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[精华推荐] 【卡内基国际和平基金会】中国,强大的异常国家
2013-03-17 fenzlie 40917 37 1
文章简介
中国正在提升的经济影响力已受到了全世界领导人的急切关注.但是北京是一个非常规的巨大力量.它国际力量的潜能正在被国内重大的经济问题压抑,而对外界似乎不怎么关心的中国领导层还没有建立一个灵活且有建设性的国际态势.随着中国经济的常规化,它的成长期问题将逐渐暴露出来.所有的这些问题都将导致中国周边国家不安全感的增加.
正文内容

China, the Abnormal Great Power

中国,强大的异常国家



【日期】2013年3月5日

【原文链接】http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/05/china-abnormal-great-power/fo53

【素材链接】http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-149606-1-3.html (文章取自素材区,感谢灰色空间提供的素材;文章很长,水平有限,分段分时翻译,难免有误,还望见谅)

China’s rising economic influence has leaders around the world on the edge of their seats. But Beijing is an abnormal great power. Its international potential is constrained by significant domestic economic vulnerabilities, and the inward-looking Chinese leadership has yet to craft a nimble and constructive international posture. And as the Chinese economy normalizes, its growing pains are laid bare. All this has the effect of elevating risks and aggravating insecurities in China’s neighborhood and beyond.

中国正在提升的经济影响力已受到了全世界领导人的急切关注.但是北京是一个非常规的巨大力量.它国际力量的潜能正在被国内重大的经济问题压抑,而对外界似乎不怎么关心的中国领导层还没有建立一个灵活且有建设性的国际态势.随着中国经济的常规化,它的成长期问题将逐渐暴露出来.所有的这些问题都将导致中国周边国家不安全感的增加.

This is not the path many hoped Beijing would follow. As China became a global economic power, expectations were raised that it would act as a responsible stakeholder, as Robert Zoellick put it when he was U.S. deputy secretary of state. Beijing, it was hoped, would help shape the international agenda—consistent with norms largely established by the West—rather than continue to adhere to long-established national interests. And indeed, Beijing seemed headed that way.

这并非是许多人所期望的北京所走的路线.正如美国曾经的副国务卿Robert Zoellick在位时所说那样,随着中国成长为一个全球性的经济力量,外界也期待其成为一个负责任的利益相关者.北京被期望能按照西方已建立的国际规范行事,而不是继续坚持多年来的以国家利益为导向的行为准则.

As far back as April 1974, the Chinese leadership was avowing its peaceful intentions. Deng Xiaoping, in a special address to the UN General Assembly, declared that “China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one. If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.” In 2003, the Communist Party’s theorist Zheng Bijian echoed the sentiment, explaining that China’s economic ascendancy should be seen as a “peaceful development” that posed little threat to its neighbors but offered many benefits to the world at large.

回到1974年的4月份,中国领导层对外宣布了他们和平的意向.邓小平,在联合国大会上发言,声称"中国现在不是,将来也不做超级大国。如果中国有朝一日变了颜色,变成一个超级大国,也在世界上称霸,到处欺负人家,侵略人家,剥削人家,那么,世界人民就应当揭露它,反对它,并且同中国人民一道,打倒它。"在2003年,中共的理论研究员郑必坚援引了这一观点,解释中国的经济优势应该被看作为"和平崛起",对它的邻居并不构成威胁,同时为世界作出积极贡献.

But expectations were clearly unrealistic. China’s remarkable economic progress has encouraged Beijing to become more rather than less confrontational. Most observers see a diminished likelihood of China playing a positive role in global affairs. The discussion is now about how rising nationalism and related security interests have hardened China’s foreign policy positions. This has created the impression—arguably unfair at times—that Beijing is more inclined to use its economic clout to advance core interests than to strengthen political relationships.

但是这些期望都是明显不合实际的.中国显著的经济进步已使北京变得越来越自信.大部分观察者发现北京在全球事务上扮演积极角色的可能性正在减弱.现在的争议在于中国日益高涨的国家民族主义与相关安全利益是如何驱使北京在对外政治立场上变得越来越强硬.但是,北京现在更乐意于利用它的经济优势来推进核心利益而非加强政治关系,而此时对中国作出这种过早的判断也是不公平的.

While the country is criticized for becoming more assertive, aggressive, and bullying, in reality it should be seen as being too reactive.

虽然中国被批评为越来越专断,且具侵略性,侍强凌弱,事实上它应该被视为太忙于应付。

China’s position stems in part from the fact that the leadership in Beijing feels the need to get its own house in order before forging its international path. Beijing is an emerging great power trying to escape the middle-income trap—domestic wages have risen so China is no longer the least expensive producer of low-cost goods, but it still cannot compete effectively with technologically more advanced countries. China also faces particular impediments that were not present for other rising states. And in transitioning to a slower but more normal growth trajectory, instability and risks have emerged. Thus, contrary to expectations, its economic successes do not translate necessarily into greater self-confidence at this stage in its development.

中国现在的立场部分源于她的领导层认为在锻造国际关系时需要先保证国内秩序.北京是一个新兴大国,随着国内工资的上升,她正在努力逃出或避免中等收入陷阱,所以中国很快将不再仅仅是廉价商品的最便宜制造商了,虽然她现在仍然无法与技术更先进的国家进行有效地竞争.而且中国还面临着许多其它正在崛起的国家所没有的特定的障碍.在她过渡到一个发展慢一些但更加平稳的增长轨迹之前,不稳定性与各种风险并存.因此,与期望恰恰相反,在现在这个发展阶段中国的经济成功并不会必然给她带来更多的自信.

Traditionally, Beijing has sought to bide its time in dealing with many sensitive geopolitical issues, preferring to build up its capabilities and wait for a favorable shift in the balance of power. But in many cases, events have forced it to act earlier than it would have liked. This reactive posture is often not well thought through and is potentially self-defeating.

习惯上,北京正在试图等待时机以解决那些敏感的地缘政治问题,更宁愿积累自己的实力同时等待力量平衡的转变.但是在很多问题上,突发事件的发生强迫她过早的处理这些问题,此时她的反应往往并非是经过深思熟虑的而且很有可能会弄巧成拙.

Many areas of friction have emerged as a result of these tendencies, including emotionally charged claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. But these reactive stances emanate from a wider set of issues, including trade and investment flows, intellectual property rights violations, interactions with “rogue” regimes, and other geopolitical concerns.

很多领域的摩擦正随着这一趋势逐渐暴露出来,包括对钓鱼/Senkaku岛充满感情色彩的领土主张.但是这些立场的反映会引发更加广泛的影响,包括交易与投资流动,知识产权侵犯,与流氓政权的交互,以及其它一些地缘政治的担忧.

These tensions are manageable. Beijing will soon be forced to take a more nimble and practical outward view—a reactive posture is counterproductive. In the meantime, both China and the United States in particular should focus on building their relationship in the economic realm and on developing more inclusive international policies.

这些紧张局势是可以控制的.北京将很快被迫采用更加灵活与实际的视角 --- 现在过度的反应正是适得其反.同时,特别是中美应该努力在经济领域建立他们的关系,从而向更具包容性的国际政策发展.

BECOMING A NORMAL ECONOMY BUT ABNORMAL GREAT POWER

北京,一个拥有正常经济却力量非常的国家

China’s rapid economic rise has pushed it into the unique position of becoming a superpower earlier than expected or intended. The country has had startling economic success, moving from low- to upper-middle-income status and lifting some 600 million Chinese out of poverty in only three decades. Some see Beijing as being able to exercise considerable influence, but in reality, its ability to do so is limited.

中国快速发展的经济正将其 比其期望或意图更快地 推进成为一个超级大国.这个国家已取得了惊人的经济成就,完成了从低收入到中高等收入状态的转变,在仅仅三十年内使约6亿中国人脱离贫困状态.有些人认为北京已可以对外施加强大的影响力,但实际上,它的能力还相当有限.

In transitioning from central planning, China’s institutional base and experience in dealing with sensitive global issues lag well behind its impressive economic achievements, placing it at a disadvantage in working with other major powers. And part of the cost of becoming a more “normal” economy is slowing growth and increased vulnerability to global economic cycles.

在中央计划中的转变过程中,中国处理全球敏感事务的制度基础和经验与她取得的经济成就相比十分不足,这使得她在与其它大国共事时显得不利.而且作为经济转变"正常"的部分代价就是经济增长减速以及面对全球经济周期的脆弱性增加.

Beijing is facing a bumpy road ahead. The country will no longer be able to maintain stability by controlling key economic prices, such as interest and exchange rates, and limiting capital movements. Liberalization in the context of internationalizing the renminbi naturally involves greater exposure and risks.

北京前路崎岖.它将很快无法仅仅通过控制关键经济指数来保持稳定,比如说利息和汇率,以及限制资本流动.在人民币国际化的大背景下,放宽措施会自然而然的带来更大的风险.

And this prospect has only exacerbated anxieties within the Chinese leadership. Those concerns then spill over into foreign policy decisions aimed at diverting attention away from domestic problems to real or imagined threats abroad.

这种前景只会给中国的领导层增加焦虑.于是那些担心便渗入到外交政策决策中,旨在把国内问题的关注转移到真实或想象的国外威胁中去.

Adding to the pressure on the leadership to bring stability and success to China is the country’s long history. China as a great power will be an “abnormal” great power compared with the United States, Japan, and the major European economies. Unlike the others, whose ascendancy represented a broadly continuous and lengthy process, China is unique in being a returning great power—one that accounted for 30 percent of global production two centuries ago but saw its share fall to less than 5 percent by 1950. Even today, after three decades of double-digit growth, its share at 15 percent is only half of what it once was.

中国人自很长一段历史以来,习惯于把带领国家走向稳定与繁荣的责任加诸在领导层上.与美国,日本和欧元区相比,中国做为一个大国显得更加的"非常规"性.不像那些优势时间长且连贯国家或集团那样,中国是唯一一个重返国际舞台的大国,是一个两世纪前占全球生产力30%但是眼睁睁看着自己生产力衰落到1950年只剩5%的国家.即便在今天,经过三十年的两位数增长,她目前的生产力全球占比也仅为辉煌时期的一半而已.

Moreover, despite its economic resurgence, China’s ability to escape the middle-income trap is not a foregone conclusion. Only a handful of middle-income countries have made the transition to high-income status in the past quarter century, and none of them had China’s formidable handicaps.

但是,尽管经济正在复苏,中国能否跳过中等收入陷阱还是个未知数.在过去四分之一世纪中,只有少数中等收入国家完成了向高等收入国家的转换,而这些国家都没有目前中国所面临的强大的阻碍.

Foremost among these challenges is that China will become old before it becomes rich. Its working-age labor force is shrinking, and the needs of the elderly represent a major financial burden. Many observers do not realize how relatively poor China is, with a per capita income ranking only around 90th internationally. Even by 2030, only about 10 percent of China’s population will be seen as relatively well off (defined as within the top decile of global incomes) compared with about 90 percent of the population in the United States.

在这些危机与挑战之中最先出现的表现形式之一就是中国正在变老,却还没有变富.她的劳动力正在缩减,而人口的老龄化代表着巨大的经济负担.许多观察者并没有意识到中国还是一个十分相对贫困的国家,她的人均收入水平国际排名仅为90位.即便到2030年,中国也只有约10%的人口可以到达相对富裕水平(即达到全球前十人均),相较于美国90%的人口.

With a legacy to live up to and domestic issues to overcome, China remains inward looking. And that stance has affected its relationships with the outside world. Tensions have arisen in a number of areas as the Chinese leadership attempts to balance its internal struggles with an evolving international order that waits for no one.

背负着远大的目标的同时面对着大量需要克服的国内问题,中国一直保持着内省.这种立场也已影响到了她与外在世界的关系.现在,中国领导层正试图平息或平衡国内斗争,而与此同时,世界上数个地区局势升级,国际秩序正不断发展且不会等待任何人.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT TENSIONS

贸易与投资紧张

For much of the last decade, friction with China has been most often reflected in trade issues. Headline criticism focuses on complaints that Beijing manipulates the exchange rate and unfairly subsidizes exporters. Since accession to the WTO in 2001, China has become the number-one target for complaints filed by the United States and Europe. But this situation has to do with China’s approach to development, not aggressive Chinese policies meant to bully the rest of the world.

在过去十年的大部分时间里,与中国的摩擦通常反映在贸易问题上.主流的批评者注意力一般放在北京操纵汇率和不公平的补贴出口商上.自2001年进入WTO后,中国已变成美国和欧洲申诉的主要目标.但是这种情况其实只是与中国的发展方式有关,而非是中国制定了侵略性的政策来欺负整个世界.

Increased litigiousness against China does not jibe with the country’s decreasing trade surplus, which has fallen sharply to around 2 percent of its GDP from a high of 8 percent five years ago. Nevertheless, trade tensions with the West persist because of China’s unique position in the East Asian production-sharing network. Components produced by its neighbors are shipped to China for assembly and final export largely to the United States and Europe. China actually benefits much less financially but bears the brunt of trade tensions with the West that should in theory be shared with others in Asia.

对中国的申诉的增加与这个国家的贸易顺差的减少这两个现象并不是相符的,尤其是在中国的出口GDP占比已从5年前的8%迅速的降到现在的2%.然而,与西方国家贸易的紧张其实是因为中国在东亚生产网络中独特的地位产生的.商品的组件在中国的周边国家那里生产后运往中国,然后在经过装配后最终出口运往美国与欧洲.中国在整个利益链条中获利占比其实相当有限,却承受着与西方贸易紧张关系的主要冲击.这些冲击其实是应该分散到整个亚洲国家的.

Beijing’s development strategy has been focused on export-oriented investment. Its economic success has been facilitated by its rapid assimilation of foreign technology through direct investments of multinationals and reverse engineering. This strategy helped propel China from a poor country to middle-income status.

北京发展的战略集中于外向型投资.她经济的成功也得利于对国外技术的急速吸取(主要来源于直接投资的跨国公司及逆向工程).这一战略帮助中国完成了从贫穷国家到中等收入国家的转变.

But the reality is that such an approach will be less helpful in the future. The country now faces the challenge of producing more sophisticated components that rely on indigenous technology. This structural transition will further raise tensions in the region as China begins to compete with more developed Asian economies as well as the United States and Europe. This is evidenced by recent U.S. and European complaints against China’s production of solar cells and wind turbine equipment.

但是现实是这样的实现方式在未来必然得不到多少帮助.这个国家现在正面临使用本土技术来生产精密部件的挑战.这种结构的转变会加速提升中国与美国和欧洲的紧张关系,就如同中国以前与比她发达的亚洲经济体进行竞争时那样.最典型最近的一个例子就是美国和欧洲投诉中国的太阳能电池和风力涡轮机设备.

Moreover, China is increasingly under attack for promoting indigenous innovation through forced technology transfers or theft. Here, China’s rise directly influences perceptions about its behavior as an international stakeholder as it grapples with implementing wide-ranging structural and legal transformations that are required to improve the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

此外,中国通过强制技术转让或盗窃来提升自主创新能力的这种做法也越来越受到别人的攻击.而且,中国的崛起直接影响她被看做一个国际利益的相关者,但同时她还疲于应付于实现国内广泛的结构与法律转型,从而提升知识产权法的执行.

And the qualitative importance of foreign direct investment to the Chinese economy is falling. Beijing wants instead to tap expertise abroad through direct investment in foreign ventures. But there too, China has problems.

而且对中国来说非常重要的国外直接投资正在下降.北京希望能由国外直接投资方式转为与国外企业合作模式,即合资企业.但是这样中国一样也会遇到困难.

Beijing’s efforts are often subject to security restrictions in destination countries. That was demonstrated recently in a congressional report that raised still-to-be-substantiated national security concerns about Huawei Technologies and ZTE, two large Chinese telecommunications companies. These suspicions were based largely on the companies’ presumed connections to the Chinese government.

中国在目标国家的努力往往受制于安全限制.最近的一个例子就是国会报告提出的未被证明的的国家安全威胁,即华为科技和中兴,两个中国的大型通讯公司.这些猜疑大多建立在假定这两个公司与中国政府相关连的基础之上.

These incidents only accentuate the image that China cannot be trusted, making it all the more difficult to nurture the vision of it becoming a responsible stakeholder.

这些事件只是在强调中国不可以被相信的形象,从而使中国更难于建立起自己负责任的大国形象.

RESOURCE NEEDS, ROGUE STATES

资源需求, 流氓国家

Further complicating matters is a major component of China’s overseas investment strategy: the search for new energy sources and natural resources. China’s overseas investments and aid flows now dwarf the amounts coming from all other multilateral and bilateral donors. That strategy, too, is not without drawbacks.

一个比较复杂的事情是中国在海外投资战略的一个主要组成部分:对能源和自然资源的寻求.中国的海外投资和援助使所有其他多边和双边捐助者的数量变小了.这个战略同样,也不是没有缺点的.

A hostile reception and burdensome regulations in more developed countries have led China to turn to markets portrayed in some cases as “rogue” states to power its growth engine. In doing business with these regimes, Beijing has at times evaded or failed to actively implement sanctions—a policy that has attracted criticism. Its export-financing terms are seen as undercutting OECD guidelines. And because China abides by principles of noninterference and respects the wishes of host governments, an oft-cited complaint is that China does not adhere to established international norms and ignores the sensitivities of affected local communities.

在发达国家充满敌意的接待与繁锁的规则使得中国开始为了增强经济引擎而转向那些被称为"流氓"的国家的市场.为了跟这些体制做生意,北京有时便逃避或未能积极地实施制裁,这又是一个受到攻击的政策.她的融资条款被视为正在削弱经合组织的指导方针.而且由于中国实行的不干涉内政以及尊重主权政府原则,一个经常被提及的抱怨就是中国从不遵守现有的国际准则和忽略对某些地区施加影响的敏感性.

But this policy is unlikely to change in the near future, which means the negative effects of China’s approach are likely to persist. Its voracious appetite for securing these resources abroad will not diminish because its industrial structure will remain heavily resource intensive for the rest of this decade. Energy consumption will continue to increase as more Chinese are lifted into the middle class. This pattern will not be mitigated by recent efforts to develop renewable energy sources, and unlike the United States, China is much further behind in being able to exploit its shale-oil deposits.

但是在可视的将来这一政策并不会改变,这意味着此政策对中国的消极影响将一直持续.在本十年内,它对海外资源贪婪的食欲将不会变小,因为她的产业结构将保持对资源密集型产业的严重依赖.而且随着越来越多的中国人进入中产阶级,中国消耗的能源也将持续增加.这一模式也不会被发展可再生能源而缓解,而且不像美国,中国离开发自身页岩油的能力还差得远.

DIFFERING TIME PERSPECTIVES ON GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES

不同时间视角的地缘政治问题

Still, the most visceral global reactions to China’s perceived assertiveness come from interactions that are seen as impacting America’s security and humanitarian interests and that are shared to varying degrees by other Asian countries and the EU. China’s real intentions in supporting the six-party talks on North Korea, for example, are questioned. Taiwan is a continuing point of contention with the United States, and Beijing’s position on Tibet attracts emotionally tinged criticism from many quarters.

尽管如此,对中国的自信全球最发自本能的的反应在于她与美国安全和人道主义利益所产生的冲突上,而美国的这一利益与其它亚洲国家和欧洲是不同程度共享的.比如说,中国支持朝鲜的六方会谈的真实意图被质疑.台湾是中国与美国不断的一个争执点,而且北京在XZ的角色受到了许多地方出于情感的批评.

On these geopolitical issues, China has been firm in supporting its long-standing principle of noninterference shaped by concerns of how the West might one day target China. But the interactions are also influenced by differing concepts of time. In such disputes, China has preferred to put off addressing the issue. This approach reflects its belief that many sensitive issues such as Taiwan will resolve themselves over time without the need for confrontation or that waiting will promote better outcomes.

在这些地缘政治问题里,中国强硬地强调它长期存在的不干涉它国内政原则,并发展为对西方有一天也许会以中国为目标这一担心.但是这种交互实际上是受双方不同时间观念的影响.在这种类似的纠纷中,中国更乐于推迟解决问题.这种方式其实反映了她相信许多敏感问题比如说台湾问题会随着时间流逝,无需冲突而自行解决,或者等待将有利于形成更好的结果.

Political differences between China and Western powers only heighten this divergence, as democracies like the United States with frequent election cycles tend to think of policy implications in terms of years while China’s leaders consider policy choices more in generations. In the North Korean example, both China and the West have a shared interest in a stable, non-nuclear state. But China is reluctant to put pressure on Pyongyang now because it hopes North Korea will eventually become a more reasonable country that can still act as a socialist buffer state. Beijing believes this waiting game will better serve its long-term interests.

中国与西方国家政治见解的不同只会加深双方的分歧,比如说民主国家像美国这样拥有较短的选举周期,它的领导层更趋向于以年为单位来考虑政策,而中国的领导层在决定政策时通常会考虑几代人.比如说朝鲜,中国和西方都需要一个平稳的无核的朝鲜.但是中国现在并不情愿向平壤施加压力因为它仍然希望朝鲜能够最终变成一个正当的社会主义过渡国家.北京认为这时等待更符合它的长期利益.

But events have often forced China to react before it really wanted to. The result is that its actions may not be well considered. This stance harms China’s image as a responsible stakeholder if others see it as being deliberately uncooperative.

但是事态发展总是逼迫中国去过早的作出反应.结果导致她的许多行动并没有深思熟虑.这种立场会导致中国负责任的大国形象受损,如果其它人认为她是故意不合作.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND SHIFTING ASIAN ALLIANCES

领土纠纷和变换的亚洲联盟

Deng’s admonition that China should avoid getting involved in external issues remains a guiding principle for Beijing. But if the actions of others are seen as jeopardizing China’s longer-term interests, the Chinese leadership may feel that its decades-old posture is no longer tenable and presents risks for both sides. In this context, defending its interests is not seen by China as being more assertive but rather as ensuring that the country can move forward on its “rightful path” at the right time. This becomes very clear in the context of ongoing territorial disputes, such as the conflict over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands that both China and Japan claim as their own, and in China’s response to America’s return to Asia.

邓的"中国应避免卷入到外部纠纷之中"这一警告在今天的北京仍是一个指导性的原则.但当其它人的行为损害到中国的长期利益时,中国的领导层也许会感觉到自己坚持了几十年的原则已难以为继,并会为双边关系带来风险.在这个背景下,中国为捍卫自己的利益而作出的行动是不会被认为是侵略,而是为了这个国家在正确的时间走向"正确的方向"所作出的努力.随着领土争端的越演越烈,这一点正变得越来越明显,比如说中日之间关于钓鱼岛的冲突,还有中国对美国回返亚太的应对上也可以看出.

A decade ago, China presented itself as a source of support for its neighbors that felt the West had abandoned them amid an Asian financial crisis. With reassuring visits by its senior leaders paired with offers of economic assistance both directly and through regional frameworks, China’s top leaders demonstrated a skillful use of soft power in the first half of the last decade. It contrasted favorably with America’s neglect of its traditional interests in Asia. But territorial disputes and more aggressive fishing ventures in the South China Sea and the waters between China and Japan have squandered this goodwill and caused many in the region to welcome an expanded U.S. role in Asia to counterbalance China’s influence.

十年以前,中国在亚洲邻居中的形象更像是一个有力的后援,帮助这些被西方抛弃的国家挺过金融危机.可靠的高层间互相访问,还有大量的直接或通过区域框架的经济援助,在过去十年的前五年中国的高层巧妙的利用了自身的软实力.对比美国对亚洲的忽视,这些行为展现良好.但是在南中国海的领土争端以及积极的渔业项目,还有中日之间的东海争端已摧毁了这一形象.而且导致这一地区许多地方欢迎美国战略重返亚洲,从而抗衡中国的影响.

China is also deeply suspicious about America’s intentions in launching its much-heralded “pivot” or rebalancing toward Asia, which Beijing has interpreted as attempted containment of Chinese power. Such a move calls into question Washington’s willingness to provide more space for a rising China. The aggressive way that America has been pushing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with a host of Asian countries is a case in point. There is little logic in a major regional trade and investment agreement that does not include the region’s largest trader and investor. Yet, the conditions of the TPP gave China no choice but to eschew membership.

中国同时对美国大肆宣扬所谓的"亚洲轴心"或亚洲局势再平衡抱有深深地猜疑,中国已把此行动解读为对中国力量的遏制,最终发展为质疑华盛顿是否愿意为中国的崛起提供更多更足够的空间.而美国推动与一大堆亚洲国家建立泛太平洋伙伴关系协定这一咄咄逼人的举动也是个非常明显的例子.一个的区域贸易和投资协议却没有包含这一地区最大的交易和投资者,这根本不合理.毕竟,中国根本不可能满足TPP(泛太平洋伙伴关系协定)的加入条件.

China has also taken a strong stance in territorial disputes. Its response has been seen as a sign of rising nationalism fueling increased assertiveness abroad. But it can also be seen as a knee-jerk reaction to what Beijing sees as the provocative acts of others. Nationalism is on the rise not only in China but also in Japan and elsewhere in the region.

中国在领土纠纷中的立场也十分的强硬.她的反应被看作是日益增长的国家民族主义推动的对外自信.但是也可以看作为北京对待它人挑衅行为时的下意识反应.国家民族主义不光在中国,在日本和这一地区的其它地方也在不断上升.

Domestic economic development also plays a role in island disputes. Lagging ASEAN countries have pressing energy and other resource needs and often look to these territories and their surrounding waters for oil and seafood.

国内的经济发展在岛屿争端中也扮演着一个角色.这些落后的亚洲国家对能源和其它资源有着紧迫的需求,从而经常把目光投向这些领土与其周边水域中的石油和海产.

The shifting power balance between Japan and China has also dragged long-standing territorial disputes to the fore. More naval equipment and nonmilitary boats from both sides are being deployed in the region—some acting independently of Beijing—and private fishing operations roam further afield as domestic consumption has soared with rising incomes. Such moves heighten the risk of accidental collisions or other incidents that could ignite conflict in the region.

在国家力量上逐渐失衡的中日双方也已把他们长期存在的岛屿争端摆到了台面上.更多的海军和非军事船只出现在这一地区,其中一些是与北京无关的,比如说随着国内消费水平的增加,私人捕鱼也在利益驱使下逐渐移向更加深远的核心区域.其中有些类似的行动增加了该地区产生冲突的风险.

China is not necessarily the aggressor in all of these conflicts. But it can be seen as being guilty of not staking out more clearly in advance what it would tolerate and thus encouraging others to become more aggressive. For example, China viewed Japan’s move in 2012 to purchase some of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a provocative attempt to nationalize the territory—even if Tokyo’s intentions were more benign. When pressed in that way, China responded with more forceful measures to establish firmer goalposts. While in the past Beijing may have expressed its unhappiness with a statement or a diplomatic cable, it now has enough weight to act.

在所有的这些冲突中,中国并非一定是惹事生非者.但是她没有事先宣扬她所能容忍的底线这一行为是有问题的,这会鼓励其它国家变得更加具有侵略性(在岛屿领土争端上).比如说,中国将日本政府在2012年的购岛行动视作为钓鱼岛国有化的挑衅行为,即便东京在这一事件中的出发点是好的.当事件被解读为对抗时,中国只能采取更加强有力的措施来增强她对争议地区的立场.如果是过去的话,北京可能也就发表一个不满的声明或一封外交电报,但是现在,她已有足够的力量来作出更有力的回应.

ENGAGING AN ABNORMAL GREAT POWER

同一个异常的大国接触

But China does not see itself as an unstoppable economic juggernaut. Chinese leaders see a country with deeply ingrained national interests and an economy faced with significant challenges and vulnerabilities that constrain its behavior on the international stage.

但是中国并不将其自身视作为一个不可阻挡的经济力量.中国的领导者从三种不同的角度审视自己的国家,大量的影响深远的根深蒂固的国家利益,以及一个面临重大挑战的经济体,还有对其在国际舞台上发挥力量的种种束缚.

A slowing growth trajectory, weakened ability to tap export surpluses, declining access to technology transfers, qualitatively less significant inflows of foreign direct investment, and sustainable growth demands are all issues China must address as it tries to transition from a middle-income to an advanced economy. China also recognizes the reality that if it ever succumbs to a major economic crisis, adequate financial support from the global community is unlikely to materialize not only because of its sheer size but also because of differences in shared values with the other major powers.

一个缓慢增长的国家,会削弱它减少贸易顺差的能力,会在技术转让(发达国家对不发达国家的)中陷入衰弱,会显著减少外部渠道的资金流入,而中国所要解决的可持续增长的问题正是她要如何从一个中等收入国家转换为一个高等收入国家的难题.而且中国也意识到一旦她自身发生严重的经济危机,在全球范围内任何力量能给予其有效援助的可能性都十分之低,不仅仅因为她自身庞大的体格,同时也因为她与其它国家价值观上的不同.

But biding time until circumstances become more favorable is not a workable option for China if the actions of others force an earlier-than-desired reaction. Beijing believes that responding aggressively will forestall future disputes, but such behavior has only increased tensions with regional partners and drawn the United States into establishing a greater presence in the region—both unanticipated results of a self-defeating strategy.

但是时机并不是靠忍耐或等待而来的,尤其是其它国家的行动也会对其造成影响,逼迫其不得不提前反应.北京相信强硬地回应会避免未来的争端,但是这样的行为只会增长她与区域内伙伴的紧张关系,同时强化美国在该地区的存在感,这都是由这种搬石砸脚的战略产生的没有预料到的结果.

A stance of engagement, reaching out, and seeking compromise with due consideration of the interests of others in region would serve China better.

一个基于承诺的,姿态放宽的,并在地区利益中与它人寻求妥协的立场,对中国来说效果会更好.

Of course, China cannot be expected to follow the international consensus when this harms its own interests—that can be expected of no great power, including the United States. And thus far, China has largely been an outsider to an international system built by the West. It does not see itself as part of the system or bound by its rules.

当然,中国不会被期望于遵守国际共识,尤其是当这些共识损害了她的利益时,你不能期望任何强国因所谓的国际共识而使自己的利益受损,包括美国.迄今为止,中国对西方建立的国际体系来讲越来越一个局外人.她不将自己视为该体系中的一员或认为自己需要受其约束.

In an ideal world, China would not be seen as a threat to be contained but as a strategic competitor that can be brought in as a partner when needed to help reduce tensions and ensure more constructive outcomes on global issues of a particularly sensitive nature. Providing China with more say in dealing with these issues might encourage a more cooperative relationship with the West.

在一个理想的世界中,中国将不会被视为一个需要控制的威胁,而是一个战略上的竞争对手,从而能被视作为一个合作伙伴,在全球范围内的敏感事务中,协助降低紧张局势和确保富建设性的国际成果.在处理这些事务中给予中国更多的发言权或许能够鼓励其变得与西方合作.

This will require greater openness on the part of both China and the United States in particular. And the two powers should concentrate on promoting cooperative commercial relations, which will help them avoid fueling tensions over hot-button issues like sovereignty.

但是这将要求中国和美国变得更加开放,尤其是后者.这两个国家应该集中精力于促进合作与交流,从而帮助他们避免在热点问题上引发紧张局势,比如说主权问题.

Beijing can start by taking the lead in supporting open markets and fighting protectionism. It would help China counter criticisms of its trade practices and put pressure on the United States and other developed countries that are moving in the direction of more protectionism. And supporting an open-trading system for commodities makes sense for China given that it is vulnerable to cuts in food imports during periods of scarcity.

北京可以开始于提供一个开放的市场和与保护主义作斗争.这会帮助中国解决她在贸易中受到的批评问题,从而向美国和其它发达国家施加压力,避免他们继续走入更强的保护主义.而提供一个开放的交易体系使得中国不会在物品稀缺时期受到食品短缺之类的问题.

As it seeks to increase its outbound investment, China also needs to support a level playing field. More open capital markets and bilateral and multilateral investment agreements can help ensure appropriate treatment and provide more flexibility to address security concerns. China needs to be sensitive to international norms about its use of aid money, but the West can also learn from China’s more efficient use of assistance for infrastructure investments.

当她开始寻求增加对外投资时,中国同时需要支撑一个公平的竞争环境.开放更多的国家资本市场,签署更多的双边或多边的贸易协定,以上这些都可以帮助确保制定合适的方案以及为区域安全问题提供更多的灵活性.中国在对外援助金方面需要对国际规范保持敏感性,虽然西方也需要学习一下中国对外更具实效的投资援助.

Efforts to be more inclusive should extend to the U.S. pivot. The TPP should have been made more flexible so that China would see itself as having a stake in constructing a productive outcome rather than seeing little to be gained by being included. That lesson should be learned and applied to future trade deals.

美国轴心方面也应提供更具包容性的政策.比如说泛太平洋伙伴协议应该具有更加的灵活性,从而中国能够把它自己看做成为其中的参与者,从而构造一个更富成效的效果.而不是让中国感到即便加入也收效甚微.这个教训应该学会并应用于将来的贸易条约.

Given the charged nature of sovereignty disputes, China and other Asian claimants might be well served by setting aside this question and focusing on narrow confidence-building measures or negotiating less troublesome resource rights, perhaps on the model of Taiwan’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. The United States should avoid making commitments that destabilize the situation and appear to favor one claimant over others.

在充满紧张气氛的主权纷争方面,中国和其它亚洲国家也许应该学会暂时避开这些问题,集中精力建立一个狭小范围内的互信机制或先用谈判来解决一些目前谈判可以解决的资源问题,也许就像台湾的东海和平倡议一样.而美国应该避免随意做出不利于局势和缓的承诺,还有要尽量在这些纠纷中不倾向于任何一方.

And because the disputes are complex, with multiple claims and overlapping interests, China should recognize that multilateral approaches involving the most concerned regional parties as well as other interests or advisory groups can help achieve fairer and more inclusive solutions—a consistent goal in China’s history of international relations.

然后,因为这些纠纷大多都是十分复杂的,伴随着众多主张与重叠利益,中国应该意识到建立一个包含热点地区所有纠纷者以及其它利益有关方和咨询小组的多边框架有利于实现或提供一个更公平、更包容的解决方案.这同样也符合中国历史对外关系的一贯做法.

A reactive China is helping neither itself nor others. The United States and other major powers should take pains to stress the benefits of more active participation in shaping the international agenda as China enters a riskier period of economic transition. Harsh rhetoric and actions that are perceived as attempts to contain China’s development will not be helpful, but reaching out and constructing sensible solutions would be wise policy for Washington. The key is convincing Beijing that its interests are best served by forging solutions now, showing that compromise and cooperation will help China in the long run, and reassuring Beijing that its concerns will be heard.

一个被动的中国对她自己或其它人都没有任何好处.美国和其它强大国家应该看到重新塑造国际议程所带来的积极意义,尤其是当中国进入了一个高风险的经济转型期时.那些严厉的言辞和行动,这些被中国视为试图遏制中国的发展的行为将不会有任何帮助,华盛顿应该寻找和构建一个合理的方案.而其中的关键在于让北京相信她的利益在现有的解决方案下可以得到最大程度的保证,向她展示只有妥协和合作才能长远地帮助中国,同时让北京相信她的关注点都会得到真实的关切.

Clare Lynch, a junior fellow at Carnegie, contributed to the preparation of this article.

Clare Lynch,卡内基的初级研究员,为此文章的撰写提供了许多帮助.

评论:

1)thmak MARCH 6, 2013 1:27 PM
@Yukon Huang: All the West’s trade disputes with China and the subsequent demonizing rhetoric are essentially motivated to thwart China’s economic thrust/competition. China is more civilized and has not responded the same. China respects other nations and does not bully other nations by false pretenses as America does. America’s security and humanitarian interest doesn’t mean that China own inherent interest and integrities must be subjected to America’s discretion. The territorial dispute provoked by Japan tells the Southeast Asian nations that they should be alert to the revive of Japan’s past superpower militarism and plundering invasions of their countries during WWII and the possibility of the repeat of Pearl Harbor raid. Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu islands is not benign and China doesn’t want to be surprised later by a Pearl Harbor Bombing scenario. The military territorial dispute in South China Sea provoked by Vietnam and Philippine should alert those nations that they will face the same provocations for their territorial dispute with the two countries. America’s pivot to Southeast Asia is destructive militarism and not prosperity to the region. That is why America’s initiatives, as well as those by Philippine and Vietnam in collusion with America, were rebuffed at the recent ASEAN meeting. Right now China is in much better financially and much better able to solve its problems than America and doesn’t presently adversely affect its neighbors as America does. A stance of engagement, reaching out, and seeking compromise with due mutual respect and mutual trust in region would serve America better.( to be continued)

所有西方与中国的贸易纠纷和伴随着妖魔化中国的言辞本质上都是出于阻挠中国的经济冲刺或竞争.中国在这些方面表现的非常的绅士,并没有以相同的手段还以颜色.中国尊重其它国家,从不会像美国一样,用一些虚情假意的理由去欺负任何国家.美国所谓的安全和人道主义利益并不意味着中国自身的固有利益和完整性需要屈从于美国的裁量.由日本引发的那个领土争端只能告诉东南亚的国家他们应该警惕日本重返军国主义和像二战那样侵略其它邻国的可能性,还有珍珠港事件重演的可能性.日本对钓鱼岛的国有化并非出于善意,中国也肯定不会想看到任何类似珍珠港受轰炸的场景发生在自己的领土上.被越南和菲律宾挑起的南中国海的领土争端同样应该使那些国家警惕,因为那些国家大多面临着与这两个国家重叠的领土主权声索.美国重返亚洲的战略属于破坏性的军国主义且并未对当地局势带来任何好处.这就是为什么美国的提案,与勾结美国的越南和菲律宾提出的提案,被最近的东盟会议断然拒绝讨论的原因.现在中国拥有一个良好的财政,与美国比起来更有可能解决自身的问题.且不会像美国那样不断地影响周围的邻国.一个基于承诺的,姿态放宽的,并在地区利益中与它人寻求妥协的立场,对美国来说效果会更好.(待续)

2)thmak MARCH 6, 2013 1:39 PM
@Yukon Huang: China’s rising economic influence has leaders around the world on the edge of their seats because they see their dominance in the world is being reduced. But Beijing is a normal great power. Its international potential is constrained by the established order setup by the Western colonial powers after WWII. The Chinese leadership concentrates to develop its society rather than sets up any international posture to address problems caused by the West. . And as the Chinese economy normalizes, its growing pains are being dealt with accordingly. So far China has not elevating risks and aggravating insecurities in China’s neighborhood and beyond as the West is doing now around the world. The present established norms were established by the West for the sole interest of the West. So there is no way that China will support those norms at the expense of the developing nations. China has no desire for a superpower status. That status is forced upon China by the West. China’s “peaceful development” is seemed as threat to the West because that reflects in contrast to the West’s “plundering/exploiting development” in the past decades. As China develops, China will encounter blocking walls set up by the West and China has been successful in tearing those walls down to arrive at what it is today. Whenever there are disputes, China intends to react with mutual trust and mutual respect and according to the rule of laws to foster a win-win solution. The Diaoyu islands dispute was provoked by Japan with USA support, not China. So far China’s central planning, institutional base and experience have been successful in dealing with its internal economic issues as well as the impact of the global economic problems better than the West and America and have reinforced the Chinese leaderships’ confidence that they are on the right path ahead. Since China is relatively poor, West’s opinion that China is a superpower has a devil’s connotation. (to be continued)

回复Yukon Huang:中国崛起的经济影响力受到世界范围内的领导人的关注,因为他们意识到自己在这个世界上的主导权正在逐渐削弱.但是北京其实是一个很正常的超级大国.她的潜能受制于西方殖民主义国家建立的二战后秩序.中国的领导层正致力于发展自己的社会,而不是设立任何国际姿态来解决那由西方引发的问题..而且随着中国经济的正常化,她正在增长的阵痛也会被妥善地解决.不像西方在全世界做的那样,到目前为止中国还未提升任何风险或在周边及其它地区制造不安全事端.现有既定的国际准则是西方建立的,自然是与西方的利益一致的.所以中国不可能牺牲所有发展中国家的利益来遵守这些所谓的条条框框.中国没有寻求一个超级大国的地位,这一地位是西方强加于中国头上的.中国的"和平崛起"对西方来说如梗在喉,只因为这一概念与西方过去几十年"掠夺式"的发展模式形成鲜明对比.随着中国的发展,她将遇到西方设制的重重阻碍,而且中国一路走来,势不可当,直到如今.无论何时,只要有纠纷,中国都趋向于在相互信任和相互尊重的基础上,依据法律与规则来促进一个双赢的局面.钓鱼岛冲突是日本在美国的支持下引发的,而非中国.目前为止中国的最主要的计划,制度基础和经验都成功的解决了她的国际经济纠纷,比如说在全球金融危机的应对上,她就比美国和其它西方国家做得好,而这件事同时加强了中国领导层的信心,让他们相信他们正走在正确的道路上.因为中国是一个相对贫困的国家,所以西方认为中国是一个超级力量的观点是不怀好意的.(待续)

Mathew MARCH 6, 2013 7:27 PM
Thanks for a thought provoking article. My understanding of the writer's sense of "abnormal" is that China has not "risen" to its present status according to other "risen" states. Every state rises through their own unique paths in the context of the mentality of its people and its exterior environment. And these interior and exterior factors change over time and this change provokes differences in mentality and the exterior environment; a sort of cybernetic feedback loop. Thus each state has its own path and each path is unique. To attach the "abnormal" label to China suggests pathological symptoms which must be corrected or rectified. I suggest that this label would be considered apt by those who have adopted or choose to believe in whatever is the dominant mentality of the United States. But for those who do not share in such mentality, China is continuing to evolve and develop as a state and as a people. And in its evolution, it is not the closed minded, narrow focused and ethnocentri country as many in the USA have been led to believe. Sure, there are a lot of different ways and methods to develop and improve. China is grappling with this. These are the means. But to what end? A state as conceived by the west? Or towards something which will surpass this conception?

多亏了这样一篇启人深思的的文章.我对作者所谓的"不正常"的理解是指中国没有像其它国家那样"崛起".每一个国家,因其不同的民众意识和独特的内部及外部环境,都有其唯一的与众不同的发展路径.而这些内因或外因随时间而变,这些变化同样驱使着人民意识和环境的多样化,类似于机械控制论的反馈回路一样.因为每一个国家都有其自有的唯一的发展路径.给中国贴上"不正常"的标签暗示着中国现有的做法是不正确的,是必须被修正的.我觉得这一标签会被那些受美国占主导地位意识影响的家伙所附和.而对于那些没有被影响的人们来说,中国正在继续以一个独立的国家发展着.而在她的演变过程中,不会被那些思想封闭,目光短视且优越感爆表受美国领导的国家所接受.当然,在发展的过程中还有很多不同的路和方法.中国正在实践着这一切.但会以什么样的姿态结束呢,一个西方设想过程中的国家?或是朝着超越这一概念的方向前进?

4)Karl MARCH 8, 2013 5:27 AM
An article that is great because it covers so much thematic ground--political, economic, and diplomatic--and brings in a historical context. It's also not focused on demonizing. Although the noninterference policy is still nominally in effect, so much has changed around it over the last forty years that it has lost much of its analytical value. Maybe "reluctant involvement" or "cautious involvement" would be a better description of the current attitude--though this might not make a good term for an official policy. Although much of the article is spot-on, the writer is overly dismissive about China's engagement with some international and multilateral bodies. Has it really rejected Western frameworks that thoroughly? It's a very engaged member of the UN and active in multilateral forums such as APEC and ASEAN. China has been an avid borrower of World Bank and ADB funds, and is pursuing a larger say in such institutions, which appointments such as Justin Lin (WB) and Zhu Min (IMF).

这篇文章非常棒,它覆盖了如此多的领域,政治,经济和外交.而且提到了一些历史方面的内容.它也没有集中注意于妖魔化.虽然互不干涉原则仍在台面上发挥影响力,在过去四十年里许多东西都已改变,而它也没有多少分析的价值.也许"勉强参与"或"谨慎参与"是一个以对当前态度更好的描述.虽然这两个词可能并不符合官方用语准则.由于许多这篇文章谈到的都是热点问题,作者对中国与一些国家和多边机构的承诺表示十分的轻蔑.中国真的完全拒绝了西方的框架了么?她是联合国最重要的参与国之一,以及活跃在多边建立的经济机构,如亚太经合和东盟.中国已成为世界银行和亚洲开发银行资金的疯狂的债主,并在这些机构寻求着更大的话语权,表现为如林毅夫(WB)和朱民(IMF)的任命。

 
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