia dropped percent year-on-year in March 2017 as consumer boycotts hit the brands.

2 消费品:2017年1月,中国监管机构禁止销售部分韩国产品,包括某些类型的空气净化器、高科技马桶座和化妆品,理由是出于安全方面的考虑。由于采取报复行动,韩国对中国的食品出口额在2017年3月同比下降5.6%,但韩国化妆品出口在1月和2月大幅上升,突显出它们在中国的巨大人气。随着消费者的抵制,韩国汽车制造商现代和起亚2017年3月在中国的销量同比下降52%。

• Tourism: Chinese regulators rejected several applications from Korean airlines to add charter flights between the two countries. In March 2017, the Chinese National Tourism Administration ordered travel agencies to stop selling package tours to South Korea. This is a significant hit to South Korea’s tourism industry—according to the Korea Tourism Organization, visitors from China accounted for 47 percent of all tourists and 70 percent of sales at duty free shops in South Korea in 2016. June 2017 data from the Korea Tourism Organization shows only 254,930 Chinese tourists visited South Korea, down from 758,534 in June 2016—a66 percent drop.

3 旅游业:中国监管机构拒绝了韩国航空公司的几份,关于增加两国之间的包机航班的申请。
2017年3月,中国国家旅游局命令旅行社停止出售韩国行旅游套餐。这对韩国旅游业来说是一个巨大的打击——根据韩国旅游发展局( Korea Tourism Organization)的数据,2016年中国游客占了韩国所有游客的47%,中国游客消费额占韩国免税店的销售额的70%。韩国旅游发展局在2017年6月的数据显示,只有254,930名中国游客到韩国旅游,低于2016年6月的758,534人,降幅达66%。

No South Korean company has been more subjected to China’s economic retaliation than Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate.* In November 2016, Lotte agreed to give one of its golf courses to the South Korean government for the THAAD deployment site; in exchange, Lotte received a plot of military-owned land. The next month, Chinese authorities launched an investigation of Lotte operations in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenyang, and Chengdu. In March 2017, construction of a chocolate factory jointly operated by Lotte and Hershey was suspended. That same month, Lotte announced its Chinese website came under a cyberattack from unidentified Chinese hackers (more than two months later the website was finally back online). By early April 2017, Lotte reported that 75 of its 99 Lotte Marts in mainland China had been closed by Chinese regulators for safety violations.These actions were accompanied by Chinese state media editorials attacking Lotte and demanding it reject the land-swap agreement or face economic repercussions.

此外,没有哪一家韩国公司受到的经济报复力度能超过乐天集团。2016年11月,乐天同意将拥有的一个高尔夫球场交给韩国政府,用于部署萨德系统,作为交换,乐天获得了一块由军方拥有的土地。同年12月,中国有关部门对乐天在上海、北京、沈阳和成都的业务展开调查。2017年3月,由乐天和好时联合运营的一家巧克力工厂的建设被叫停。就在同一个月,乐天宣布其中文网站遭到了来自身份不明的中国黑客的网络攻击(两个多月后,该网站才终于重新上线)。乐天在2017年4月出的报告称,其在中国内地的99家乐天超市,有75家因违反安全规定而被中国监管机构关闭。在这些行动的同时,中国官方媒体的社论攻击乐天,要求其拒绝土地互换协议,否则将面临经济制裁。

According to private cyber security experts, Lotte was not the only target of Chinese hackers, with a notable uptick in the number and intensity of intrusions since South Korea said it would deploy THAAD. On April 21, 2017, John Hultquist, director of cyber espionage analysis at FireEye, a U.S. cybersecurity firm, noted in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that “two cyber espionage groups that [FireEye] linked to Beijing’s military and intelligence agencies have launched a variety of attacks against South Korea’s government, military, defense companies and a big conglomerate,” without naming the targets. Mr. Hultquist also said “patriotic Chinese hackers acting independently of the government” have joined the government-led cyber intrusions against South Korea. In a separate interview, Mr. Hultquist noted China uses cyber espionage “pretty regularly” to gather information

根据一位不愿意透露姓名的网络安全专家的说法,乐天并不是中国黑客的唯一目标,自韩国宣布将部署“萨德”以来,黑客入侵的数量和强度都出现了显著上升。2017年4月21日,约翰·胡尔奎斯特——火眼公司(美国一家网络安全公司)的网络间谍分析主任——在接受《华尔街日报》采访时指出,“两个与中国的军事和情报机构有联系的间谍组织,发起了对于韩国政府、军事、国防公司和大企业集团的攻击,“没有明确的目标”,胡尔特奎斯特还说,“独立于政府的爱国的中国黑客”加入了政府主导的针对韩国的网络入侵行动。在另一次采访中,胡尔特奎斯特指出,中国“相当有规律地”利用网络间谍活动收集信息。

China also appears to have used diplomatic levers to punish South Korea. All official interactions between the South Korean and Chinese militaries, including at low levels (such as military academy visits), were reportedly frozen during the second half of 2016. In November 2016, Beijing suspended high-level defense consultations with Seoul and postponed a planned meeting between defense ministers. Organizers of the Boao Forum for Asia, China’s response to the Davos Global Summit, cancelled a March 2017 panel originally scheduled to include South Korea’s trade minister.

中国似乎也利用外交手段来惩罚韩国。据报道,在2016年下半年,韩国与中国军方之间的所有官方互动,包括较低级别的活动(如军事学院访问)都被冻结。2016年11月,中国政府暂停了与韩国的高层防务磋商,并推迟了原定的国防部长会议。中国作为博鳌亚洲论坛——中国版达沃斯全球峰会——的主办者取消了原定于2017年3月举行的由韩国贸易部长参加的会议。

Thus far, South Korea has resisted China’s economic coercion, staying committed to THAAD. In April 2017, South Korea filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese retaliation, citing restrictions on the sale of baby formula and medical equipment. China did not offer a direct response to South Korea’s complaint. When South Korea first lodged an informal complaint with the WTO in March, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman only said, “We support normal business and other exchanges between China and South Korea, but everyone knows this needs a corresponding basis in public opinion.” Seoul may find it challenging to prove Beijing’s actions are deliberate retaliation. The Chinese government has not publicly acknowledged any of its retaliatory actions, citing safety regulations or routine investigations as justifications for various bans. Beijing has also tacitly stoked consumer boycotts of South Korean products, which are rationalized as actions of patriotic Chinese protesting foreign aggression.

到目前为止,韩国一直在承受着中国的经济制裁,坚持部署“萨德”。2017年4月,韩国向世界贸易组织(WTO)提交了一份关于中国经济报复的正式申诉,理由是其婴儿配方奶粉和医疗设备的销售受到限制。中国没有对韩国的抱怨做出直接回应。2017年3月,当韩国首次向WTO提出非正式申诉时,中国外交部女发言人只是表示,“我们支持中韩两国的正常贸易和其他交流,但每个人都知道,这需要在公众舆论中建立相应的基础。”“首尔可能会发现,要证明北京的行动是蓄意报复,这是一件很有挑战性的事情。”中国政府没有公开承认任何报复行动,只是用安全规定或例行检查来为中国各种禁令打幌子。中国政府还暗中煽动了消费者对韩国产品的抵制,这些活动被称作爱国人士抗议外国挑衅的行为,从而变得合理化。

With the election of President Moon in May 2017, signs that China’s retaliation against South Korea is easing started to appear. Although nearly all Lotte Mart stores remain closed, three South Korean musicals were scheduled as early as June, and K-pop music became available again on QQ Music, one of China’s biggest music streaming sites.81 Chinese budget airline Spring Airlines said it would restore flights to South Korea, while South Korean carriers are reportedly preparing for a return of Chinese travelers.82 Nonetheless, during the Commission’s trip to Seoul in May 2017, some South Korean interlocutors expressed concerns about China’s continued use of economic coercion against South Korea.

随着2017年5月韩国总统大选月的到来,有迹象显示中国开始减缓对韩国的报复行动。尽管几乎所有的乐天百货商店仍然出于关门歇业状态,但三部韩国音乐剧预计最早于6月上演,而在QQ音乐——中国最大的音乐流媒体之一 ——上又可以听韩国流行音乐了。中国廉价航空公司春秋航空表示,将恢复飞往韩国的航班,而据报道,韩国航空公司正准备迎接中国游客的回归。尽管如此,在本委员会(译者注:撰写该报告的委员会)于2017年5月访问首尔期间,一些韩国的谈判人员仍然担心中国会继续制裁韩国。

South Korea’s economic dependence on China makes it particularly vulnerable to retaliation. China is South Korea’s largest export market: China has, on average, accounted for about 25 percent of South Korea’s annual exports over the past decade (see Appendix Table 1).89 In 2016, South Korean exports to China reached $124 billion, nearly twice as much as exports to the United States, South Korea’s second-biggest export market.90 Such economic leverage means a prolonged clash would be very problematic for South Korea. At the same time, China’s reliance
on exports from South Korea has been declining since 2014.91 Part of the reason for this decline—independent of any political motivations—is the changing nature of China’s domestic manufacturers, which are increasingly

韩国对中国的经济依赖使其特别容易受到报复。中国是韩国最大的出口市场:在过去的十年里,中国市场几乎平均占据了韩国出口总额的25%。2016年,韩国对中国的出口达到1240亿美元,是对美国——韩国的第二大出口市场——出口额的2倍左右。这样的经济影响力意味着长期的冲突对韩国来说将会导致很大的问题。与此同时,中国对韩国进口品的依赖度自2014年一直在下降。这种依赖度的下降——与任何政治动机无关——部分是中国国内制造商不断在改变,并且越来越明显。