The balance of power in Europe is shifting as displaced Ukrainians flow westward.

随着流离失所的乌克兰人向西流动，欧洲的权力平衡正在发生变化。


Members of the local Ukrainian diaspora, war refugees, peace activists, volunteers and local supporters during the 109th day of the 'Protest Nato Close The Sky' at the Adam Mickiewicz monument in the Main Square in Krakow. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

在克拉科夫主广场亚当·密茨凯维奇纪念碑旁参与“抗议北约关闭天空”第109天活动的当地乌克兰侨民、战争难民、和平活动家、志愿者和当地支持者。

The Russian war in Ukraine—now into its fourth month and with no end in sight—has exposed some of the fault lines that divide the nations of the West. Most analyses, however, focus on material considerations such as troop counts and artillery capacity and neglect to notice the profound lack of effective leadership at every level. As a result, the West, led by the European unx in principle and the United States in practice, suffers from the lack of a strategic vision that could unite the disparate interests of its constituent nations and drum up enough pathos to convince them to hold the line. Nowhere is this lack of leadership more evident than in Europe’s policies on Ukrainian refugees. Neither the president of the United States nor any of the presidents of the European unx seem capable of balancing both the quotidian needs of their citizens and the strategic demands of the conflict against the greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Second World War.

俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争——现在已经进入第四个月，而且没有结束的迹象——已经暴露了分裂西方国家的一些断层线。然而，大多数分析都集中在部队人数和火炮能力等物质方面的考虑上，而忽视了在各个层面上严重缺乏有效的领导。因此，原则上以欧盟为首、实际上以美国为首的西方国家缺乏战略眼光，无法团结其成员国的不同利益，也无法鼓动足够的悲情来说服他们坚持到底。这种领导力的缺失在欧洲对乌克兰难民的政策中表现得最为明显。无论是美国总统还是欧盟的任何一位总统，似乎都没有能力在二战以来欧洲最大的人道主义危机中平衡其公民的日常需求和冲突的战略需求。

I recently spent a few weeks studying this issue in Poland, both in the border city of Przemyśl and Kraków, in Poland’s heartland. In my many conversations with Poles, foreign volunteers, and Ukrainian refugees, a clear narrative emerged: Despite their amazement at the heroic generosity of individual Poles, my interlocutors were troubled by the lack of a unified European unx response to the refugee crisis and worried that waning popular interest in the conflict would deliver most, if not all, of Ukraine into the hands of a relentless Russia. Almost everyone expressed concern over the sustainability of the response, especially as news began to emerge of Ukraine’s setbacks in the Donbas.

我最近花了几周时间在波兰研究这个问题，包括在边境城市普热梅希尔和波兰中心地带的克拉科夫。在我与波兰人、外国志愿者和乌克兰难民的多次交谈中，出现了一种清晰的叙述。尽管他们对个别波兰人的英勇慷慨感到惊讶，但我的对话者对欧盟缺乏对难民危机的统一反应感到不安，并担心民众对冲突的兴趣减弱会使乌克兰的大部分（如果不是全部）落入无情的俄罗斯手中。几乎所有人都对应对措施的可持续性表示担忧，尤其是当乌克兰在顿巴斯地区开始出现不利的消息时。

To assess the West’s response to the more than five million refugees who fled Ukraine, one must first dismantle the false assumption that there exists a “typical” Ukrainian refugee. The bulk of Ukraine’s refugees—not knowing where to flee and lacking the resources to flee far—remained in Ukraine. Nonetheless, no one doubted that the Ukrainians who crossed into Poland in the first days of the Russian invasion had indeed fled violence and the obliteration of their ways of life. They were mostly women and children who had gathered their lives into a single backpack. One could see them loitering in large groups outside Ukrainian cultural centers and Greek Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox churches in search of basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter. As the military situation stagnated and Polish largesse grew, however, a different type of Ukrainian began to arrive: the economic migrant. Such people headed directly to Poland’s bigger cities, such as Kraków, Warsaw, and Wrocław, where they collected government benefits and took up low-skilled jobs, largely alongside other Ukrainians in the food-service and hospitality industries.

为了评估西方对逃离乌克兰的500多万难民的反应，我们必须首先破除存在“典型的”乌克兰难民的错误假设。大部分乌克兰难民——不知道该往哪里逃，也没有资源逃得很远——仍然留在了乌克兰。然而，没有人怀疑，在俄罗斯入侵的最初几天越过边境进入波兰的乌克兰人确实是在逃避暴力和他们生活方式遭到的毁灭。他们大多是妇女和儿童，他们将自己的生活物资集中在一个背包里。人们可以看到他们成群结队地在乌克兰文化中心和希腊天主教或乌克兰东正教教堂外徘徊，寻找食物、水和住所等基本必需品。然而，随着军事局势的停滞和波兰的慷慨解囊，一种不同类型的乌克兰人开始到来：经济移民。这些人直接前往波兰的大城市，如克拉科夫、华沙和弗罗茨瓦夫，他们在那里领取政府福利并从事低技能的工作，主要是与其他乌克兰人一起从事餐饮服务和酒店业。

The path of Ukrainian migration into Europe runs through established centers of Ukrainian expatriates, which explains why roughly 80 percent of them took refuge in Poland. While nearly all passed through Przemyśl, very few stayed there, as those who had friends or relatives in Poland went to join them and those who had neither were assisted by the networks of Poles that had sprung up to provide humanitarian assistance and lodging.

乌克兰人向欧洲移民的路径贯穿了既定的乌克兰侨民中心，这就解释了为什么他们中大约80%的人在波兰避难。虽然几乎所有的人都经过普热梅希尔，但很少有人留在那里，因为那些在波兰有朋友或亲戚的人去投奔了他们，而那些既没有朋友也没有亲戚的人则得到了波兰人网络的帮助，这些网络被建立起来提供人道主义援助和住宿。

As the conflict persisted and Poland’s government began to offer more free services, such as discounted or free lodging and monthly social security payments, the proportion of economic migrants increased. Such people may have been internally displaced refugees who needed the money, or they may have been opportunists who made the trip to supplement their incomes. It is difficult to tell in the first place, and the goodwill of Poles and their government continue to give Ukrainians the benefit of the doubt. Yet the presence of that doubt and the depth of the average European’s frustration over rising costs and proliferating refugee settlements belies the air of confident competence that E.U. and national leaders work so hard to project.

随着冲突的持续和波兰政府开始提供更多的免费服务，如打折或免费的住宿和每月的社会保障金，经济移民的比例增加了。这些人可能是需要钱的国内流离失所的难民，也可能是为了贴补收入而进行旅行的机会主义者。首先很难说，波兰人及其政府的善意继续给乌克兰人以令人存疑的好处。然而，这种怀疑的存在，以及普通欧洲人对成本上升和难民安置点激增的挫败感的深度，掩盖了欧盟和国家领导人努力投射出的自信能力的氛围。

Indeed, exasperation pervades Poland. It lurks in the tents set up for refugees and it sneaks into everyday conversation, not only among Poles but among foreigners as well. Everyone wonders how long Poland’s extraordinary generosity toward Ukrainian refugees will last and, more importantly, who will pay for it. The ruling Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, abbreviated PiS) Party has permitted Ukrainians entering Poland to obtain a PESEL number (the equivalent of a Social Security number in the U.S.) and to receive all the legal and financial entitlements afforded to Polish citizens without extending citizenship itself.

事实上，波兰到处都存在着愤懑情绪。它潜伏在为难民搭建的帐篷里，并潜入到日常谈话中，不仅在波兰人之间，也在外国人之间。每个人都想知道，波兰对乌克兰难民的异常慷慨会持续多久，更重要的是，谁会为此买单。执政的法律和正义党（Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc，缩写为PiS）允许进入波兰的乌克兰人获得PESEL号码（相当于美国的社会保障号码），并获得波兰公民享有的所有法律和财务权利，而无需提供公民身份。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处


As with any form of charity, this has led to abuse. In Przemyśl, I heard numerous anecdotes from a wide variety of sources about Ukrainian women entering the country to set up their PESEL, then promptly returning to Ukraine to enjoy the monthly family stipend, paid per child, under the “500 Plus” (500 PLN per month) program. While lingering at the train station in Przemyśl, I observed dozens of well-groomed women with fresh pedicures and children with iPhones disembarking from their trains, walking past the refugee station, and heading into town to dine out and do some shopping before returning to Ukraine. In Przemyśl, one taxi driver told me, enterprising Ukrainians had bought up all the used cars and driven them back over the border.

与任何形式的慈善一样，这也导致了弊端的出现。在普热梅希尔，我从各种渠道听到了许多关于乌克兰妇女进入该国建立PESEL档案，然后迅速返回乌克兰，享受“每月500波兰兹罗提”计划下每个孩子的家庭月津贴的轶事。当我在普热梅希尔的火车站逗留时，我看到几十个整洁干净的妇女和拿着苹果手机的孩子从火车上下来，走过难民站，到城里去吃饭和购物，然后返回乌克兰。在普热梅希尔，一位出租车司机告诉我，进取的乌克兰人买下了所有的二手车，并把它们开回了边境。

Although the E.U. has granted Ukrainians the right to live and work in any of the bloc’s 27 nations for up to three years, it has left its member states to deal with the economic and social costs of the influx. Many in Poland gripe about the generosity extended to Ukrainians, pointing out that Ukrainians are receiving all the benefits of Polish citizenship without any of the tax burden or civic responsibilities. Most Ukrainians themselves have noticed this disparity. While some take it in hand as a sign of Poland’s Christian solidarity with the oppressed, others worry that it would lead to enmity in the future if the conflict continued to drag on.

尽管欧盟给予了乌克兰人在该集团27个国家中的任何一个国家生活和工作三年的权利，但它却让其成员国不得不面对难民涌入的经济和社会成本。波兰的许多人对乌克兰人的慷慨表示不满，指出乌克兰人获得了波兰公民身份的所有好处，却没有任何税收负担或公民责任。大多数乌克兰人自己也注意到了这种不平等。虽然有些人把它当作波兰对被压迫者的基督教团结的标志，但其他人担心，如果冲突继续拖下去，这将导致未来的敌意。

One Slovakian woman I happened to meet at the train station told me that she worries what effect this influx of people will have on social cohesion and stability in the affected nations. She described the train ride from Vienna to Bratislava as a window into the Ukrainization of central Europe, driven by sprawling tent cities and festering with resentment for the lifestyles that were left behind and could not be replicated in Europe, despite the best efforts of host nations and their citizens. One of my interlocutors, an Austrian volunteer, described the E.U.’s policy in recent months as “a vanishing act” and wondered how it could delay so long in providing long-term solutions to the pressures posed by refugees in E.U. nations such as Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia.

我在火车站碰巧遇到的一位斯洛伐克妇女告诉我，她担心这些人的涌入会对受影响国家的社会凝聚力和稳定产生影响。她把从维也纳到布拉迪斯拉发的火车旅程描述为欧洲中部乌克兰化的一个窗口，在无边无际的帐篷城市的推动下，对被抛弃的生活方式的怨恨不断发酵，尽管收容国及其公民做出了最大努力，但这些生活方式在欧洲无法复制。我的一位对话者，一位奥地利志愿者，将欧盟最近几个月的政策描述为“消失的行为”，并想知道它怎么能在为波兰、罗马尼亚、摩尔多瓦、匈牙利和斯洛伐克等欧盟国家的难民所带来的压力提供长期解决方案方面拖延这么久。

Nonetheless, it is telling that the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees have settled in Poland, where nearly 1.5 million have applied for temporary resident status, rather than proceed to the wealthier countries in the E.U. One Ukrainian woman told me about a news item circulating among her peers through WhatsApp, which relates that a Ukrainian woman in Germany had been raped by refugees from North Africa in a refugee-housing facility. This woman told me that she knew that such a thing would never happen in Poland, where she felt safe and welcome despite the relatively low amount of aid she was receiving.

然而，绝大多数乌克兰难民都在波兰定居，那里有近150万人申请了临时居民身份，而不是前往欧盟中较富裕的国家，这很能说明问题。一位乌克兰妇女告诉我，她的同龄人中通过WhatsApp流传着一则新闻，说德国的一名乌克兰妇女在一个难民安置设施中被来自北非的难民强奸了。这位妇女告诉我，她知道这样的事情在波兰绝对不会发生，尽管她得到的援助相对较少，但她在波兰感到安全和受欢迎。

At a playground in Krakow, where I went with a friend and his kids, a Ukrainian woman who had been living in Poland for several years before the war told us that most of the refugees she had met intended to stay in Poland for the long term. This woman, who had always spoken Russian as her first language, also noted that Putin’s aggression had led most Ukrainians she knew to begin speaking Ukrainian instead of Russian. Furthermore, Putin seems to have rekindled amity between Poles and Ukrainians despite the historical trauma that has cast a pall on relations between the two nations since the Ukrainian nationalist uprising and ethnic cleansings of Poles during the Second World War. Now Putin has provided both nations with a common adversary.

在克拉科夫的一个游乐场，我见到了一个朋友以及他的孩子，她是一个战前就已经在波兰生活了几年的乌克兰妇女，她告诉我们，她遇到的大多数难民都打算长期留在波兰。这位一直以俄语为第一语言的妇女还指出，普京的侵略行为导致她认识的大多数乌克兰人开始说乌克兰语而不是俄语。此外，普京似乎重新推动了波兰人和乌克兰人之间的友好关系，尽管自第二次世界大战期间乌克兰民族主义起义和对波兰人的种族清洗以来，历史创伤给两国关系蒙上了一层阴影。现在，普京为这两个国家提供了一个共同的对手。

Despite the complexity of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its ramifications for all of Europe, two questions illuminate the behavior of every actor: “Who benefits?” and “What are the stakes?” For nations like Poland and Czechia, which have donated impressive amounts of military equipment and humanitarian aid, the stakes are no less than the current global balance of power. Should Ukraine defeat Russia and send its once-formidable army back over the border, it will shift the whole balance of power in Europe. Countries like France and Germany, whose interests largely define those of the European unx as a whole, depend on a secure and regionally influential Russia for cheap and stable energy to power their economies, which depend on industrial output and a commuter workforce. If an ascendant bloc of Central and Eastern European nations, led by Poland and Ukraine, were to assume Russia’s current role in the geopolitical order, their new power would displace that of a weakened France and Germany.

尽管俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵及其对整个欧洲的影响十分复杂，但有两个问题照亮了每个行为者的行为。“谁受益？”和“利害关系是什么？”。对于像波兰和捷克这样捐赠了大量军事装备和人道主义援助的国家来说，其利害关系不亚于当前的全球力量平衡。如果乌克兰击败俄罗斯并将其曾经强大的军队遣送出境，它将改变欧洲的整个力量平衡。像法国和德国这样的国家，其利益在很大程度上决定了整个欧盟的利益，它们依赖于一个安全的、具有区域影响力的俄罗斯，以获得廉价和稳定的能源，为其经济提供动力，而这些经济依赖于工业产出和通勤劳动力。如果以波兰和乌克兰为首的中欧和东欧国家集团在地缘政治秩序中承担起俄罗斯目前的角色，他们的新力量将取代被削弱的法国和德国的力量。

The United States stands to benefit from either outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The U.S., of course, won the Cold War with Ukraine a part of the Soviet unx, so it does not need Ukraine or its resources to pursue a successful Russia policy. On the other hand, a Ukrainian victory would see the U.S.’s investment in Ukraine pay off handsomely in terms of goodwill, political cooperation, and perhaps even access to resources in the mineral-rich Donbas region. Furthermore, the ascendancy of Poland, one of the most pro-American nations in Europe, would give the United States more influence over the politics of Europe writ large. At present, the E.U. seems to prefer the status quo of dealing with Russia as a regional power rather than ceding more ground to the United States. This might explain the European Commission’s reluctance on the issue, except for the occasional platitude or grandstanding declaration that everyone knows is less a policy prescxtion than a reflexive attempt at ensuring the E.U.’s relevance.

美国将从俄乌冲突的任何一种结果中获益。当然，美国是在乌克兰成为苏联一部分的情况下赢得冷战的，所以它不需要乌克兰或其资源来推行成功的俄罗斯政策。另一方面，乌克兰的胜利将使美国在乌克兰的投资得到丰厚的回报，包括善意、政治合作，甚至可能在矿产丰富的顿巴斯地区获得资源。此外，作为欧洲最亲美的国家之一，波兰走上前台将使美国对整个欧洲的政治产生更大的影响。目前，欧盟似乎更倾向于将俄罗斯作为一个地区大国来处理的现状，而不是将更多的地盘让给美国。这可能解释了欧盟委员会在这个问题上的不情不愿，除了偶尔的陈词滥调或哗众取宠的声明，大家都知道这与其说是一个政策处方，不如说是为了确保欧盟的相关性而做出的反射性尝试。

On one side, Poland, Czechia, and other states have thrown money and materiel at Ukraine in the hope of bringing about an order defined by a weakened Russia, a humbled Franco-German axis, and an ascendant Central-Eastern Europe. Even the United Kingdom has grasped the potential of such a shift and rushed to play a part in the dismantling of Russian power, in a series of plays that evokes its support for the White Russian armies during the Russian civil war. On the other side, France, Germany, and Italy have conducted diplomacy that seeks nothing more than the immediate restoration of the status quo of cheap fuel and ready access to Russia’s enormous consumer market. Meanwhile, somewhere on the sidelines, the European unx and its commissioners make increasingly desperate plays for relevance by announcing some ineffectual sanctions package or other.

一方面，波兰、捷克和其他国家向乌克兰投入资金和物资，希望带来一个由被削弱的俄罗斯、被削弱的法德轴心和上升的中东欧组成的秩序。甚至英国也抓住了这种转变的潜力，急于在瓦解俄罗斯力量的过程中发挥作用，这一系列的好戏让人想起它在俄罗斯内战期间对白俄军队的支持。在另一边，法国、德国和意大利开展了外交活动，其目的只是为了立即恢复廉价燃料和随时进入俄罗斯巨大消费市场的现状。与此同时，在某个地方，欧盟和它的委员们通过宣布一些无效的制裁方案，为争取相关性做出了日益绝望的努力。

Ukraine’s refugees, then, are not ground between the gears of a revanchist Russia and an indifferent West; rather, they are suffering the birth pangs of a new geopolitical order struggling to tear itself out of the old one. In either case, the United States will benefit from stability in Europe and the restoration of brittle global supply chains. The U.S. must decide, however, which countries to side with as we head toward a multipolar world. To that end, Joe Biden and his administration would do well to look at the five million Ukrainian refugees who have already made their choice.

那么，乌克兰的难民并不是被遗忘在一个反叛的俄罗斯和一个冷漠的西方的齿轮之间；相反，他们正在忍受一个新的地缘政治秩序的诞生的阵痛，该秩序正在努力从旧秩序中撕裂出来。无论是哪种情况，美国都将从欧洲的稳定和脆弱的全球供应链的恢复中受益。然而，美国必须决定在我们走向多极世界的过程中与哪些国家站在一起。为此，乔·拜登和他的政府最好看看已经做出选择的500万乌克兰难民的情况。