尽管法国拥有更强大的军队，但为何在二战中如此迅速地被德国击败？

How did France fall so quickly to Germany in WWII despite having a larger army?

2023-10-24 Natsuo 4956 22 0 收藏纠错&举报

译文简介

法国在纸面上拥有一支强大的军队，但实际情况却不同。这是因为基本的预算现实问题。法国决定采取静态防御战略。他们修建了马其诺防线，并依靠他们有限的军队以及英国的协助来填补由于外交原因存在的防线空隙。

正文翻译

Steven Pace
France had a strong army on paper, but the reality was different. This is because of the fundamental budgetary reality.
France decided to adopt a static defence strategy. They constructed the Maginot line, and relied on their limited army, along with British assistance, to cover the gap in the line that existed for diplomatic reasons.

法国在纸面上拥有一支强大的军队，但实际情况却不同。这是因为基本的预算现实问题。
法国决定采取静态防御战略。他们修建了马奇诺防线，并依靠他们有限的军队以及英国的协助来填补由于外交原因存在的防线空隙。

The reason for the limitations of the French army was the expense of the static defence. Something else had to be sacrificed. What they chose to do was to use what was left to compliment the static defence. That is logical.
What they gave up was all the systems needed to handle modern mass mobile warfare. Training, doctrines, and equipment, at all levels of their army. They had lots of tanks, but they were not designed correctly, and their armour doctrine was all wrong. They had not invested in it
For defending the Maginot line, the French army was quite adequate.

法国军队受限的原因是静态防御的高昂费用。其他方面必须做出牺牲。他们选择利用剩下的资源来补充静态防御。这是合乎逻辑的。
他们放弃的是处理现代大规模机动战争所需的所有系统。包括军队各级别的训练、战术和装备。他们拥有大量坦克，但设计不正确，装甲战术也完全错误。他们没有对此进行投资。
对于马奇诺防线的防守来说，法国军队已经足够了。

评论翻译

Robert Paul
The fall of France to Germany in World War II can be attributed to a combination of factors, including military strategy, political decisions, and operational circumstances. While France did have a larger army than Germany, several key factors contributed to their rapid defeat:
1. Defensive Strategy: France relied heavily on the Maginot Line, a massive system of fortifications along its border with Germany. This defensive strategy was based on the assumption that any German invasion would come through the heavily fortified Franco-German border. However, the Germans circumvented the Maginot Line by launching a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest, which was believed to be impassable for tanks and large-scale military operations.

二战期间法国被德国占领可以归因于多种因素，包括军事策略、政治决策和作战环境等。虽然法国拥有比德国更庞大的军队，但以下几个关键因素导致了他们的迅速失败：
1. 防御策略：法国严重依赖马其诺防线，这是一条沿法德边境的大规模防御工事系统。这种防御策略基于假设任何德国入侵都将通过重兵防守的法德边境进行。然而，德国人通过发起突袭行动穿过被认为对坦克和大规模军事行动不可通过的阿登森林，绕过了马其诺防线。

2. Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany employed the innovative military strategy of blitzkrieg, which involved rapid and coordinated movements of tanks, aircraft, and infantry. The German forces concentrated their forces and swiftly penetrated the weakly defended Ardennes region, which allowed them to bypass the heavily fortified areas of the Maginot Line and cut off the French and British forces from the north.

2.闪电战战术：德国采用了创新的军事战略——闪电战，该战术涉及坦克、飞机和步兵的快速协调行动。德国军队集中兵力并迅速穿过防御薄弱的阿登地区，使他们能够绕过马其诺防线的重兵防御区域，并从北方切断法国和英国军队的联系。

3. Technological Superiority: The German military had several technological advantages over the French. The German tanks, such as the Panzer III and IV, were superior to most French tanks, which were outdated and poorly equipped. The German Luftwaffe also achieved air superiority, allowing them to conduct devastating aerial attacks on French positions and supply lines.

3.技术优势：德国军队在技术上比法国有几个优势。德国坦克，如III号和IV号坦克，优于大多数过时和装备不良的法国坦克。德国空军也取得了制空权，使他们能够对法国阵地和补给线进行毁灭性的空中攻击。

4.Coordination and Communication: The German forces demonstrated superior coordination and communication compared to the French. German commanders, such as General Erwin Rommel, made swift and decisive decisions on the battlefield, exploiting weaknesses in the French defenses. In contrast, the French command structure was hampered by a lack of coordination and effective communication, leading to delays in response and an inability to counter the German advances effectively.

4.协调和沟通：与法国相比，德国军队展示了更出色的协调和沟通。德国指挥官，如埃尔文·隆美尔将军，在战场上迅速做出果断决策，利用法国防御的弱点。相比之下，法国指挥结构缺乏协调和有效的沟通，导致反应迟缓，无法有效地应对德国的进攻。

5. Political and Psychological Factors: The political situation in France was complex and tumultuous during this period. France was still recovering from the trauma of World War I, and there was a lack of confidence and unity within the French leadership. Additionally, the German propaganda machine had effectively demoralized and undermined the French army's will to fight through psychological warfare and subversive tactics.

5.政治和心理因素：在此期间，法国的政治局势复杂而动荡。法国仍在从一战的创伤中恢复过来，法国领导层缺乏信心和团结。此外，德国的宣传机器通过心理战和颠覆性的战术有效地削弱了法国军队的战斗意志。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

These factors combined to create a situation where the German forces were able to swiftly advance and defeat the French army. The fall of France in 1940 marked a significant turning point in World War II and had profound consequences for the subsequent course of the war.

这些因素结合起来造成了德国军队能够迅速前进并击败法国军队的局面。1940年法国的陷落标志着二战的一个重要转折点，并对随后战争的进程产生了深远的影响。

Michael Wright
The short answer is that the French Army’s command, control, and communications systems were antiquated. In contrast, the Germans were trailblazing and leading the world in these systems. It was the German innovations in these areas that allowed the Blitzkrieg to function.
The French command was a rigidly top-down system. Higher ranking officers had no faith in junior officers being able to make decisions on their own in the field. Therefore, higher level officers micro-managed by dictating orders to junior officers. This slowed down the ability of units in the field to respond to situations in the field. Combined with the communications problems, which I will discuss below, it made response times ridiculously slow.

简单来说，法国军队的指挥、控制和通信系统已经过时。相比之下，德国在这些领域处于领先地位，并引领着世界。正是德国在这些领域的创新使得闪电战得以实施。
法国的指挥系统是一种严格的自上而下的系统。高级军官不相信下级军官能够在战场上独立作出决策。因此，高级军官通过向下级军官发号施令进行微观管理。这减缓了现场部队应对情况的能力。再加上下面将讨论的通信问题，响应时间变得非常缓慢。

In contrast, the German Army sought to train and develop junior officers and NCO’s and encourage them to make decisions on their own. Junior officers were expected to know the duties and responsibilities of officers up to two levels higher than their own grade. In that way, if a higher level officer was injured or killed, a junior officer was immediately ready to step in on the spot. To any active or former U.S. soldiers reading this, you will recognize that that is part of modern U.S. doctrine as well. They (and I suspect most modern armies) adopted from the Germans because it works.

相比之下，德国军队试图培训和发展下级军官和士官，并鼓励他们独立做出决策。下级军官被期望了解比自己高两个级别的军官的职责和责任。这样，如果更高级别的军官受伤或死亡，下级军官可以立即代替他们。任何正在服役或曾经服役于美国的士兵读到这篇文章，你会认识到这也是现代美国教义的一部分。他们（我猜大多数现代军队）从德国人那里借鉴了这一点，因为它行之有效。

French communications systems were also problematic. The French had radios but did not adopt the wholesale use of them in their forces. Gamelin, the Chief of General Staff of the French Army in 1940, distrusted them and felt the transmissions could be intercepted by the enemy. They could, of course, and the Germans were quite adept at that too. But radios also allowed for more rapid movements and responses in forces. In the French Army in 1940, radios were utilized among division-level units for communications with artillery assets, among infantry battalion commanders, and among tank company commanders. Instead of radios, the bulk of French forces relied on land-line wires and couriers to issue and receive instructions. Sometimes, superior officers relied on phone lines to issue orders. General level officers were sometimes required to report in person to receive orders and directives from their superiors.

法国的通信系统也存在问题。法国有无线电，但没有在其军队中全面使用。1940年，法国陆军的总参谋长甘末林不信任无线电，并认为传输可能会被敌人拦截。当然，它们确实可以被拦截，而且德国人在这方面非常擅长。但是，无线电也允许更快速的移动和响应部队。在1940年的法国军队中，无线电仅在师级单位之间用于与炮兵资产、步兵营指挥官和坦克连指挥官进行通信。除了无线电，法国军队的大部分力量依靠地线电缆和信使发布和接收指令。有时，高级军官依赖电话线发出命令。将军级别的军官有时需要亲自报到，从他们的上级那里获得命令和指示。

The German Army had a much more liberal approach to the use of radios. Radios were issued to every individual tank and to every infantry platoon. Their information was routed to radios at command centers where commanders could direct immediate responses to the ever-changing combat circumstances. As a result, they were able to move and react far more quickly than French forces and to retain their organizational control in the process.
The French could not even imagine this type of rapid movement and control in 1940. While they had the troops and equipment sufficient to respond to the German assault, they could not move them quickly enough to respond to the ever-moving enemy positions.

德国军队对无线电的使用有更加自由的态度。无线电发放给每个坦克和每个步兵排。他们的信息被路由到指挥中心的无线电中，指挥官可以针对不断变化的战斗情况直接做出反应。因此，他们能够比法国军队更快地移动和反应，并在此过程中保持组织控制。
1940年，法国甚至无法想象这种快速移动和控制。虽然他们有足够的部队和装备来应对德国的攻击，但他们无法迅速移动以应对不断移动的敌人位置。

Morgan Jones
They did have a large army and great quality equipment on par or even ahead of the Germans, however the reason they lost within six weeks was because of their communication. France's communications wasn't well equipped while the Germans was. The Germans had every single unit equipped with radios so that they could move and react better than the French, with this came their air and ground communication to give them as much firepower as possible.

他们确实拥有庞大的军队和与德国人相当甚至领先的优质装备，然而他们在六周内失败的原因是因为通讯问题。法国的通讯设备并不完善，而德国人则装备了每个部队都配备无线电，这样他们能够比法国人更好地移动和反应，同时通过空中和地面通讯，使他们拥有尽可能多的火力。

Kevin Cross
The fundamental reason was a failure of three things: Ineffective strategy, military leadership, and political will.
Strategy: France was wedded to a fundamentally defensive strategy based on the Maginot Line. When the German forces bypassed the Line, and began a war of manouver and mobility on French soil, the military literally had no backup plan.
Military Leadership: The French military leaders had no flexibility of thought, a poor grasp on basic strategy, and had primarily gained their rank by either doing well in WWI or their political connections, or both. So, they were basically incompetent.

失败的根本原因是三个方面的问题：策略不当、军事领导力不足和政治意愿的缺乏。策略：法国坚持了一种基于马其诺防线的根本性防御策略。当德军绕过防线，在法国境内展开机动战时，法军实际上没有备选计划。军事领导力：法国军事领导者思维僵化，对基本战略了解不足，他们主要通过在一战中表现出色或与政界有关系而获得军衔。因此，他们基本上是无能的。

Political Will: When things started falling apart, the political side could have salvaged the situation with a combination of decisive action and will to make the hard decisions, like sacking the incompetent generals and preparing for a longer and very different war. No one picked up the baton. No one made the hard decisions. They just kept squabbling and in the end, just decided they were beaten - when the French army WASN’T beaten, and could well have fought on.

政治意愿：当局势开始崩溃时，政治方面本可以通过果断行动和做出艰难决策来挽救局势，比如撤换无能的将军，并为一场更长期、截然不同的战争做准备。然而没有人接过接力棒，没有人做出艰难的决策。他们只是继续争吵，最终决定认输，尽管法军并没有被击败，而且完全有能力继续战斗下去。

It’s important to remember that there was no military failure here at the level of the individual soldier or officer in the field. They did their job, they did it well, and they had as good or better arms and armour as the Germans. But without overall strategic direction, support from the government, and a plan, they were just flailing ineffectually while the Germans secured their obxtives.

重要的是要记住，在这里并不存在个别士兵或指挥官在战场上的军事失误。他们完成了自己的任务，做得很好，并且拥有与德国人一样甚至更好的武器和装甲。但是，缺乏整体的战略指导、政府的支持和计划，他们只是无效地挣扎，而德军则确保了他们的目标。

Mathias von Roden
In short the French Communication and Command structure was more or less WW1 Era and not made for the Lightning Quick advance of the German Army.
Communication by Radio was sparsely used by the French Army, who still depended on Soldiers driving too the Local Headquarters and gaining orders for their Commanders in the Field. Often those Soldiers got back to their Units but the whole situation has changed so that the Orders couldnt be executed as planed. Sometimes the Units where also gone since they where forced to flea before the German Onslaught.

简而言之，法国的指挥和通信结构基本上还停留在一战时期，并没有适应德军迅速推进的速度。
法国军队对无线电的使用非常有限，仍然依赖士兵亲自前往当地指挥部获取指令。这些士兵有时会返回部队，但整个情况已经发生了变化，无法按计划执行命令。有时，部队也可能已经撤退，因为他们被迫在德军的猛攻之前撤离。

Also France didnt excepted that Germany would drive with lots of Armored Vehicles through the Ardennes because some study said that wasnt possible. So the Germans lured the Majority of the Mobile French Forces along with the BEF into Belgium by attacking Belgium like they did in WW1 and then cut them off from Supplies etc. by punching through the week French Defense at the End of the Ardennes and rushing too the Channel Coast with a speed that was too fast for the French General Staff too realy react too.

此外，法国也没有预料到德国会带着大量装甲车辆穿过阿登，因为一些研究认为这是不可能的。所以德国人像一战中那样，通过攻击比利时，引诱了大部分法国机动部队和英国远航部队进入比利时，然后通过在阿登高地末端击穿法国一周的防御，切断了他们的补给等，并以法国总参谋部也无法反应的速度冲向海峡海岸。

Nom De Famille
French equipment at that point was not that bad, small arms worse but functional, artillery (save for the heaviest items) roughly equivalent, tanks had their oddities (small turrets) but often had better armour and armour penetrating ability. I’d need to rec-check on air power.
There seems to have been several facets:
They based their planning on an attack through belgium despite indications that there would also be an attack through the ardennes. The Maginot line was severely undermanned and had not been properly maintained.

法国的装备在那个时候并不差，小型武器可能稍逊一筹但功能正常，炮兵（除了最重的装备）大致相当，坦克虽然有些奇怪（小炮塔），但装甲和穿甲能力通常更好。关于空中力量，我需要再次核实。
问题似乎有几个方面：他们的计划是基于通过比利时进行进攻，尽管有迹象表明也会有通过阿登地区的进攻。马其诺防线的守备人员严重不足，并且没有得到适当的维护。

The more junior commanders were not given anY LEEway, there was an assumption that any attack (or in this case counter-attack) had to be prepared with at least a 3:1 superiority in men and artillery, this had to be approved and prepared by higher command. By contrast the junior german officers and NCOs were trained to take the initiative.
The tanks were not concentrated, they were subordinated to the infantry.

更年轻的指挥官没有任何自主权，他们认为任何进攻（或在这种情况下的反击）必须在人数和火炮上至少具备3:1的优势，并且必须经过高级指挥的批准和准备。相比之下，德国的初级军官和士官接受的培训是要主动采取行动。
坦克没有集中使用，而是隶属于步兵。

Communications were archaic, by the time information was received and digested at HQ the situation would have changed, the french could not cope with the blitz part of the krieg. It would soon become obvious to those in combat that HQ did not have the matter in hand. On the other hand the german army was able to call up air support as “mobile artillery”.
An overall sense of unease seeing the roads blocked with civilians fleeing westwards.

通信方式陈旧，当情报在总部接收和消化时，情况已经发生了变化，法国无法应对“闪电战”的部分。在战斗中，很快就会明显感觉到总部无法掌握局势。而德国军队能够调集空中支援作为“机动炮兵”。
人们看到道路上挤满了向西逃离的平民，整体上感到不安。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Eric Saunders
1. Their command structure was operating like it was still WW1. Carrier pigeons, telegraph, written messages. Their communications were sub standard.
2. The Belgian situation. Belgium had been encouraged to build north off the Maginot line. They declined and then when France and UK failed to respond to Anschluss, they declared neutrality. This broke the original war plan. (Invade the Ruhr valley from Belgian territory and destroy Germany’s heavy industry.) At the same time the Maginot line is going to funnel Germany's invasion into Belgium. This forces the French Army to sit on the border and wait for the Germans to invade Belgium and them rush in and meet them as far forward as possible. (A job the French army isn’t built for.)

1.法国的指挥结构仍然像一战时期那样运作。使用信鸽、电报和书面信息进行通信，他们的通信水平不达标。
2.比利时的情况。比利时曾被鼓励在马其诺防线的北部建设防线，但他们拒绝了，并且在法国和英国未能对德国吞并奥地利做出回应后，宣布中立。这破坏了最初的战争计划（从比利时领土入侵鲁尔地区，摧毁德国的重工业）。与此同时，马其诺防线将德国的入侵引导到比利时，迫使法国军队坐在边境等待德国入侵比利时，然后尽可能快速地冲向前线与他们会合（而这不是法国军队的强项）。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

3. Doctrine. The French had more Tanks but mostly divided them up amongst their army instead of concentrating them into a few hard hitting, fast moving units.
4. Airforce. The French Airforce is inferior to the Luftwaffe. (The UK was unwilling to commit the full strength of the RAF to the continent.) At the critical time, when they needed to move fast, the French army was under almost continuous air attack.
5. A measure of luck. The plan the German’s executed in 1940 had been put together after the original plan was compromised. (A officer with a copy crashed in Belgium. Interestingly the allies thought it was fake.) If the Germans had gone with the original plan, who knows?

3.理论。法国拥有更多坦克，但大部分将其分散在各个军队中，而不是集中在少数具有强大打击力和快速机动能力的单位中。
4.空军。法国空军不如德国空军（英国不愿意将皇家空军的全部实力投入到欧洲大陆）。在关键时刻，当他们需要迅速行动时，法国军队几乎不断受到空袭。
5.运气的成分。德国在1940年执行的计划是在最初计划受到破坏后制定的（一名携带计划副本的军官在比利时坠机，有趣的是盟军认为这是伪造的）。如果德国按照最初的计划行动，谁知道会发生什么？

法国军队二战德国

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