In a pandemic, there is no substitute for immunity, because immunity provides the best protection against reinfection. That’s why Sweden set its sights on immunity from the very beginning. They crafted a policy that was designed to protect the old and vulnerable, prevent the public health system from being overwhelmed, and, most important, allow younger, low-risk people to interact freely so they’d contract the virus and develop the antibodies they’d need to fight future infections. That was the plan and it worked like a charm. Now Sweden is just weeks away from achieving herd immunity (which means that future outbreaks will not be nearly as severe) while the lockdown nations– that are just now easing restrictions– face an excruciating uphill slog that may or may not succeed. Bottom line: Sweden analyzed the problem, figured out what to do, and did it. That’s why they are closing in on the finish line while most of the lockdown states are still stuck at Square 1.


Giesecke’s analysis veers from the conventional view of the virus which explains why the Swedish response has been so different. For example, he says: “I think there is relatively little chance of stopping this whatever measures we take.”


This gets to the root of the Swedish approach. Sweden is not trying to suppress the infection which they see as a force of nature (like a tsunami) that cannot be contained but only mitigated. From the beginning, the Swedish approach has been to “control the spread of the virus”, not to suppress it through containment strategies. There’s a fundamental difference here, and that difference is expressed in the policy.

这就是瑞典抗疫政策的根源。瑞典没有打算抑制感染,他们认为这是自然界的力量(像海啸一样),无法控制,只能缓解。从一开始,瑞典的做法就是 "控制病毒传播",而不是通过遏制来抑制病毒的传播。这有根本的区别,区别体现在政策上。

Second, “We have data now from Sweden that between 98 and 99% of the cases have had a very mild infection or didn’t even realize they were infected.” In other words, this is highly-contagious infection that poses little or no threat to most people. That suggests the economy can be kept open without endangering the lives of low-risk groups. The added benefit of allowing certain businesses to remain open, is that it creates a controlled environment in which the infection can spread rapidly through the healthy population who, in turn, develop the antibodies they need for future outbreaks. This all fits within Sweden’s plan for managing, rather than avoiding, the virus.

第二,"瑞典现有数据显示,98%到99%的确诊病例都是非常轻微的感染,或者说根本没有意识到自己被感染。" 换句话说,这是种传染性很强的传染病,对大多数人几乎不构成威胁。这表明,可以在不危及低风险群体生命的情况下,保持经济开放。允许某些企业保持开放的额外好处是,创造了可控的环境,在这个环境中,疫情感染可以通过健康人群迅速传播,而健康人群反过来又会发展出他们所需要的抗体,以防将来会爆发。这一切都符合瑞典管理而不是避免病毒的计划。

Finally, “What we looking at is a thin layer at the top of people who do develop the disease and an even thinner layer of people who go into intensive care and an even thinner layer of people who die.” The vast majority of people who die from Covid are over 65 with multiple underlying conditions. It’s a terrible tragedy that they should die, but destroying the lives and livelihoods of millions of working people in a futile attempt to stop an unstoppable force like Covid, is foolish and unforgivable. The appropriate response is to protect the old and infirm as much as possible, carefully monitor the rise in cases to prevent the public health system from cratering, and keep the economy operating at a lower level. And that’s exactly what Sweden has done.

最后,"我们看到的(官方确诊和死亡病例)真正有明显症状的病例只不过是感染病例冰山的一角,而进入重症监护室的人和死亡的人只不过是冰山一角的一角。" 绝大多数死于新型冠状病毒的人都是65岁以上,患有多种疾病。他们的死亡是可怕的悲剧,但为了阻止像新型冠状病毒这样不可阻挡的力量而徒劳地破坏数百万劳动人民的生命和生计,是愚蠢的,也是不可原谅的。适当的应对措施是尽可能保护老弱病残,谨慎地监控病例的上升,防止公共卫生系统崩溃,让经济运行在较低的水平上,这才是合适的。而这正是瑞典所做的事情。