Instead, Bacque attempts to provide more realistic estimates based upon an examination of the population totals of the various German censuses together with the recorded influx of the huge number of German refugees. Applying this simple analysis, he makes a reasonably strong case that the excess German deaths during that period amounted to at least around 10 million, and possibly many millions more. Furthermore, he provides substantial evidence that the starvation was either deliberate or at least enormously worsened by American government resistance to overseas food relief efforts. Perhaps these numbers should not be so totally surprising given that the official Morgenthau Plan had envisioned the elimination of around 20 million Germans, and as Bacque demonstrates, top American leaders quietly agreed to continue that policy in practice even while they renounced it in theory.
Assuming these numbers are even remotely correct, the implications are quite remarkable. The toll of the human catastrophe experienced in post-war Germany would certainly rank among the greatest in modern peacetime history, far exceeding the deaths that occurred during the Ukrainian Famine of the early 1930s and possibly even approaching the wholly unintentional losses during Mao’s Great Leap Forward of 1959-61.

相反，巴克试图根据对德国各种人口普查的人口总数的审查以及记录的大量德国难民的流入，提供更现实的估计。通过这一简单的分析，他提出了一个合理有力的理由，即在这一时期，德国人的额外死亡人数至少在1000万左右，可能还少估计了数百万。此外，他还提供了大量证据，证明饥荒要么是蓄意造成的，要么至少是由于美国政府对海外食品救援努力的抵制而严重恶化的。考虑到官方的摩根索计划设想消灭大约2000万德国人，也许这些数字不应该那么令人惊讶，正如巴克所展示的那样，美国高层领导人悄悄地同意在实践中继续执行这一政策，尽管他们在理论上放弃了这一政策。
即使这些数字只有一点点正确，其含义也相当显著。战后德国所经历的人类灾难的死亡人数无疑是现代和平时期历史上最大的，远远超过了20世纪30年代初乌克兰饥荒期间的死亡人数……。

Furthermore, the post-war German losses would vastly outrank either of these other unfortunate events in percentage terms and this would remain true even if the Bacque’s estimates are considerably reduced. Yet I doubt if even a small fraction of one percent of Americans are today aware of this enormous human calamity. Presumably memories are much stronger in Germany itself, but given the growing legal crackdown on discordant views in that unfortunate country, I suspect that anyone who discusses the topic too energetically risks immediate imprisonment.
To a considerable extent, this historical ignorance has been heavily fostered by our governments, often using underhanded or even nefarious means. Just like in the old decaying USSR, much of the current political legitimacy of today’s American government and its various European vassal-states is founded upon a particular narrative history of World War II, and challenging that account might have dire political consequences. Bacque credibly relates some of the apparent efforts to dissuade any major newspaper or magazine from running articles discussing the startling findings of his first book, thereby imposing a “blackout” aimed at absolutely minimizing any media coverage. Such measures seem to have been quite effective, since until eight or nine years ago, I’m not sure I had ever heard a word of these shocking ideas, and I have certainly never seen them seriously discussed in any of the numerous newspapers or magazines that I have carefully read over the last three decades.

此外，以百分比计算，战后德国的损失将远远超过上述任何一件不幸事件，即使巴克的估计大幅下调，这一结论仍将成立。然而，我怀疑今天是否有不到百分之一的美国人意识到这场巨大的人类灾难。大概在德国，人们的记忆要强烈得多，但考虑到在这个不幸的国家，对不和谐观点的法律打击越来越大，我怀疑，任何过于积极地讨论这个话题的人，都有立即入狱的风险。
在相当大的程度上，这种对历史的无知在很大程度上是由我们的政府助长的，他们经常使用不正当甚至邪恶的手段。就像老旧的苏联一样，当今美国政府及其各个欧洲附属国的政治合法性，在很大程度上是建立在对第二次世界大战的特定叙述历史之上的，挑战这种叙述可能会带来可怕的政治后果。
巴克令人信服地内容，导致一些明显的干涉以阻止任何主要报纸或杂志发表文章，讨论他的第一本书的惊人发现，从而实施“封锁”，旨在绝对减少任何媒体报道。这些措施似乎相当有效，因为直到八、九年前，我不确定我是否听到过这些令人震惊的想法，而且我在过去三十年中仔细阅读的众多报纸或杂志中，我肯定从未看到过它们被认真讨论过。

In assessing the political factors that apparently produced such an enormous and seemingly deliberate death toll among German civilians long after the fighting had ended, an important point should be made. Historians seeking to demonstrate Hitler’s tremendous wickedness or to suggest his knowledge of various crimes committed during the course of the Second World War are regularly forced to sift tens of thousands of his printed words for a suggestive phrase here and there, and then interpret these vague allusions as absolutely conclusive declarative statements. Those who fail to stretch the words to fit, such as renowned British historian David Irving, will sometimes see their careers destroyed as a consequence.

在评估政治因素时，应该指出一个重要的观点，这些因素显然在战斗结束很久之后才在德国平民中造成如此巨大的、似乎是故意造成的死亡人数。历史学家们试图证明希特勒的滔天罪行，或暗示他对二战期间犯下的各种罪行了如指掌，他们经常被迫从他成千上万的印刷文字中筛选一个暗示性的短语，然后将这些模糊的典故解释为绝对结论性的陈述。那些没有把词语拉长到合适的程度的人，比如著名的英国历史学家大卫·欧文(David Irving)，有时会发现自己的职业生涯因此而毁于一旦。

But as early as 1940, an American Jew named Theodore Kaufman became so enraged at what he regarded as Hitler’s mistreatment of German Jewry that he published a short book evocatively entitled Germany Must Perish!, in which he explicitly proposed the total extermination of the German people. And that book apparently received favorable if perhaps not entirely serious discussion in many of our most prestigious media outlets, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Time Magazine. If such sentiments were being freely expressed in certain quarters even before America’s actual entrance into the military conflict, then perhaps the long-hidden policies that Bacque seems to have uncovered should not be so totally shocking to us.

但早在1940年，一位名叫西奥多·考夫曼(Theodore Kaufman)的美国犹太人就对他所认为的希特勒对德国犹太人的虐待感到非常愤怒，以至于他出版了一本名为《德国必须灭亡!》在那篇文章中，他明确提出要彻底消灭德国人民。这本书显然得到了许多最有声望的媒体的好评，即使不是完全严肃的讨论，包括《纽约时报》、《华盛顿邮报》和《时代》杂志。如果这种情绪在美国真正介入军事冲突之前就已经在某些地区自由表达了，那么巴克似乎已经揭露的长期隐藏的政策就不应该让我们感到如此震惊。


Question 5: The Pearl Harbor Attack
Was Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor unexpected or was it preceded by numerous US provocations that compelled Japan to respond militarily?
Ron Unz—On December 7, 1941, Japan’s military forces launched a surprise attack against our Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor, sinking many of our largest warships and killing more than 2,400 Americans. As a result, America was suddenly propelled into World War II and that date “lived in infamy” as one of the most famous in our national history.
At the time, nearly all ordinary Americans regarded the Japanese attack as a shocking, unprovoked bolt-from-the-blue, and for more than 80 years, our mainstream history books and media coverage have reinforced that strong impression.

问题5:珍珠港事件
日本偷袭珍珠港是出乎意料的，还是美国的多次挑衅迫使日本做出军事回应?
1941年12月7日，日本军队对驻扎在珍珠港的美国太平洋舰队发动了突然袭击，击沉了许多大型军舰，2400多名美国人丧生。结果，美国突然被推入了第二次世界大战，而那一天作为美国历史上最著名的日子之一，“生活在耻辱之中”。 当时，几乎所有的普通美国人都认为日本的袭击是一个令人震惊的、无缘无故的晴天霹雳，80多年来，我们的主流历史书籍和媒体报道强化了这种强烈印象。

But as I explained in 2019, the actual facts are entirely different:
From 1940 onward, FDR had been making a great political effort to directly involve America in the war against Germany, but public opinion was overwhelmingly on the other side, with polls showing that up to 80% of the population were opposed. All of this immediately changed once the Japanese bombs dropped on Hawaii, and suddenly the country was at war.
Given these facts, there were natural suspicions that Roosevelt had deliberately provoked the attack by his executive decisions to freeze Japanese assets, embargo all shipments of vital fuel oil supplies, and rebuff the repeated requests by Tokyo leaders for negotiations.

但正如我在2019年解释的那样，实际情况完全不同：
从1940年开始，罗斯福在政治上做出了巨大的努力，让美国直接参与对德战争，但公众舆论压倒性地站在另一边，民意调查显示，多达80%的人反对。日本在夏威夷投下炸弹后，这一切都立刻改变了，这个国家突然陷入了战争。
鉴于这些事实，人们自然会怀疑罗斯福是通过他的行政决定——冻结日本资产、禁止所有重要燃油供应的运输、拒绝东京领导人一再提出的谈判要求——故意挑起了这次袭击。

In the 1953 volume edited by Barnes, noted diplomatic historian Charles Tansill summarized his very strong case that FDR sought to use a Japanese attack as his best “back door to war” against Germany, an argument he had made the previous year in a book of that same name. Over the decades, the information contained in private diaries and government documents seems to have almost conclusively established this interpretation, with Secretary of War Henry Stimson indicating that the plan was to “maneuver [Japan] into firing the first shot”
By 1941 the U.S. had broken all the Japanese diplomatic codes and was freely reading their secret communications. Therefore, there has also long existed the widespread if disputed belief that the president was well aware of the planned Japanese attack on our fleet and deliberately failed to warn his local commanders, thereby ensuring that the resulting heavy American losses would produce a vengeful nation united for war.

在巴恩斯1953年编辑的这本书中，著名的外交历史学家查尔斯·坦西尔(Charles Tansill)总结了他非常有力的论点，即罗斯福试图利用日本的攻击作为他对德国最好的“战争后门”，这是他在前一年的一本同名书中提出的论点。几十年来，私人日记和政府文件中的信息似乎几乎完全证实了这一解释，战争部长亨利·斯廷森(Henry Stimson)表示，该计划是“操纵(日本)打响第一枪”。
到1941年，美国已经破译了日本所有的外交密码，并自由地阅读了他们的秘密通信。因此，长期以来，人们普遍认为，尽管存在争议，但总统很清楚日本计划袭击我们的舰队，并故意没有向他的地方指挥官发出警告，从而确保美国的重大损失将导致一个报复心很强的国家联合起来发动战争。

Tansill and a former chief researcher for the Congressional investigating committee made this case in the same 1953 Barnes volume, and the following year a former US admiral published The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, providing similar arguments at greater length. This book also included an introduction by one of America’s highest-ranking World War II naval commanders, who fully endorsed the controversial theory.
In 2000, journalist Robert M. Stinnett published a wealth of additional supporting evidence, based upon his eight years of archival research, which was discussed in a recent article. A telling point made by Stinnett is that if Washington had warned the Pearl Harbor commanders, their resulting defensive preparations would have been noticed by the local Japanese spies and relayed to the approaching task force; and with the element of surprise lost, the attack probably would have been aborted, thus frustrating all of FDR’s long-standing plans for war. Although various details may be disputed, I find the evidence for Roosevelt’s foreknowledge quite compelling.

坦西尔和国会调查委员会的前首席研究员在1953年出版的同一本书中提出了这一观点，次年，一位前美国海军上将出版了《珍珠港的最后秘密》，以更长的篇幅提供了类似的论点。这本书还包括美国二战期间最高级别海军指挥官之一的介绍，他完全赞同这一有争议的理论。
2000年，记者罗伯特·M·斯廷内特(Robert M. Stinnett)根据他八年的档案研究，发表了大量额外的支持证据，最近的一篇文章对此进行了讨论。斯廷内特提出的一个说明问题的观点是，如果华盛顿向珍珠港指挥官发出警告，他们所做的防御准备就会被当地的日本间谍注意到，并传递给正在逼近的特遣部队。由于失去了出其不意的因素，这次袭击很可能会流产，从而使罗斯福长期以来的战争计划落空。尽管各种细节可能存在争议，但我发现罗斯福的预见证据相当令人信服。

Last year I further extended these arguments:
This historical reconstruction is strongly supported by much additional material. During this period, Prof. Revilo P. Oliver had held a senior position in Military Intelligence, and when he published his memoirs four decades later, he claimed that FDR had deliberately tricked the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor. Knowing that Japan had broken Portugal’s diplomatic codes, FDR informed the latter country’s ambassador of his plans to wait until the Japanese had over-extended themselves, then order the Pacific Fleet to launch a devastating surprise attack against their home islands. According to Oliver, Japan’s subsequent diplomatic cables revealed they had successfully been convinced that FDR planned to suddenly attack them.
Indeed, just a couple of months before Pearl Harbor, Argosy Weekly, one of America’s most popular magazines, carried a fictional cover story describing exactly such a devastating surprise attack on Tokyo in retaliation for a naval incident, with the powerful bombers of our Pacific Fleet inflicting huge damage upon the unprepared Japanese capital. I wonder whether the Roosevelt Administration didn’t have a hand in getting that story published.

去年，我进一步扩展了这些论点:
这种历史重建得到了许多额外材料的有力支持。在此期间，Revilo P. Oliver教授在军事情报部门担任高级职位，四十年后出版回忆录时，他声称罗斯福故意欺骗日本人袭击珍珠港。
罗斯福知道日本已经打破了葡萄牙的外交密码，他通知葡萄牙大使，他计划等到日本人过度扩张后，再命令太平洋舰队对他们的本土岛屿发动毁灭性的突然袭击。根据奥利弗的说法，日本随后的外交电报显示，他们已经成功地相信罗斯福计划突然袭击他们。
事实上，就在珍珠港事件发生前几个月，美国最受欢迎的杂志之一《阿尔戈西周刊》(Argosy Weekly)刊登了一篇虚构的封面故事，描述了为报复一起海军事件而对东京进行的一次毁灭性的突然袭击，我们太平洋舰队的强大轰炸机对毫无准备的日本首都造成了巨大的破坏。我想知道罗斯福政府是否参与了这篇报道的发表。

As early as May 1940, FDR had ordered the Pacific Fleet relocated from its San Diego home port to Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, a decision strongly opposed as unnecessarily provocative and dangerous by James Richardson, its commanding admiral, who was fired as a result. Moreover:
There was also a very strange domestic incident that immediately followed the Pearl Harbor attack, one which seems to have attracted far too little interest. In that era, films were the most powerful popular media, and although Gentiles constituted 97% of the population, they controlled only one of the major studios; perhaps coincidentally, Walt Disney was also the only high-ranking Hollywood figure perched squarely within the anti-war camp. And the day after the surprise Japanese attack, hundreds of U.S. troops seized control of Disney Studios, allegedly in order to help defend California from Japanese forces located thousands of miles away, with the military occupation continuing for the next eight months.

早在1940年5月，罗斯福就下令将太平洋舰队从圣地亚哥的母港搬迁到夏威夷的珍珠港，这一决定遭到指挥官詹姆斯·理查森(James Richardson)的强烈反对，认为这是不必要的挑衅和危险，他因此被解雇。此外:
珍珠港事件发生后，美国国内也发生了一件非常奇怪的事件，这件事似乎很少引起人们的兴趣。在那个时代，电影是最强大的大众媒体，尽管非犹太人占人口的97%，他们依然控制了一家主要的电影公司。也许巧合的是，华特·迪士尼也是好莱坞唯一一个完全站在反战阵营中的高层人物。在日军突然袭击的第二天，数百名美军占领了迪斯尼影城，据称是为了帮助保护加州不受数千英里外日军的攻击，军事占领持续了接下来的8个月。

Consider what suspicious minds might have thought if on September 12, 2001, President Bush had immediately ordered his military to seize the CBS network offices, claiming that such a step was necessary to help protect New York City against further Islamicist attacks.
Pearl Harbor was bombed on a Sunday and unless FDR and his top aides were fully aware of the pending Japanese assault, they surely would have been totally preoccupied with the aftermath of the disaster. It seems highly unlikely that the U.S. military would have been ready to seize control of Disney studios early Monday morning following an actual “surprise” attack.

试想一下，如果布什总统在2001年9月12日立即下令军队占领哥伦比亚广播公司网络办公室，声称这一步骤有助于保护纽约市免受进一步的伊斯兰袭击，多疑的人会怎么想。
珍珠港是在一个周日被轰炸的，除非罗斯福和他的高级助手充分意识到日本即将发动袭击，否则他们肯定会全神贯注于灾难的善后工作。美国军方似乎不太可能在周一早上发生真正的“突然”袭击后，准备好控制迪士尼工作室。