For years, Saudi Arabia has vowed to intervene in the oil market only in concert with OPEC bigwigs — and rarely, if ever, alone.

多年来，沙特阿拉伯一直誓言只在与石油输出国组织的协调下干预石油市场，很少情况下单独行动。

Call it the oil version of “all for one, one for all.” On Sunday, Riyadh threw away its own rule book, announcing a unilateral output cut that would push the country’s production down to levels rarely seen in the last decade.

可以称之为“人人为我、我为人人”的石油版。然而在周日，利雅得扔掉了自己的规则，宣布了单方面减产，将该国的产量推至过去十年中很少出现的水平。

The market reaction? Meh. Oil rose a lackluster 2% in early trading on Monday, with Brent still below $80 a barrel.

市场反应呢？周一早盘油价涨幅不足2%，布伦特原油仍不到每桶80美元。

Few Saudi officials understand better than Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman the “never alone” mantra. The current Saudi oil minister attended his first OPEC meeting in 1987. It was a teaching moment for the young royal. For several years, Riyadh had cut oil production unilaterally to support prices, ceding market share to rivals inside and outside OPEC. At one point in late 1985, with output barely covering domestic consumption, the kingdom threw in the towel and sharply boosted output, triggering a price collapse.

很少有沙特官员比阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹·本·萨勒曼王子更理解“永远不要孤军作战”的口号。现任沙特石油部长在1987年参加了他的第一次石油输出国组织会议，那是一个为这位年轻的王室成员提供教训的时刻。多年来，利雅得一直单方面减少石油产量以支撑价格，削弱了在石油输出国组织内外的竞争对手的市场份额。在1985年末的某个时刻，由于产量几乎无法满足国内消费需求，该国放弃了减产，急剧提高了产量，导致价格崩溃。

So why has Prince Abdulaziz, a critic of previous Saudi ministers who acted alone, taken the solo route?

那么为什么是批评此前沙特部长单独行动的阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹王子采取孤军奋战的路线呢？

On Sunday, Riyadh announced it will reduce output by 10% in July. Coming on top of cuts in May and June, which only included a handful of OPEC nations rather than the whole group, it would reduce Saudi output to 9 million barrels a day. Excluding a period during the COVID-19 pandemic, when demand plunged, Saudi oil output would drop to a level unseen in more than a decade. Riyadh regularly pumped more than 9 million barrels a day in 2003 and again from 2005 to 2008.

在周日，利雅得宣布将在7月份减少10%的产量。这还紧随5月和6月的减产，这两个月的减产仅涵盖了少数石油输出国组织国家而不是整个组织。这将把沙特产量降至每天900万桶，除了新冠疫情期间需求暴跌的一个时期，沙特石油产量将降至十多年来前所未有的水平。利雅得在2003年以及2005年至2008年再次稳定地每天输送了900万桶以上的石油产量。

The cut is meant to be only for July, but the Saudis indicated it may be extended if needed. Oil traders reckon that’s likely. Prince Abudlaziz said the cut highlighted how the kingdom “will do whatever is necessary to bring stability to this market.” For stability, read higher oil prices.

这次减产计划仅适用于七月份，但沙特阿拉伯表示，如有必要，这一减产可能会延长。石油交易商认为这是有可能的。阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹王子表示，这次减产凸显了这个王国“将采取一切必要措施来使市场稳定。” 稳定的前提是更高的油价。

Because Riyadh is forfeiting so much production, unless prices rally over the next few days it would end giving up an enormous amount of petroleum revenue. Everyone else inside the OPEC+ alliance would reap the benefits. To keep earnings unchanged, Riyadh needs oil to surge by more than $10 a barrel to offset the drop in production from April to July. It’s impossible to know what would have happened to oil prices had the Saudis kept output unchanged. But for now, it doesn’t look like the strategy is paying off.

由于利雅得正在放弃这么多产量，除非价格在未来几天反弹，否则它将放弃大量的石油收入。欧佩克+联盟内的其他人将受益。为了保持收入不变，利雅得需要油价上涨超过10美元/桶，以抵消4月到7月产量下降的影响。不可能预知沙特阿拉伯如果维持产量不变，油价会发生什么。但现在看起来，这种策略似乎没有取得成功。

Still, if one accepts the Saudi narrative, the cut is the oil market equivalent to “shock-and-awe” in modern warfare. It will rapidly tighten a market that was about to get tighter anyway thanks to seasonally rising oil demand. Using the supply-and-demand balances published by the International Energy Agency, the oil market may be undersupplied by more than 1.5 million barrels a day during the second half of the year. That’s a huge gap that requires higher prices. Also, because Riyadh doesn’t cheat on its oil-output pledges, as others in OPEC do, the impact of the extra cuts would be truly felt in the physical petroleum market. Over time, the physical market tightness will spread into the world of financial contracts in Wall Street, flushing out speculators.

尽管如此，如果人们接受沙特的说法，这次减产就像现代战争中的“惊天动地”一样影响石油市场。它将迅速紧缩市场，因为季节性需求上升，市场正变得更为紧张。根据国际能源署发布的供求平衡数据，下半年石油市场的供应可能会出现超过150万桶/日的缺口，这需要更高的价格。此外，由于利雅得不像欧佩克内的其他国家那样舞弊减产，这些额外的减产将真正在实际的石油市场中起到作用。随着时间的推移，实际市场的紧张局势将蔓延到华尔街金融合同领域，把投机者逼出市场。

Taking a sympathetic view, the cut dubbed the “Saudi lollipop” by Prince Abdulaziz is bullish, perhaps marking a first step to drive oil prices back to the $90 to $100 range the Saudis prefer. Unlike in the 1980s, the Saudis don’t face massive competition. Back then, oil production was gushing everywhere. Now, even the U.S. shale industry is somewhat on the back foot and Russia isn’t in a position to increase production either.

从同情的角度看，阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹王子的减产是看涨的，也许标志着推动油价回到沙特欲望的90到100美元/桶的第一步。与20世纪80年代不同，沙特面临的竞争压力要小得多。当时，石油产量到处都有。现在，即使是美国的页岩油产业也有些处于被动，俄罗斯也无法增加产量。

But there’s a far less rosy view. The skeptical perspective says the OPEC weekend didn’t go Saudi Arabia’s way and Prince Abdulaziz was, effectively, forced into a solo cut. Since Riyadh roped Russia into the cartel in 2016, it meant that both countries would cut in unison. Over the weekend, no deeper output reductions were pledged by Moscow, which instead simply extended the length of curbs previously announced. Moreover, many inside OPEC were skeptical, to put it mildly, that the Russians were even delivering on those supply promises. And with the United Arab Emirates winning an increase in its quota for 2024, that nation will soon be adding oil into the market, irrespective of what the Saudis do. The dichotomy of Saudi Arabia cutting output to a 10-year low while its neighbor prepares to open the taps is telling.

但也有一种更悲观的观点。持怀疑态度的人认为，欧佩克周末并未对沙特阿拉伯起到作用，阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹王子实际上是被迫独自削减产量。自2016年开始，利雅得将俄罗斯纳入了欧佩克。在周末，莫斯科没有承诺更深入的减产，而是仅延长了之前公布的限制时间。此外，欧佩克内部许多人对俄罗斯是否履行了这些供应承诺表示怀疑。随着阿联酋赢得了其2024年配额的增加，无论沙特阿拉伯怎么做，该国很快将向市场增加石油。沙特阿拉伯削减产量达到10年低点，而其邻国准备开启油龙头之间的差异显而易见。

Put together, both measures indicate that Moscow and Abu Dhabi are more content with lower oil prices than Riyadh is. Both are vocal enough to get their way, too. If that’s true, Saudi Arabia could be forced to shoulder more of the weight of managing the oil market alone if it wants to keep prices elevated — much as it had to do in the 1980s.

综合起来，这两项措施表明，莫斯科和阿布扎比更愿意接受较低的油价，而利雅得不愿意。两个国家都有足够的发言权，如果真是这样，沙特阿拉伯将不得不承担更多石油市场管理的重任，以保持高油价——正如1980年代所做的那样。

It’s a high-reward but extremely high-risk strategy. The Saudis are hoping their unilateral cut will be short-lived and soon the market would tighten enough to require more of their oil. That was the bet, too, in the 1980s. Back then, the strategy failed spectacularly. Hopefully for Prince Abdulaziz, the lessons learnt may mean he succeeds where his predecessors stumbled.

这是一个高回报但极高风险的策略。沙特阿拉伯希望它的单边削减计划将是短暂的，很快市场将变得紧张，需要更多的石油。这也是1980年代的赌注。当时该策略失败得非常惨烈。希望阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹王子从中吸取教训，取得成功。