As much as neo-conservative/Zionist ideologues like Robert Kagan write about the exceptional inevitability of the American world order, there is a general sinking feeling among the people of the United States that this country does not have a future.
Is this impression justified? Students of imperial decline can examine historical observations and parallels to decide.
Admittedly, utilizing historicism to try and predict geopolitical developments in the short and medium term is an imperfect science, often taking the form of prejudiced soothsaying or intuitive assertions.

正如Robert Kagan等新保守主义/犹太复国主义理论家所写的那样，“美国世界秩序杰出”的必然性在美国人民中普遍存在一种沉沦的感觉，即这个国家没有未来。
这种印象有道理吗?研究帝国衰亡的学生可以通过历史观察和相似之处来决定。
诚然，利用历史决定论试图预测短期和中期的地缘政治发展是一门不完美的科学，往往会采取带有偏见的预言或直觉断言的形式。

Part of the problem is an overreliance on ancient history, particularly Rome, as a reference point for understanding the rise and fall of empire. The lack of specific data regarding the developments that culminated in Rome’s downfall has led to subsequent commentators to fill in the blanks through the ideological prisms of their time. For example, 18th-century British historian Edward Gibbon singled out the Roman elite’s behavioral decadence as the catalyst for its downfall. Individual moral purity was a strong fixation for Protestant Englishmen like Gibbons during his time, but this theory can be challenged by information revealing widescale moral excesses among Roman rulers during the lead up and fruition of the empire’s 2nd Century AD territorial peak, e.g., the infamously obscene Caligula or Nero. Today, narratives blaming climate change for Rome’s decline, a 21st century obsession, have gained a foothold.

问题的部分原因在于，人们过于依赖古代历史，尤其是罗马历史，将其作为理解帝国兴衰的参照点。由于缺乏具体的数据来说明导致罗马灭亡的发展，导致后来的评论家们通过他们那个时代的意识形态棱镜来填补空白。
例如，18世纪英国历史学家Edward Gibbon指出，罗马精英的行为堕落是其垮台的催化剂。在他的时代，像Gibbon这样的新教英国人对个人道德的纯洁有着强烈的执着，但这一理论可能会受到挑战，因为有信息显示，在公元2世纪帝国领土高峰的前期和后期，罗马统治者普遍存在道德上的过度行为。
例如臭名昭著的、猥琐的卡利古拉或尼禄。如今，将罗马衰落归咎于气候变化的说法——21世纪的执念——已经站稳了脚跟。

A more direct comparison with the downfall of the Soviet unx, where detailed information is available, is more useful in seeking to investigate the malaise and long-term viability of the America empire. The United States of 2024 shares several demographic trends with the Soviet unx of the 1970s — “the era of stagnation” — that ultimately led to the vast Eurasian superpower’s implosion in 1991.
When examining the short to medium term (10 to 30 years) prognosis of the American empire, we will also contrast it with its major adversaries: primarily Russia and China, and, supplementally (more so in later articles), Iran.

更直接的比较是，苏联的垮台 (对此有详细的信息)，在寻求调查美帝国的萎靡和长期生存能力方面更有用。2024年的美国与20世纪70年代的苏联(“停滞时代”)有几个人口趋势相同，这最终导致了这个庞大的欧亚超级大国在1991年的内爆。
在研究美帝国的中短期(10到30年)预测时，我们还将把它与它的主要对手进行对比:主要是俄罗斯和中国，以及补充(在后面的文章中更多)伊朗。

This author stresses that it is under no impression that either Russia, China, or Iran can defeat the American empire on their own. All three countries have different advantages over the United States in their world-historical struggle against neo-liberal unipolarity, but also disadvantages as individual contenders, suggesting that a future without Pax Americana could be a pre-WWII one limited to natural spheres of influence rather than a recreation of Washington’s ambitious efforts for world domination. If the three powers coordinate and unite — as China and Russia’s “no limits” partnership or the two powers’ multi-year pacts with Iran suggest they have — the Washington-led, post-war liberal world order may go down sooner than we expect.

作者强调，没有人认为俄罗斯、中国或伊朗可以凭一己之力打败美帝国。与美国相比，这三个国家在反对新自由主义单极的世界历史斗争中具有不同的优势，但作为单独的竞争者也有不利之处。这表明没有美国治下的、和平的未来，可能是二战前的那种局限于自然势力范围的未来，而不是华盛顿统治世界的雄心勃勃的重现。
如果这三个大国协调一致——就像中国和俄罗斯的“无限制”伙伴关系，或者这两个大国与伊朗的多年协议所表明的那样——华盛顿领导的战后自由世界秩序可能会比我们预期的更快瓦解。

Russia and China remain behind America on a wide array of metrics, but what is impossible to deny is that they are starting to catch up while the United States is broadly at an inflection point. In 2021, *** made this point in his address, affirming that “time and momentum” were on China’s side.
One logical point to make is that, generally speaking, life for ordinary Russian and Chinese people is obxtively getting better, while things are getting demonstrably worse in American. This alone can create divergences in national morale during a great power competition.
The economic, military, soft power, political, and other factors pointing to the coming failure and geopolitical neutralization of the US and its ideology on the world stage will be explored in future articles.

俄罗斯和中国在许多指标上仍落后于美国，但不可否认的是，当美国大体处于拐点时，它们正开始迎头赶上。2021年，中国领导在讲话中强调了这一点，肯定“时间和势头”站在中国一边。
一个合乎逻辑的观点是，总的来说，俄罗斯和中国普通民众的生活客观上正在变得更好，而美国的情况却明显变得更糟。仅这一点就能在大国竞争中造成国家士气的分歧。
经济、军事、软实力、政治和其他因素将导致美国及其意识形态在世界舞台上的失败和地缘政治中立，（对此，）我们将在以后的文章中探讨。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处


Part I: Demographics
One of the first symptoms of a nation’s decline is a breakdown in social and human health. Often small changes in data related to population well-being speaks to an underwater iceberg of more significant and systematic problems within a people.
At the hump of the USSR’s “Brezhnev stagnation” in the mid to late 1970s, demographers began speculating about the health of the once seemingly omnipotent empire after discovering that the nation’s rates of infant mortality were beginning to rise. Though this increase was minor — only a few percentage points — it broke a cycle of decades of rapid gains in the survivability of Soviet infants since the end of World War II.

第一部分:人口统计
一个国家衰落的最初症状之一是社会和人类健康的崩溃。与人口福利有关的数据的微小变化往往反映了一个民族内部更重大的制度性问题的水下冰山。
在苏联“勃列日涅夫停滞”的上世纪70年代中后期，人口统计学家发现苏联的婴儿死亡率开始上升，于是开始猜测这个曾经看似无所不能的帝国的健康状况。尽管这一增长幅度很小——只有几个百分点——但它打破了自二战结束以来苏联婴儿存活率持续数十年快速增长的循环。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处


This was perplexing to mainstream observers at the time, as the Soviet unx was, financially, enjoying relative prosperity due to a global oil export boom triggered by the Arab League’s 1973 oil embargo. The USSR under Leonid Brezhnev (who ruled from 1964-1982) planned its economy to become a military peer of the United States (especially in the realm of nuclear weapons), was industrially powerful, and matched or led its rivals in the world in various cutting-edge fields, such as aerospace.
Yet despite the superficial success of the system, the USSR’s most important asset, its people, began showing signs of decay and misery.

这让当时的主流观察家感到困惑，因为1973年阿拉伯联盟的石油禁运引发了全球石油出口的繁荣，苏联在财政上相对繁荣。列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫(1964年至1982年执政)领导下的苏联，计划将其经济发展成为美国的军事对手(特别是在核武器领域)，工业实力雄厚，在航空航天等各种尖端领域与世界上的竞争对手匹敌或领先。
然而，尽管该体系表面上取得了成功，但苏联最重要的资产——人民——开始显示出衰败和痛苦的迹象。

Today in the United States, we are seeing similar patterns.
In the Soviet context, Central Asian Minorities within the multi-ethnic Soviet space, who benefited from special economic, social and legal privileges (before America, the Bolsheviks of the Soviet unx created the first nation to practice official racial discriminate against its own ethnic majority citizens, as detailed in Terry Martin’s 2001 book The Affirmative Action Empire), grew at much faster rates than the less fertile Slavic population during the 1960s and 70s. By 1979, ethnic Russians declined to barely 52% of the Soviet population.
As Robert D. Putnam’s 2000 book Bowling Alone has shown, multiculturalism/ multiracialism is strongly correlated with alienation and distrust. As in the USSR in its period of downturn, America’s racial makeup has radically changed in the last 50 years, with white people now making up less than 58% of the population.

今天在美国，我们看到了类似的模式。
在苏联的背景下，多民族苏联空间中的中亚少数民族，他们受益于特殊的经济，社会和法律特权(在美国之前，苏联的布尔什维克创建了第一个对自己的多数民族公民实行官方种族歧视的国家，如Terry Martin 2001年的书《平权行动帝国》所述)，在20世纪60年代和70年代，其人口增长速度远远快于生育能力较差的斯拉夫人口。到1979年，俄罗斯族在苏联人口中的比例下降到52%。
正如Robert D. Putnam在2000年出版的《独自打保龄球》一书中所表明的那样，多元文化主义/多种族主义与异化和不信任密切相关。就像苏联在衰退时期一样，美国的种族构成在过去的50年里发生了根本性的变化，白人现在占总人口的比例不到58%。

Besides the national problems created by racial and cultural alienation, changes in demographics lead to changes to a society overall. Nations naturally begin taking on the character of the home countries of the new people who populate them, which in the American context means falling behind peripheries of its empire, such as Western Europe, in critical sectors. This is another commonality with the 1970s USSR, where the Soviet homeland itself was racked with dysfunction and living standards were falling behind ethnically/racially homogenous Warsaw Pact protectorates such as Hungary or East Germany. It may be possible for non-white, non-Asian nations to achieve success, but this would require illiberal governance, ethno-cultural cohesion and enforced discipline that thoroughly multi-racial countries (like America or Brazil) appear to lack.

除了种族和文化异化造成的国家问题外，人口结构的变化还会导致整个社会的变化。国家自然会开始呈现新移民母国的特征，在美国的背景下，这意味着在关键领域落后于其帝国的外围地区，比如西欧。
这是与20世纪70年代的苏联的另一个共同点，当时苏联本土本身就受到功能失调的困扰，生活水平落后于民族同质的、华沙条约受保护国如匈牙利或东德。非白人、非亚洲国家或许有可能取得成功，但这需要非自由主义的治理、民族文化凝聚力和强制纪律，而这些似乎是完全多种族的国家(如美国或巴西)所缺乏的。

Predictably, it is no coincidence that the United States is facing falling living standards and social degradation, including among the once prosperous white majority, which place it at a grave disadvantage against geopolitical competitors.
In 2022, the Center for Disease Control reported that American infant mortality rose 3% for the first time in decades, from 5.44 infant deaths per 1,000 live births the previous year to 5.60. In 2023, no ground was made up in tackling this problem: the same figure was reported.
Comparatively, Russia’s infant mortality is now lower. In 2023, there were 4.807 deaths per 1,000 live births, a 3.8% decline from 2022. This is a remarkable feat of the Vladimir Putin government. In 2003, early in Putin’s reign, Russia suffered an alarming 16.156 deaths per 1,000 live births, while the United States had an infant morbidity rate of 6.85 at this time.

可以预见的是，美国正面临生活水平下降和社会退化，包括曾经富裕的白人多数在内。这并非巧合，这使美国在面对地缘政治竞争对手时处于严重劣势。
2022年，美国疾病控制中心报告称，美国婴儿死亡率几十年来首次上升3%，从前一年的每1000名活产婴儿死亡5.44人上升到5.60人。2023年，在解决这一问题方面没有取得任何进展:报道的数字是相同的。
相比之下，俄罗斯现在的婴儿死亡率更低。2023年，每千名活产婴儿中有4.807人死亡，比2022年下降3.8%。这是弗拉基米尔·普京政府的一项非凡成就。2003年，普京执政初期，俄罗斯每1000名活产婴儿中就有16.156人死亡，而美国同期的婴儿死亡率为6.85。

On the Chinese front, their massive population lags behind the US with 8.4 infants dying per 1,000 births. We can consult with ***’s quote about “momentum” here. China has seen this statistic consistently falling by over 3% every year, as America suffers the inverse, suggesting that like Russia they can be forecasted to overcome this hurdle.
Much of this rise in infant mortality correlates with the increase in America’s minority population. Blacks and Amerindians in particular have high rates of infant mortality due to neglectful activities such as drug use, alcoholism, abuse, as well as overburdened or poorly administered minority-run health care services. At the same time, the infant mortality rate is going up for white mothers as well, suggesting that these symptoms of deterioration are harming the white American community as well.

在中国方面，他们庞大的人口落后于美国，每1000名新生儿中有8.4名婴儿死亡。中国的这一统计数据每年持续下降超过3%，而美国则相反，这表明可以预测他们会像俄罗斯一样克服这一障碍。
婴儿死亡率的上升在很大程度上与美国少数民族人口的增加有关。黑人和美洲印第安人的婴儿死亡率尤其高，原因是吸毒、酗酒、滥用药物等被忽视的活动，以及少数民族经营的医疗服务负担过重或管理不善。与此同时，白人母亲的婴儿死亡率也在上升，这表明这些恶化的症状也在伤害美国白人社区。

This withering of fundamental life measures is part of a broader trend. From 2019 to 2023, US life expectancy fell from 79 years to now 76. This figure is more at home among developing nations than those we consider advanced. Among developed US liberal peers, Germany’s current life expectancy is 82 years, UK 82, France 83, and so on.
Following a modest increase from 2022 to 2023, Chinese life expectancy now surpasses that of Americans, at 77 years, a historic first for China. Russia, which is fighting a brutal war in Ukraine, still saw an increase in life expectancy from 2022 to 2023: 72 to 73.
Returning to 2003 numbers, the American life expectancy was 77, while China’s was 73 and Russia’s 65.

这种基本生活标准的消亡是一个更大趋势的一部分。从2019年到2023年，美国人的预期寿命从79岁降至现在的76岁。这一数字在发展中国家比我们认为的发达国家更为普遍。在美国的自由主义发达国家中，德国目前的预期寿命为82岁，英国为82岁，法国为83岁，依此类推。
从2022年到2023年，中国人的预期寿命略有增加，现在超过了美国人，达到77岁，这是中国历史上的第一次。俄罗斯虽然正在乌克兰打一场残酷的战争，但从2022年到2023年，俄罗斯人的预期寿命仍然有所增加:72岁到73岁。
回到2003年的数据，美国人的预期寿命是77岁，而中国是73岁，俄罗斯是65岁。

When comparing Soviet data during the era of stagnation, we again see a similarity with the US. The politburo began internally ringing alarm bells when they discovered that life expectancy suddenly fell in a form similar to the US, from 69.5 in 1971 to 67.9 in 1978, a fact publicly disclosed to much controversy during Perestroika and Glasnost.
America’s dwindling life expectancy and rising infant mortality, as in the case of the Soviet unx, is being fueled by an explosion in substance abuse, obesity, suicide, institutional failures, and other informal measures of nihilism and despair rooted in anomie.
In the year 2023, there were a whopping 112,000 drug overdose deaths, primarily among the young.

当比较苏联在经济停滞时期的数据时，我们再次看到了与美国的相似之处。当政治局发现预期寿命突然下降，从1971年的69.5岁降至1978年的67.9岁时，他们开始在内部敲响警钟，这一事实在改革和开放期间被公开披露，引发了许多争议。
美国人预期寿命的缩短和婴儿死亡率的上升，就像苏联的情况一样，是由药物滥用、肥胖、自杀、制度失败以及其他植根于反常的虚无主义和绝望的非正式衡量标准的激增所推动的。
在2023年，有高达112,000人死于药物过量，主要是年轻人。

This dwarfs Russia, which itself is seen to have a drug problem. During a recent surge in drug overdoses in 2021, the nation with less than half the US population suffered 7,316 fatal ODs, driven in part by boredom or loneliness during COVID.
In China, with its population of 1.4 billion and with its historic crisis of opium addiction in the rearview mirror, the rate of drug-related deaths is approximately 49,000 per year.
In the realm of suicide, Russia has long had the reputation of being a world leader in this category, but the US has now quietly surpassed it.
In 2021, Russia suffered 10.7 self-inflicted deaths per 100,000 people. In the same year, the United States’ rate jumped to 14.04 per 100,000.
By comparison, in the year 2000, Russians committed suicide at the rate of 39 deaths per 100k, so their new figures are a massive leap forward when tackling the issue.

这让俄罗斯相形见绌，俄罗斯本身也被认为存在药物滥用问题。在最近2021年药物过量激增期间，这个人口不到美国一半的国家遭受了7316例致命的药物过量，部分原因是新冠疫情期间的无聊或孤独。
中国有14亿人口，鸦片成瘾的历史性危机已经过去，与毒品/药品有关的死亡率约为每年49 000人。
在自杀领域，俄罗斯长期以来一直享有世界领先的声誉，但美国现在已经悄然超越了它。2021年，俄罗斯每10万人中有10.7人自杀。同年，美国的自杀率跃升至每10万人有14.04 人。
相比之下，在2000年，俄罗斯人的自杀率为每10万人中有39人死亡，因此他们的新数据在解决这一问题方面是一个巨大的飞跃。

In America, we are suffering an astonishing step backwards. In 2000, Americans were 40% less likely to kill themselves, with the rate of 10.4 per 100,000.
For China, suicide rates have declined from 10.88 to 5.25 between 2010 and 2021.
In the world of serious mental illness, the United States is also one upping its rivals.
In 2022, approximately 5% of Americans suffered from severe mental disorders, such as psychosis or schizophrenia, while 1 out of 5 US citizens are being medically treated for milder forms like clinical depression.
In Russia, around 8.8% of citizens are diagnosed with clinical depression. Only 0.3% of Russians are schizophrenics. This is another sharp statistical decrease from the recent Russian past.
It will come to nobody’s surprise that Americans are the most obese in the world, a key co-morbidity accelerating these demographic problems. This does not require number crunching.

在美国，我们正在遭受惊人的倒退。在2000年，美国人自杀的可能性比现在低40%，每10万人中有10.4人自杀。
2010年至2021年间，中国的自杀率从10.88降至5.25。
在严重精神疾病的世界里，美国也是领先对手的国家之一。到2022年，大约5%的美国人患有严重的精神障碍，如精神病或精神分裂症，而五分之一的美国公民正在接受临床抑郁症等较轻微形式的治疗。
在俄罗斯，大约8.8%的公民被诊断患有临床抑郁症。只有0.3%的俄罗斯人患有精神分裂症。这是最近俄罗斯统计数据上的又一次急剧下降。
毫无疑问，美国人是世界上最肥胖的人，这是加速这些人口问题的关键并发症。这并不需要数字计算。
（未完待续）