网友讨论：从军事角度看，俄乌战争给我们带来了什么教训?

Joe Willmore Follow
These “lessons” include some that veteran war fighters will go “we learned this 100 years ago back in….” and they’re right. Practically none of this is revolutionary, stand-on-your-head, turn all military doctrine upside down. I’m also going to skip lessons about motivation because there is a big difference between the forces in that regard but that’s kind of a no-brainer I’d hope. However, some of these lessons I do note call in to question (just to speak of the US military) some of our force structure and much of our combat doctrine for conventional warfare. Finally, let me apologize for the length—but this is the “short version” of what we’ve learned from this war so far.
1.Fighting against civilians and non-uniformed combatants (whether it’s Afghanistan or Chechniya) is not the same as fighting against a military that has infrastructure, modern weaponry and can do more than fight in small units. Success in Syria doesn’t equal success in Ukraine.
2.There is a very reasonable question about the survivability and viability of rotary wing aircraft in a combat zone flying at less than 5,000 feet. I’m really serious about this—are helos viable in contest air space against a modern army?

这些“教训”包括一些老兵会说的“我们100年前在....学到的他们是对的”。实际上这些都不是革命性的，不会让你觉得醍醐灌顶，颠覆你以往所有的军事理论。我也会跳过关于动机的课程，因为在这方面不同的力量之间有很大的不同，但我希望这是很简单的。然而，我确实注意到的一些教训对我们的一些部队结构和常规战争的战斗理论提出了质疑(仅就美军而言)。最后，请允许我为篇幅太长而道歉——但这是迄今为止我们从这场战争中学到的东西的“简短版本”。
1. 与平民和不穿制服的战斗人员(无论是在阿富汗还是车臣)的作战方式与拥有基础设施、现代武器、更擅长大部队作战的军队作战是不一样的。在叙利亚的成功并不等于在乌克兰就能成功。
2. 旋转翼飞机在飞行高度低于5000英尺的战区的生存能力一直是一个非常值得探究的问题。我对这个问题是认真的——直升机在与现代军队的空中竞争中是否具有可用性?

3.UAVs (drones) are a critical element of modern warfare now. For recon, to provide air cover, to launch strikes against AFVs and other hard targets (mobile or stationary). And the flip side, is mobile forces that do not have good anti-UAV measures will be decimated.
4.Higher tech doesn’t always mean better tech or better weapons. The Obama Administration provided high-end UAVs with weapons to Ukraine. Russia has spent a decade figuring out how to defeat them (and did). So the Ukrainians came up with a low-tech UAV (that was smaller, less footprint) and bought something similar from Turkey and Russia had no answer.
5.Aircraft flying below 10,000 feet that aren’t accompanied with a mix of ground forces/artillery strikes to take out SAMS, electronic counter-measure aircraft to deal other SAMs and MANPADS, are also incredibly vulnerable. Let me translate: strike aircraft going in without substantial support from other weapons systems and technology have very questionable survivability in the modern battlefield.

3. 无人机是现代战争的一个关键因素。用于侦察，提供空中掩护，对装甲战车和其他坚固目标(移动或静止的)发动打击。另一方面，没有良好的反无人机措施的机动部队将会被摧毁。
4. 更高的技术并不总是意味着更好的技术或更好的武器。奥巴马政府向乌克兰提供了可携带武器的高端无人机。俄罗斯花了10年时间研究如何击败它们(并且做到了)。所以乌克兰人想出了一种低技术含量的无人机(更小，杀伤范围更小)，并从土耳其购买了类似的东西，这让俄罗斯没有应对手段。
5. 在1万英尺以下飞行的飞机，如果没有混合地面部队/炮兵打击来摧毁地对空导弹，没有电子对抗飞机来对付其他地对空导弹和便携式防空导弹，也非常容易受到攻击。让我翻译一下: 在没有其他武器系统和技术支持的情况下，攻击机在现代战场上的生存能力是非常值得怀疑的。

6.Mobility matters. The ability to rain fire from a range of weapons and distances means that establishing a defensive wall or line that doesn’t move is very dubious. Instead, defenses need to maneuver. Which gets us to…
7.Small unit effectiveness is critical. This is actually many lessons. The ability to operate behind enemy lines to cripple supplies needs to be more than just a Special Operations function. Much modern combat will be in small units (in part to mitigate against artillery barrages or use of tactical nuclear weapons). The reliance on small units means initiative is critical. It means having a corp of veteran, knowledgeable NCOs who can make quick decisions and lead while in combat is critical. It means troops need to be very comfortable with a poorly defined or fluid front-line (hello USMC, Airborne, and 75th Rangers!). It means troops need to be training to take initiative and also make decisions. So rather than a highly centralized command, frontline troops that can call in air strikes or change an axis of advance—that capability is critical.
8.Rotation of units to allow rest, recovery, lessons learned debriefs, weaponry upgrades—this is critical. Ukraine did it. Russia did not. Despite heavy losses, Ukrainian forces are strong enough to mount multiple effective counter offensives. Even the best Russian frontline units are looking at being as low as 20% strength, low morale, missing key roles, inability to defend effectively. This is why the 200,000–300,000 Russian reservists are pretty much irrelevant for the next 3 months.

6. 流动性问题。从一系列远程发射炮火的武器的打击力不断增强意味着建立不移动的防线的行为是非常值得推敲的。相反，防御也需要机动力。我们需要明白这一点…
7. 小单位部队的作战效率是关键。这其实是很多教训。在敌后行动破坏补给的能力不仅仅是特种作战部队的一项职能。现代战争中许多战斗将以小单位部队的碰撞进行(部分原因是为了减少炮火和战术核武器的使用)。对小单位部队作战的依赖意味着主动性至关重要。这意味着队伍中需要拥有一个经验丰富、知识渊博的军士长，他们能够在战斗中迅速做出决定并发挥领导作用，这是至关重要的。这意味着部队需要非常适应一个模糊的或流动的前线(你好，美国海军陆战队，空降兵和75游骑兵!)这意味着军队需要接受相应的训练，以便能够占据主动并做出正确决策。因此，与高度集中的部队作战的指挥不同，前线部队可以呼叫空袭或改变前进轴的能力是至关重要的。
8. 轮换部队休整、恢复、总结经验教训、升级武器——这是至关重要的。乌克兰和俄罗斯都没有如此。尽管损失惨重，但乌克兰军队强大到足以发动多次有效的反攻。即使是最好的俄罗斯前线部队也只有20%的兵力能给发挥作用，俄军士气低落，没有关键角色，无法有效防御。这就是为什么20万到30万的俄罗斯预备役军人在接下来的3个月里几乎对战局是无关紧要的。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

9.The impact of having “better weapons” or “better technology” is overrated. There are exceptions of course. But almost across the board, Russia has had better aircraft, better artillery, better AFVs, better warships in this fight. The higher/better technology has belonged to the Russians. If this was a video game, Ukraine lost on Feb. 26, 2022. The weapons matter to the extent they exploit a critical weakness that the enemy can’t deal with and they also work with your doctrine. Thus, the Turkish drones were outstanding for Ukraine. The Iranian drones (even better technology than Turkish ones) are having far less impact on the battlefield. Some of you will say “but what about HIMARS?” That proves my point. Russia has weapons that can strike from a longer distance than HIMARS. Ukraine has used this weapon wisely. For Ukraine, it’s being used against Russian command centers, supply depots, railroad crossings, and chokepoints. It’s having a decisive impact on this war—not because it’s a magical weapons system but because it hammers the Russians at a critical weakness—their logistics. Which gets us to…

9. 拥有“更好的武器”或“更好的技术”的影响被高估了。当然也有例外。但在这场战战争中，俄罗斯几乎拥有着更好的飞机、更好的火炮、更好的装甲战车和更好的军舰。更高/更好的技术属于俄罗斯人。如果这是一场电子游戏，乌克兰在2022年2月26日就输了。武器的重要性在于，它们利用了敌人无法对付的关键弱点，而且它们也符合你的原则。因此，土耳其无人机对乌克兰来说非常出色。伊朗无人机(甚至比土耳其无人机技术更好)在战场上的影响力要小得多。你们中的一些人会说"那HIMARS呢? "这证明了我的观点。俄罗斯拥有比HIMARS更远距离打击的武器。乌克兰明智地使用了这一武器。对乌克兰来说，它被用来打击俄罗斯的指挥中心、补给仓库、铁路过境点和咽喉要道。它对这场战争有着决定性的影响，不是因为它是一个神奇的武器系统，而是因为它打击了俄国人的一个关键弱点——他们的后勤保障。这让我们谨记…
注：HIMARS-M142高机动性多管火箭系统

10.In a modern war that lasts more than 3 days, logistics trumps everything. Modern armies fighting a modern war burn through supplies (food, fuel, rounds, weapons) in massive amounts. If you can’t keep your forces well supplied, if you can’t keep your tubed artillery with sufficient rounds, your offensive (or defensive) plans breakdown and you get your butt handed to you. Relevant to this, you can’t rely on one primary means of supply (like a critical airfield, or railroads) which create chokepoints that long distance weapons or special operators can hit. To me, there are two “impossible” lessons from this war so far and this is one of them. People who just focus on the war porn or stories about a weapons system (“Go HIMARS!”) are missing the larger issue. This isn’t just about loading crates of ammunition on a railroad in Germany, shipping them across Poland and offloading them at the border with Ukraine. Russia would interdict that easily. Instead, the supply chain from the West to Ukraine uses hundreds of channels and is constantly changing. And this is a high attrition war—Ukraine needs everything but AFVs. And yet they’re not running out. And unlike Russia, their military isn’t having to ration rounds because of shortages. Or their troops aren’t going 2–3 days without food. This is the amazing story of this war that the public isn’t focusing on and very little coverage is about (in part because we don’t want the Russians to know about transit points, routes, etc.).

10. 在一场持续3天以上的现代战争中，后勤保障胜过一切。现代军队在现代战争中会大量物资(食物、燃料、弹药、武器)。如果你不能让你的部队得到充足的补给，如果你不能让你的管状火炮拥有足够的弹药，你的进攻(或防御)计划就会崩溃，你就会被抓个正着。与此相关的是，你不能单独依赖于一个主要的供应手段(如关键的机场或铁路)，这将创造出远程武器或特种作战人员能够击中的关键节点。对我来说，到目前为止，这场战争有两个“不可能”的教训，这是其中之一。那些只关注战争进度或武器系统的故事(“加油，HIMARS!”)的人忽略了更大的问题。这不仅仅是在德国的铁路上装载成箱的弹药，然后把它们运到波兰，然后在乌克兰的边境上卸货。这样的话，俄罗斯可以很容易就能阻止。相反，从西方到乌克兰的供应链使用了数百个渠道，而且在不断变化。这是一场高消耗战争，乌克兰除了装甲战车什么都需要。然而，它们并没有耗尽。与俄罗斯不同的是，他们的军队不需要因为弹药短缺而实行定量配给。或者他们的军队不会连续2-3天没有食物。这是这场战争的惊人故事，公众没有关注，也很少报道(部分原因是我们不想让俄罗斯人知道那些过境点、路线等)。

11.You need to simultaneous prepare for cyber and communications supremacy and plan to have your communications shut down. This lesson stood out in the Russia invasion of Georgia and the Donbas 2015 operation. Russian troops are having to rely on commercial cellphones to communication (shades of Tannenberg!). Meanwhile the Russian cyber measures are having almost no impact on the Ukrainians—they prepared counter measures and they prepared to have their communications limited.
12.Social media can be a huge weapon. Both as a source of intelligence on the other side and also as a tool by your side (and I don’t mean mass propaganda).
13.Corruption in the Russian military is far more pervasive than the US IC or DoD perceived. Example: reactive armor on AFVs being stuffed with cardboard.
14.Counter-battery fire and capability is critical. Otherwise, with the massive amount of firepower modern weaponry can provide, you’ll be pummeled to death.
15.Force Multipliers are critical. A “Force multiplier” is something that has far more impact than you’d expect—it “punches” far beyond its weight. Here are some examples: a HIMARS strike on Russian frontlines might kill 20 Russian infantry. A HIMARS strike on a Russian Command Center might kill 5 people but incapacitate 80–100 Russian pieces of artillery. A Special Ops team of 6 operators behind the lines that takes out a bridge can suddenly force 5,000–8,000 troops to retreat because their resupply is now in-doubt. Blowing up rail lines by 2 TDF fighters can delay arrival of fuel and stop 70–100 AFVs.

11. 你需要同时为网络和通信的主导权争夺做好准备，并计划关闭你的通信。这一教训在俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚和2015年顿巴斯行动中表现得尤为突出。俄罗斯军队不得不依靠商用手机进行通信(简直是视频游戏的现实写照!)与此同时，俄罗斯的网络措施对乌克兰几乎没有影响——他们准备了应对措施，并限制了通信。
12. 社交媒体可以成为一个巨大的武器。既可以作为获取对方的情报的来源，也可以作为你身边的工具(我不是指大规模宣传)。
13. 俄罗斯军队的腐败比美国情报局或国防部所认为的要普遍得多。例如: 装甲车上的反应装甲被纸板填充。
14. 反炮台火力和能力至关重要。否则，以现代武器所能提供的大量火力，你会被轻易打死。
15. 力乘数是关键。“力量倍增器”是一种比你想象的更有影响力的东西——它的“冲击力”远远超过了它的重量。这里有一些例子: HIMARS对俄罗斯前线的打击可能会杀死20名俄罗斯步兵。HIMARS对俄罗斯指挥中心的打击可能会杀死5人，但会使80-100门俄罗斯火炮失去作战能力。一个由6名作战人员组成的特种作战小组，在防线后方摧毁一座桥梁，就能突然迫使5000 - 8000名士兵撤退，因为他们的补给问题现在充满了疑问。用2架TDF战斗机炸毁铁路可以延迟敌人燃料的到达，并阻止70-100辆装甲战车的推进。
注：HIMARS-M142高机动性多管火箭系统

16.The military should report to a civilian leader. But the civilian leader should not control military strategy. Ukraine’s military operations are determined by Ukraine’s military. Putin is increasingly controlling what Russia does in Ukraine—and it’s leading to more disasters (for Russia). Case in point: Ukrainian commanders are already mentioning about how they’re encountering conscxts reservists who’ve just been called up and they’re being slaughtered in mass. Under-equipped, not trained, no leadership, very critically—no unit cohesion, unfamiliar with the terrain or the enemy. Putin’s decision to call up the reserves is not only wildly unpopular but really dumb from a military standpoint.
17.The survivability of AFVs in a modern war environment against a decently trained and equipped enemy is in serious doubt. You can’t just “send in the tanks.” it’s critical to have manned and unmanned air cover, flankers and skirmishers, multiple columns, ground that supports the armor (so no attacks in “mud season” where you are confined to roads). The Ukrainian armor is surviving because it’s operating in small units, the Russians lack the quick reaction time to deal with mobile forces, and the Ukrainians are using a modern combined arms approach.

16. 军方应该向文职领导人汇报。但是文官领导人不应该控制军事战略的制定。乌克兰的军事行动是由乌克兰军方决定的。普京越来越多地控制俄罗斯军队在乌克兰的所作所为，这给俄罗斯军队带来了更多的灾难。举个例子: 乌克兰指挥官已经提到了他们如何遭遇刚刚征召的后备役士兵，他们被大规模屠杀。这些人装备不足，没有训练，没有领导，非常关键的是——他们没有部队凝聚力，不熟悉地形和敌人。普京征召预备役的决定不仅极不受欢迎，而且从军事角度来看也非常愚蠢。
17. 装甲战车在现代战争环境中对抗训练有素和装备精良的敌人的生存能力受到严重质疑。你不能就这么“派坦克过去”。“有载人和无人的空中掩护，侧翼有小规模步兵，多个纵队，支持装甲的地面火力是至关重要的(所以在“泥泞季节”，你即使被限制在道路上，也没有受到攻击)。乌克兰装甲部队之所以能存活下来，是因为它的作战单位很小，俄罗斯人缺乏应对机动部队的快速反应时间，乌克兰人使用的是现代的联合武器。

18.To me, the single biggest lesson (and the second “impossible” feat accomplished by Ukraine) is this: the ability to transmogrify (to use a good Calvin and Hobbes word) their military so it can fight a modern war and exploit the weaknesses of their opponent. The Ukrainian army in 2014 was “USSR-lite.” It has been trained using Russian doctrine and old Soviet equipment. They got embarrassed in 2014 and 2015. Their senior leadership concluded they couldn’t beat Russia when outnumbered, out-equipped, and using the same doctrine as the Russians. The football coach George Allen was once asked why he didn’t just sign all the players cut by the Cowboys and start them and he replied “you don’t beat the Cowboys First String with their Third String.” Ukraine took a huge gamble. While threatened (Ukraine and Russia were at war while all of this was happening), they junked just about everything they’d been taught, how they were organized, how they were supposed to use their weapons. They went through a massive retraining with a host of Western countries. They remade their doctrine on how to organize a military and how to defend their country. For instance, the original Ukrainian military didn’t have much in the way of NCO’s (but modern western militaries do—they’re essential for small unit combat and inexperienced troops). The Russians don’t have an experienced NCO corps. Ukraine developed one. Ukraine formed the TDF (Territorial Defense Force) and then the US 10th Special Forces Group began training them to be insurgents, how to ambush columns behind Russian lines, how to call in artillery strikes. The US National Guard rotating units in to Ukraine continuously to provide training (and a Ukrainian unit would simultaneously rotate to train in the US). The Ukrainian military of 2015 is unrecognizable compared to 2021. It’s not just better training or some Western weaponry. How they think, how they’re organized, what assumptions they made about this war, how they prepared for it, how they fight, their tactics—it’s all turned upside down. I would be hard-pressed to find a single element of pre-2014 Ukrainian military ground forces structure, tactics, and doctrine that hasn’t been turned upside and revisioned. This is not an easy thing to do. People have vested interested. Just look at what is happening now with the USMC and the internal battle between the Commandant and a lot of former Marine senior officers about force structure and roles. What Ukraine did in this area is impossible—except that they managed to do it. Again, this was so much more than just sending 250,000 personnel to training, this was about ditching almost everything you previously “knew” and embracing foreign concepts.

18. 对我来说，唯一最大的教训(也是乌克兰取得的第二个“不可能”成就)是: 改造(用加尔文和霍布斯的话来说)自己军队的能力，使其能够打一场现代战争，并利用对手的弱点。2014年的乌克兰军队是“苏联军队精简版”。它使用俄罗斯的理论和旧的苏联装备进行训练。他们在2014年和2015年的表现都很尴尬。他们的高层认为，在人数、装备与俄罗斯人相同的情况下，他们无法击败俄罗斯。橄榄球教练乔治·艾伦曾经被问到，为什么他不签下所有被牛仔队裁掉的球员，然后让他们首发，他回答说:“你不能用他们的第三阵容打败牛仔队的第一阵容。”乌克兰进行了一场巨大的赌博。在受到威胁时(发生这一切的时候，乌克兰和俄罗斯正处于战争状态)，他们抛弃了几乎所有他们学到的东西，包括如何组织，如何使用武器。他们在许多西方国家接受了大规模的再培训。他们重新制定了如何组织军队和如何保卫国家的教条。例如，最初的乌克兰军队没有太多的士官(但现代西方军队有-他们是小单位战斗和缺乏经验的部队必不可少的)。俄国人没有经验丰富的下士。乌克兰开始领先。乌克兰组建了TDF(领土防御部队)，然后美国第10特种部队群开始训练他们成为精英部队，教他们如何在俄罗斯防线后伏击敌人，如何召集炮火袭击。美国国民警卫队在乌克兰不断轮换部队提供训练(乌克兰部队将同时轮换到美国训练)。2015年的乌克兰军队与2021年相比简直是天壤之别。这不仅仅是更好的训练或一些西方武器。他们是如何思考的，他们是如何组织的，他们对这场战争做了什么假设，他们是如何准备的，他们是如何战斗的，他们的战术——一切都颠倒了。我很难找到2014年前乌克兰地面部队的结构、战术和理论的任何一个元素没有被颠覆和修正过。这不是一件容易的事。因为人们有既得利益。看看美国海军陆战队现在发生了什么，看看指挥官和许多前海军陆战队高级军官之间关于部队结构和角色的内部斗争。乌克兰在这一地区的所作所为是不可思议的——除非他们成功做到了。再次强调，这不仅仅是派遣教官对25万名作战人员进行培训的行为，这是抛弃你以前“知道”的几乎所有东西，然后拥抱外国概念。

19.The importance of intelligence. It had to be incredibly demoralizing for the US to publicly share the Russian invasion plans with the rest of the world just days before the jumping off point for Russia. Britain has learned this as well (see their most recent GCHQ public briefing—powerful stuff). Satellite and UAV coverage providing real-time intelligence. Special Operations units sneaking around behind the lines calling in targets. HIMARS works because of real-time satellite imagery combined with Special Ops and TDF people sneaking around behind Russian lines.
20.Ground forces have to be able to operate and fight at night. That doesn’t mean you have a set of NVGs and thus you’re good. It means you know how to organize, attack, re-group, and move under fire at night. It means you have to know how to spoof the other sides’ NVG and body heat detection systems.
I used a bunch of abbreviations in this post. Here is what they mean: AFV—armored fighting vehicle, manpads-man portable air defense system, HIMARS-high mobility artillery rocket system, NVG-night vision goggles, GCHQ—government communications head quarters—sort of the British version of the NSA, NCO-non commissioned officer (think Sergeants), USMC—US Marine Corps.

19. 智力的重要性。对于美国来说，在距离俄罗斯的发动攻击只有几天的时候，向世界其他国家公开俄罗斯的入侵计划，一定是非常令俄军泄气的行为。英国也学到了这一点(看看他们最近的政府通信指挥部的公开简报——强大的东西)。卫星和无人机覆盖提供实时情报。特别行动小组在防线后面偷偷摸摸地呼叫火力打击目标。机动火炮火箭系统的工作得益于实时卫星图像与特种部队和TDF人员在俄军后方的潜行。
20. 地面部队必须能够在夜间作战。这并不意味着你有一系列的夜视镜，所以你就是优秀的。这意味着你需要知道如何组织，攻击，重组，并在夜间的炮火下移动。这意味着你必须知道如何欺骗对方的夜间探测和体温检测系统。
我在这篇文章里用了很多缩写。这就是他们的意思:afv -装甲战车，单兵便携式防空系统，himars -高机动火炮火箭系统，nvg -夜视镜，gchq -政府通信指挥部——有点像英国版的NSA, nco -士官(想想中士)，usmc -美国海军陆战队。

Roland Bartetzko Follow
I think the most important military “innovation” of the war in Ukraine is this one:
You cannot leave an important thing such as war to the generals. Instead, you need to involve the smartest and most innovative people in your country.
This is what Ukraine is doing and this is why they’re so successful. Under normal circumstances, the scientific community of a nation, its top engineers and IT people, aren’t very keen on working for the military-industrial complex.

我认为乌克兰战争最重要的军事“创新”是:
你不能把像战争这样重要的事情单单交给将军们。相反，你需要让你的国家最聪明、最具创新力的人参与进来。
这就是乌克兰正在做的事情，也是他们如此成功的原因。在正常情况下，一个国家的科学界、顶级工程师和IT人员都不太愿意为军事工业联合体工作。

A small attack drone from a combat unit that I support with equipment. (Photo copyrights by the author of this post)
When a top university graduate or a researcher decides to work for a defense corporation, it's often because of the top dollars these companies pay. Of course, this doesn't necessarily attract the brightest people.
The nature of the war in Ukraine, however, where a democratic country was brutally attacked by its much bigger neighbor, caused many people to get involved, and this includes the scientific community.
Only six months ago, it would have been unthinkable to call, for example, a chemist or an electronics engineer, and ask them how to better produce a more potent explosive or a navigation system for an attack drone. They would have hung up the phone immediately.

一架小型攻击无人机来自我提供了装备的作战部队。(图片版权归本文作者所有)
当一名顶尖的大学毕业生或研究人员决定为国防公司工作时，通常是因为这些公司支付的高薪。当然，这并不一定会吸引最聪明的人。
然而，乌克兰战争的本质导致许多人参与其中，其中包括科学界人士。在乌克兰，一个民主国家遭到了比它大得多的邻国的残酷袭击。
就在6个月前，打电话给化学家或电子工程师，问他们如何更好地制造威力更大的炸药或为攻击型无人机设计导航系统，这是不可想象的。他们会立刻挂掉电话。

Today, many of these top scientists are advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine, even without financial compensation. The brightest and smartest people of Ukraine (and a lot of international scientists, too) are devising new ways how to kill the Russians more effectively.
For every possible problem they face, the Ukrainian military has now the smartest people in every possible scientific field at their disposal. They have access to a lot of brainpower and this gives them an enormous advantage over their adversary.
If you want to help me support Ukrainian volunteers (civilian and military, foreigners and locals), please use the contact email in my profile descxtion.

今天，这些顶级科学家中的许多人正在为乌克兰武装部队提供咨询，即使没有经济补偿。乌克兰最聪明、最智慧的人(以及许多国际科学家)正在设计新的方法，探究如何更有效地打击俄军。
对于他们面临的每一个可能的问题，乌克兰军队现在拥有每一个可能的科学领域最聪明的人。他们拥有大量的脑力，这使他们比对手拥有巨大的优势。
如果你想帮助我支持乌克兰志愿者(平民和军人，外国人和当地人)，请使用我的个人资料描述中的联系邮箱。

Chris Everett Follow
1.Manned, non-stealth aircraft are done. Finished. Scrap metal. At least when in airspace that is credibly contested. Abhirup Sengupta has been calling this for quite some time, and his views and evidence have been proven correct. Against an opponent with even a mildly competent IADS network, legacy fighters can’t operate.
2.If infantry can’t operate at night, they are dead.
3.It’s all but impossible to take ground from an actively hostile population in the 21st century.
4.Drones are critical to the future of warfare.
5.While the vulnerability of tanks has been clear really starting in Yemen, the full scope of this is now on display. Tanks require supporting forces to include aerial assets. Tanks are no longer the tip of the spear. (Drones are).

1. 有人驾驶的非隐身飞机已经落伍了，应该被淘汰了。它们就是一堆废金属，至少在有明确争议的空域是这样。阿比鲁普·森古普塔提出这个观点已经有一段时间了，他的观点和证据已经被证明是正确的。即使对手没有搭建北约整合防空系統，传统战斗机也无法继续作战了。
2. 如果步兵不能在夜间行动，他们就死定了。
3. 在21世纪，从一个充满敌意的人群手中夺取地盘几乎是不可能的。
4. 无人机对未来的战争至关重要。
5. 虽然坦克的脆弱性从也门战争开始就很明显，但这一问题的全面爆发现在已经显现出来。坦克需要支援部队包括空中支援。坦克不再是武器的尖端(无人机取代了它)。

6.Comms are both critical and vulnerable. I expect to see major investments in making better, more secure communication systems that are harder to direction find.
7.Soviet style tightly controlled planning systems are essentially suicide. Modern warfare requires flexibility and individual decision making at every level.
8.Logistics is still what professionals talk about.
9.The advantages that modern ATGM’s and related weapons provide isn’t just about stopping tanks. I’ve long advocated for infantry units that routinely incorporate heavier weapons and have less focus on the rifle. I think that this conflict proves this correct.
10.Never get involved in a land war in Asia.

6. 通信既关键又脆弱。我希望看到在更好、更安全、更难找到方向的通信系统方面的重大投资。
7. 苏联式的严格控制的作战计划本质上是自杀。现代战争需要各个层面的灵活性和个人决策。
8. 物流仍然是专业人士谈论的话题。
9. 现代反坦克导弹和相关武器的优势不仅仅在于阻止坦克推进。长期以来，我一直主张步兵部队应该常规装备重型武器，而不是步枪。我认为这个冲突证明了这是正确的。
10. 永远不要卷入亚洲的陆地战争。

Martin Porter Follow
I would take away two seemingly contradictory lessons.
Firstly, drones are here to stay. We’ve seen them in the War On Terror, but that was against an enemy with almost no air defences. US Predator and Reaper drones were not meant for high intensity conventional wars the USA would not have used them in Ukraine even if they’d been a combatant.
Russia used drones in 2014, but that was against minimal opposition too. They were widely used in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, but that was an unusual conflict too, with very little manoeuvring and mostly just artillery duels. Against a high tech enemy with an integrated air defence system, most of which had supposedly been upgraded to deal specifically with drones, they should have been much less effective. However, that has not been the case.

我会得到两个看似矛盾的教训。
首先，无人机会一直存在。我们在反恐战争中见过它们，但那是针对一个几乎没有防空系统的敌人。美国的捕食者和收割者无人机不适合高强度的常规战争，即使它们是有效可用的，美国也不会在乌克兰使用它们。
俄罗斯在2014年就使用了无人机作战，遭到的反制也很少。它们在2020年的纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫战争中被广泛使用，但那也是一场不同寻常的冲突，很少有机动作战，主要是炮兵决斗。面对一个拥有综合防空系统的高科技敌人，它们的效率应该要低得多，因为大部分防空系统应该都经过了升级，专门用来对付无人机。然而，情况并非如此。

A fair amount of this is probably Russian corruption and incompetence. A certain amount is also the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone, which is small enough and slow enough to hide in radar clutter. But Ukraine is also using ordinary commercial drones for reconnaissance purposes.
Related to the use of drones is something of a renaissance in artillery. In the clip above a mobile antiaircraft unit fires on the drone and, even though the BUK immediately starts to move off, the drone calls in an artillery barrage that destroys it. We’re used to a war fought with missiles and guided weapons, but they are expensive, and nobody has all that many. But thanks to low-cost drones, ordinary artillery is just as effective.

其中很大一部分原因可能是俄罗斯的腐败和无能。还有一部分是土耳其的Bayraktar TB2无人机，它足够小，速度足够慢，可以隐藏在雷达杂波中。但乌克兰也在使用普通商用无人机进行侦察。
与无人机的使用有关的是火炮的复兴。在上面的视频中，一个机动防空部队向无人机开火，尽管俄军的山毛榉导弹系统立即开始移动，但无人机呼叫了一波炮火，将其摧毁。我们习惯了用导弹和制导武器作战，但它们很昂贵，没有哪个国家有那么多。但由于有了低成本的无人机，普通的火炮也同样有效。

However, for all the technology that has been used in the war, the main lesson is one of leadership and morale. Having seen the Western trained, but utterly corrupt, new Iraqi army turn and run from Islamic State, and the Western trained, but utterly corrupt, Afghan National Army roll over to the Taliban, few people would have been surprised if the Armed Forces of Ukraine had done exactly the same thing.
However, instead of stuffing his pockets with bank notes and fleeing in an American helicopter, President Zelenskyjj stood and fought. So did all his generals, his soldiers and most of the population. At every stage of the conflict, we have had press briefing from upbeat Ukrainian generals, seen pictures of smiling Ukrainian troops and defiant Ukrainian civilians preparing defences, telling Russian troops to go home or, in the most iconic pictures of the war, stealing their abandoned military vehicles.

然而，对于所有在战争中使用的技术，主要的教训是领导能力和士气。目睹了西方训练但腐败不堪的新伊拉克军队逃离伊斯兰国，目睹了西方训练但腐败不堪的阿富汗国民军向塔利班投降，如果乌克兰武装部队做了完全相同的事情，很少有人会感到惊讶。
然而，泽伦斯基吉总统并没有在口袋里塞满钞票，然后乘坐美国直升机逃离，而是站在那里战斗。他所有的将军、士兵和大部分的人民都是如此。在冲突的每一个阶段，我们都听到了乐观的乌克兰将军的新闻发布会，看到了笑容可掬的乌克兰军队和无惧一切的乌克兰平民准备防御的照片，并警告俄罗斯军队回家，或者在这场战争最具标志性的照片中，偷走了他们遗弃的军用车辆。

Meanwhile on the Russian side it has been a tale of utter woe. Bewildered POWs, desperate phone calls home, doom filled intercepted radio messages and completely inept propaganda. Usually in war the side that attacks first has the advantage of surprise. Here Russia seems to have surprised itself. The conscxts went from being on a ‘training exercise’, to being ‘liberators’ to being abused by locals and then blown up. It’s not often you can feel sorry for an invading army, but I do here.
So those are my first two takeaways so far. There will be more when the dust has settled. Perhaps then we can decide if it was material or morale that won this war for Ukraine, but either way we can say quality has beaten quantity.
EDIT
There will also be major lessons to be learnt from the air war, but we have no idea what they are yet. There hasn’t been an air campaign between two equivalent level air forces since 1982, when we had the Falklands War and the Isreali invasion of Lebanon, both of which were quite different to what we have here. All we know is that against all odds Ukraine hasn’t lost the air war, and their pilots say they are ‘rewriting the rules on air warfare’ which is very definately believable.

与此同时，在俄罗斯方面，这是一个完全悲惨的故事。困惑的战俘，绝望的回家电话，被截获的无线电信息和完全无能的宣传。通常在战争中，先进攻的一方具有出其不意的优势。在这一点上，俄罗斯似乎让自己感到惊讶。应征入伍的士兵从“训练演习”变成了“解放者”，然后被当地人虐待，最后被炸死。你很少会为入侵的军队感到难过，但在这里我很难过。
以上就是我目前得到的两个结论。尘埃落定后还会有更多。也许到那时，我们就可以决定是物质还是士气为乌克兰赢得了这场战争，但无论如何，我们都可以说质量战胜了数量。
编辑：我们还将从空战中吸取重大教训，但我们还不知道这些教训是什么。自从1982年马岛战争和以色列入侵黎巴嫩以来，两支同等水平的空军之间还没有发生过空中对抗，这两起事件都与我们现在的情况大不相同。我们所知道的是，尽管困难重重，乌克兰并没有输掉空战，他们的飞行员说他们正在“改写空战规则”，这是非常可信的。

Yannis Gaitanas Follow
First the most popular, though kinda misunderstood. Drones are vital to modern warfare. Although jet fighters are still relevant, drones have basically replaced the airbombers. it doesn’t matter if you have a competent airdefence or airforce, some drone will sneak through and bomb your assets. Even if you manage to destroy most drones (which seems to be the case as Ukraine reportedly runs out of TB2s), they cost much less than the targets they destroy so they are value for money. Ironically, the smaller, cheaper (than the American) Turkish drones are more effective against antiair defence because they are harder to get spotted.

首先是最受欢迎的，虽然有点被误解。无人机对现代战争至关重要。虽然喷气式战斗机仍有用武之处，但无人机基本上已经取代了轰炸机。不管你是否有强大的防空或空军，一些无人机会潜入并轰炸你的资产。即使你设法摧毁了大多数无人机(据报道乌克兰的tb2无人机已经用完了)，它们的成本也比摧毁的目标低得多，所以它们是物有所值的。讽刺的是，土耳其无人机(比美国的)更小，更便宜，能更有效地对抗防空系统，因为它们更难被发现。

Secondly, and somewhat contradicting the first one a lesson learned is the importance of airdefence. yes, drones score hits against airdefence units but you know why? Because these are the targets generals want to take out more than anything, apart from some much better protected deep underground or individuals that are hard to be found (though US drones have routinely assassinated leaders). The role of anti-air units is so important that here’s what happened. Russia took out most of Ukrainian air defences and airforce, then lost some airdefence to Ukrainian drone attacks but still there are very few jets flying over Ukraine. Despite Russia rules the skies, it’s reluctant to put planes prone to antiair defence and helicopters that are prone to manpads. Which leads us to another lesson.
Manpads are even very useful to regular armies too. For years we had been hearing how manpads, various antitank and antihelicopter weapons were useful for guerilla fighters but they couldn’t stop armored units as a regular army themselves. Despite Ukraine is lacking a lot in tanks compared to Russia, still it got a whole lot of such weapons and put it to good use. Especially the Javelin, it’s super effective.

其次，与第一点有些矛盾的是，我们得到的教训是防空的重要性。是的，无人机能命中防空部队，但你知道为什么吗? 因为这些是将军们最想除掉的目标，除了一些在地下深处受到更好保护的人或难以被发现的个人(尽管美国无人机经常暗杀领导人)。防空部队的作用如此重要，所以发生了这样的事情。俄罗斯摧毁了乌克兰的大部分防空系统和空军，然后在乌克兰无人机的袭击下失去了一些防空系统，但仍然有很少的飞机在乌克兰上空飞行。尽管俄罗斯控制着天空，但它不愿意让飞机安装防空系统，也不愿意让直升机安装便携式防空导弹。这就引出了另一个教训。
便携式防空导弹对正规军也很有用。多年来，我们一直听说便携式防空导弹、各种反坦克和反直升机武器对游击战士有用，但它们无法阻止作为正规军的装甲部队本身。尽管与俄罗斯相比，乌克兰缺乏大量坦克，但它仍然拥有大量此类武器，并很好地利用了它们。尤其是标枪便携式导弹，它非常有效。

Another important thing is international support. Other countries being invaded by NATO didn’t get support and the world media didn’t support them. In 1974 Cyprus got invaded and instead of support got a weapons embargo while the invading Turkey got a whole lot of ships and other weapons and even a factory for hundreds of F-16s. Did the world support Iraq like Ukraine when it got invaded? Serbia? Justified or not, these countries, being isolated were overwhelmed. But Ukraine keeps getting support. I mentioned antitank weapons. I tas gotten many thousands, tens of thousands maybe, in numbers it never had before.
Next lesson, is that now the aggressor is not NATO. Russia is able (though we still don’t know if itill be victorious) to launch a large scale invasion against a big country, the biggest country in Europe after Russia itself. Despite international sanctions, it still operates just fine. People tend to downplay that but it shows how little have most European countries have invested in military.
Furthermore, it’s worth noticing how he front stabilised outside major cities and the port of Odessa.

另一件重要的事情是国际支持。其他被北约入侵的国家没有得到支持，世界媒体也不支持他们。1974年，塞浦路斯被入侵，并没有得到国际支持，而是被武器禁运，而入侵的土耳其却得到了大量的船只和其他武器，甚至还有一个生产数百架F-16战机的工厂。当伊拉克被入侵时，世界像支持乌克兰一样支持伊拉克吗? 塞尔维亚? 不管合理与否，这些被孤立的国家都不堪重负。但乌克兰一直在获得支持。我提到了反坦克武器。我们已经得到了成千上万套，也许是以前从未有过的数量。
下一个教训是，现在的侵略者不是北约。俄罗斯有能力(尽管我们还不知道是否会获胜)对一个大国发动大规模入侵，这个大国是欧洲仅次于俄罗斯的第二大国家。尽管受到国际制裁，但它仍然运转良好。人们倾向于淡化这一点，但这表明大多数欧洲国家在军事上的投资是多么的少。
此外，值得注意的是，它是如何在主要城市和敖德萨港口之外保持稳定的。

This shows that in the flat terrain of Ukraine the superior force prevails but urban warfare is a difficult task as RUssian forces sem reluctant go go in the big cities and when they try to, they fail. Similarly, despite its clear domination in the sea, Russia hesitates to launch an amphibious campaign while taking a major city might require destroying it. Things haven’t changed much at that since WWII.

​这表明，在乌克兰平坦的地形上，优势部队占上风，但城市战是一项艰巨的任务，因为俄罗斯军队可能不愿意进入大城市，当他们试图进入时，他们失败了。同样，尽管俄罗斯在海上拥有明显的统治地位，但在占领一个主要城市可能需要摧毁它的情况下，俄罗斯在发动两栖战役方面犹豫不决。自二战以来，这一情况并没有太大变化。