越南什么时候才能变成第一世界国家？

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Michael Modler
The noted sage philosopher/pro baseball player Yogi Berra once said “its hard to make predictions, especially about the future.” Events have a way of defying even well informed long-term predictions. For evidence of Yogi’s wisdom, we can turn to the shockingly dismal track record of professional forecasters in the fields of economics, politics and international relations.Who, in 1960, predicted South Korea would become an economic power rivaling a mid size Western European state within 40 years? It''''s a rhetorical question and the answer is nobody. Who predicted the Reagan Revolution of the 80s after Goldwater’s landslide defeat to Lyndon Johnson in the 60s, or the US opening to Mao’s China in early 1970s whilst the two nations were involved in a shooting war on the Korean Peninsula in early 50s? I could go on.

著名的哲人兼职业棒球运动员约吉·贝拉曾经说过:“预测是件很难的事，尤其是对未来的预测。”即使是在消息灵通前提下，长期预测也很有挑战性。要证明约吉的智慧，我们可以看看经济，政治和国际关系领域的专业预测者们令人震惊的惨淡记录。1960年，谁能预测韩国将在四十年内成为一个与西欧中等国家相抗衡的经济强国？ 这是一个反问句，答案是没有人。谁能预测60年代戈德华特会在压倒性优势下败给林登·约翰逊，还有80年代的里根革命，或者70年代初美国对中国开放，而50年代初两国还在朝鲜半岛枪战？ 我可以继续举例子。

Nobody has a crystal ball. But with that caveat out of the way, I basically agree with Kevin’s post. Although I would hesitate to use the words “never” and “impossible” when talking about the future, he gives a lucid, authoritative and damming case for pessimism about Vietnam’s future chances of joining the ranks of advanced economies in my lifetime (I’m 36).This doesn''''t mean Vietnam will stagnate or collapse. I actually think those are also unlikely outcomes. For me, a relatively optimistic base case scenario is that Vietnam will have a relatively diversified, competitive, middle class economy in 30 years. This is basically what Poland, Malaysia and Southern Thailand have today. A more pessimistic, but also plausible scenario is that Vietnam would show more resemblance to the lopsided, insular, plutocrat- dominated economies of Russia or Indonesia in 30 years.

没人有水晶球。 不过，我基本上同意凯文的观点。 尽管在谈到未来时，我会犹豫是否使用“永远不会”和“不可能”这些词，但他清晰，权威，有力地说明了，我对越南在有生之年（我36岁）加入发达经济体行列的悲观看法。这并不意味着越南会停滞不前或崩溃。实际上我认为这些也是不太可能的结果。 对我来说，一个相对乐观的基本情况是，三十年后越南将拥有一个相对多元化，具有竞争力，中产阶级的经济。 这基本上就是今天的波兰，马来西亚和泰国南部的状态。 一个更悲观，但也似乎合理的设想是，三十年后，越南将表现出更多类似俄罗斯或印度尼西亚的畸形，孤立，财阀主导的经济体。

I don’t think a South Korea or Taiwan-style miracle is in the cards. Vietnam faces several impediments to reaching 1st world status. Some might be social/cultural and others might be historical, or even environmental. But, I think Kevin is right to highlight Vietnam’s weak rule of law and ineffectual political institutions. These are the crux of the problem in my view.The underdeveloped financial system remains dominated by state owned commercial banks, whose main function is that of a patronage scheme to support other state owned companies and crony capitalists. Almost without exception, these firms have attempted to copy the conglomerate businesses model, but they barely export anything outside of oil and other commodities. They do, however, dominate domestic markets in highly regulated, protected and corruption prone industries; such as natural resources, utilities, transportation, steel and cement, real estate and construction.

我不认为韩国或台湾式的奇迹可能发生在越南。 越南要达到世界第一的地位，面临着几个障碍。 一些可能是社会/文化的，另一些可能是历史的，甚至是环境的。 但是，我认为凯文强调越南薄弱的法治和无效的政治体制是正确的。 在我看来，这就是问题的症结所在:不发达的金融体系仍然由国有商业银行主导，其主要功能是支持其他国有公司和亲信资本家的赞助计划。 几乎无一例外，这些公司都试图复制企业集团的模式，但除了石油和其他商品，它们几乎不出口任何东西。 然而它们在受到高度管制，高度保护和容易发生腐败的行业的国内市场中占据主导地位； 如自然资源，公用事业，运输，钢铁和水泥，房地产和建筑。

These companies are usually a subsidiary of a bank, or have a bank as a subsidiary, or are tied to a major bank via substantial cross shareholdings. In any case, the arrangement effectively allows these companies to print money by lending cash to themselves. The state also lavishes these firms with other forms of market manipulation and government largesse (monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, no-bid contracts, access to cheap or free land, subsidies, bailouts, etc).Government officials are at the top of the food chain in Vietnam because they control the licensing system and the purse strings. And what have they done with wealth obtained through bribery, embezzlement and fraud? The most common route, it seems, is to establish oneself as a land speculator and rentier with income streams from multiple real estate holdings. Particularly in Saigon and Hanoi, you can easily find these erstwhile communist revolutionaries (and their progeny) decked out in Hermes, Chanel and Patek Philippe, while being chauffeured around town in a Bentley or an S class Mercedes.

这些公司通常是一家银行的子公司，或拥有一家银行作为子公司，或通过大量交叉持股与一家大银行绑定。无论如何，该安排有效地允许这些公司通过向自己出借现金来印制钞票。 国家还通过其他形式的市场操纵和政府干预（垄断或寡头垄断竞争，无竞标合同，廉价或免费土地，补贴，救助等），为这些公司铺平道路。在越南，政府官员处于食物链的顶端，因为他们控制着许可证制度和钱袋。而他们通过贿赂，贪污和欺诈等手段获得的财富，又做了些什么呢？最常见的途径，似乎是通过占有多个房产，建立自己作为一个土地投机者和食利者的收入流。尤其是在西贡和河内，你很容易发现这些昔日的革命者，以及他们的后代穿着爱马仕，香奈儿和百达翡丽，开着宾利或S级奔驰车在城里兜风。

It should be self-evident that above descxtion is generalized caricature. It doesn''''t apply to every business, government official or rich person in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the shoe fits a lot of the time.Some of the wealth of the nouveau riche obviously does trickle down to the lower rungs of the economic ladder. But unsurprisingly, this environment has failed to spawn a truly dynamic and competitive private sector. Most genuinely private firms (excluding pseudo-private crony firms like Vingroup, Sovico, Massan and HAGL) remain very small, highly localized and informal. In urban areas, most owe their existence to the near total absence of zoning laws or motorbike regulations, as well as road infrastructure that has barely been expanded since the French colonial period. These low risk/low reward ventures in service fields like restaurants, coffee shops, mini-hotels, mom and pop stores, barbershops and the like provide a living for a lot of families. But the potential for growth and productivity improvements through economies of scale, education and technological advancement are not great.

不言而喻，上述描述是泛化的描述。它并不适用于越南的每一个企业，政府官员或富人。 但不幸的是，这只鞋在很多时候都合脚。显然，暴发户的一些财富确实流到了经济阶梯的较低阶层。 但毫不奇怪的是，这种环境未能催生出一个真正充满活力和竞争力的私营部门。 大多数真正的私营公司（不包括Vingroup，Sovico，Massan和HAGL等伪私营公司）仍然非常小，高度本土化和非正式化。 在城市地区，大多数城市的存在，是因为几乎完全没有分区法或摩托车管理条例，以及自法国殖民时期以来，几乎没有扩大的道路基础设施项目。 这些服务领域的低风险/低回报企业，如餐馆，咖啡店，迷你旅馆，夫妻店，理发店等，为许多家庭提供了生计。但是，通过规模经济，教育和技术进步，实现增长和提高生产力的潜力并不大。

Vietnamese institutions are also not very proactive, aggressive, realistic or effective in identifying and dealing with challenges of development. Mechanisms that provide a measure of accountability and transparency in the West, such as a free press, non-politicized judiciary and competitive elections are obviously lacking. Meanwhile, Vietnam has also been described as a “land without a king.” It lacks a strong China-like central authority capable of imposing its will upon the cacophony of localities and vested interests vying for influence. Vietnam has the territorial size of Texas and economic size of Louisiana. Yet it plans to have more international airports than Japan and more international seaports than the entire western continental USA.All countries have problems, but for Vietnam to reach the status of an advanced, industrialized, high-income economy, it clearly needs to address these problems somehow. And it probably needs to do so quickly, because another problem is looming on the horizon: demographic decline.

越南的机构在确定和处理发展挑战方面也不是很积极，进取，现实或有效。 在西方有某种程度的问责制和透明度的机制，例如自由的新闻，非政治化的司法和竞争性选举，越南显然是缺乏的。同时，越南也被形容为“无王之地”，它缺乏一个像中国那样强大的中央权力机构，能够将自己的意志强加给争夺影响力的地方和既得利益集团。越南的领土面积相当于得克萨斯州，经济规模相当于路易斯安那州。然而，它计划拥有比日本更多的国际机场，比整个美国西部大陆更多的国际海港。所有国家都有问题，但越南要达到先进，工业化，高收入经济体的地位，显然需要设法解决这些问题。 而且它可能需要尽快这么做，因为另一个问题正在地平线上隐现:人口下降。

Vietnam’s boosters are quick to point to a track record of 7% average annual GDP growth since the early 90’s. On the surface level this looks great, even if we account for the extremely low starting point. However, this run of growth looks less impressive when we account for significant population growth (increased by around 35% since 1990) and other demographic factors.A sustained period of high fertility rates (“baby boom”) followed by a period of much lower fertility rates (“baby bust”) will eventually produce a “demographic dividend.” During this period, the working age population increases relative to the dependent population (comprised of children and seniors who are too young or too old to work.) The “dividend” moniker stems from the obvious fact that more workers will tend to produce more savings, more entrepreneurship, and more labor inputs to the economy in general.

越南的支持者很快就指出，自90年代初以来，越南的GDP年均增长率达到了7%。 表面上这看起来很棒，即使我们考虑到极低的起点。 然而，当我们考虑到人口的显著增长（自1990年以来增长了35%左右）和其他人口因素时，这种增长看起来就不那么令人印象深刻了。一段持续的高生育率时期（“婴儿潮”）和一段低得多的生育率时期（“婴儿谷”）将最终产生“人口红利”。在此期间，劳动年龄人口相对于受抚养人口（由年龄太小或太大无法工作的儿童和老年人组成）增加 “红利”这个绰号源于一个明显的事实，即更多的工人将倾向于积累更多的储蓄，激发更多的创业精神，以及更多的劳动力投入到整个经济中。

Unfortunately, all demographic dividends eventually come an end after baby boomers enter retirement age. The lower fertility rate during the baby bust years ensures a rising dependency ratio and an aging society. These are simple rules of humble arithmetic.In some cases, an economy may attempt to dodge this problem by importing people as the native population ages. But unless you are Singapore (small, rich, multiethnic), immigration can only dull the pain. (Even in Singapore, high immigration may not be politically sustainable) Demographic boom/bust cycles will vary in their intensity. For example, the American fertility rate fell from a high level of 3.5 children per women in the 1950’s to a lower level of around 2.0 in the 1970’s and beyond. Japan and Korea experienced a steeper decline in dependency ratio because fertility rates were initially higher than America’s, and they subsequently fell faster and farther. This means the dividend was stronger, but the coming “burden” will also be more severe (especially in light of minimal immigration).

不幸的是，所有的人口红利最终都会在婴儿潮一代进入退休年龄后终结。 婴儿潮时期较低的生育率导致了抚养比的上升和社会的老龄化。 这些都是简单的算术规则，在某些情况下，当本地人口老化时，一个经济体可能会试图通过引进外来人口回避这个问题。 但除非你是新加坡（小，富，多种族），否则移民只能减缓痛苦。即使在新加坡，高移民在政治上也不一定是可持续的。人口繁荣/萧条周期的强度也会有所不同。 例如，美国的生育率从1950年代每个妇女生育3.5个孩子的高水平下降到1970年代及以后的2.0左右的较低水平。 日本和韩国的抚养比下降得更快，因为他们的生育率最初比美国高，后来下降得更快更远。 这意味着红利更强了，但即将到来的“负担”也将更严重（尤其是在移民人数极少的情况下）。

China will start to feel the pain of an aging population over the next decade, and the situation will get progressively worse after 2030. This is considered problematic because income levels in China are still considerably lower than a poorer European country like Poland.The decline Vietnam’s fertility rates from the 1980’s (around 5 children per woman) until today (1.7) is nearly unprecedented. The only two examples that come close are South Korea and China. Vietnam’s population is still relatively young, so its demographic burden is a bit farther into the future than China’s and much farther thsn South Korea’s, which is already starting to bite.Unfortunately, Vietnam’s GDP per capita is currently around 1/4th of China’s and 1/14th of South Korea’s. And unlike China and South Korea to an even greater extent, it simply did not make good enough use of its demographic sweet spot. This is why my super long-term prediction is that Vietnam will become something like Thailand: a one-time shooting star that moved up the ranks quickly from a low base, but never quite made it as a truly advanced economy. Eventually, it will simply get old before getting rich.

未来十年，中国也将开始感受到人口老龄化，2030年后，情况将逐渐...。 这被认为是有问题的，因为中国的收入水平仍然远低于像波兰这样较穷的欧洲国家。越南的生育率从20世纪80年代（大约每个妇女5个孩子）一直下降到现在（1.7个），这几乎是前所未有的。 仅有的两个比较接近的例子是韩国和中国。 越南人口仍然相对年轻，所以它的人口重担来的比中国要远一些，比韩国要远得多，而韩国已经开始发作了。不幸的是，越南的人均GDP目前大约是中国的1/4，韩国的1/14。 与中国和韩国更大程度上不同的是，越南没有充分利用其人口优势。 这就是为什么我超长期的预测是，越南将成为像泰国一样的国家:一个曾经的流星，从一个低基数迅速上升，但从未完全成为一个真正发达的经济体。 最终，它只会未富先老。

Hoàng Hà Nguyên Vĩnh
When the young generation fully take over the politics/economy of the nation.
Lets face it : many of our leaders are old farts right now , they are both physically and mentally limited in what they can think and able to do.They are also very inflexible and slow to catch on or understanding the importance of certain new technology.They need to teach and provide the basis younger generations to take over.And it is clearly showing , especially in aviation. Many of my old mentors say straight out that they can no longer understand ！ nor follow the speed of modernization and new technology / operational demand standard.

当年轻一代完全掌握国家的政治/经济时。让我们面对现实:我们现在的许多领导人都是老生常谈的人，他们的思想能力和行动能力都受到了身体和精神的限制。他们也非常缺乏灵活性，对某些新技术的重要性缺乏了解。他们需要教导并为年轻一代提供取而代之的基础。这一点非常明显，尤其是在航空领域。我的许多老导师直截了当地说，他们再也无法理解，也无法跟随现代化的速度和新技术和操作的需求标准。

One of the airforce colonel i know even bluntly talk that he cant no longer learn what is necessary to keep up with the arms race around the world. His only chance would be to give his replacement the best he can in terms of training and equipment support policy. He is optimistic though , that the VCP is providing the best funds available to modernize the airforce , and he has the means needed to equip the young pilots under his command.This can happen in 20 , maybe 30 years. Who knows. But i do know that at the very least , the top guys are nearing their limits , and they are looking for talents to replace their seats so they can go honeymoon somewhere else.

我认识的一位空军上校甚至直言不讳地说，他再也学不到跟上全球军备竞赛所必需的东西了。 他唯一的机会，就是在训练和装备支持政策方面，给予他的替代者最好的帮助。 不过，他还是很乐观的，认为越共正在为空军现代化提供最好的资金，而他也有必要的手段来装备他手下的年轻飞行员，这可能会在20年，也许30年后实现。 谁知道啊。 但我确实知道，最起码顶层的家伙们已经接近他们的极限了，他们正在寻找人才来取代他们的席位，这样他们就可以去别的地方度蜜月了。

So , if you are both talented and connected , you will go pretty far in the food chain. Even if you are only talented , right now building connection is easier than ever.I have read that there are answers painting a sad “ NEVER” straight out picture. And i must say that the moment you say never , you will never get it. Thats a fact. Because when you say never , you stop thinking , you stop working toward that goal , it is the easy way out. You need to set crazy goals , work toward it with a plan , and be sastified after you have tried your best , the results are not important.And i will say this straight out , it doesnt matter where you are in the world , connection is important.

所以，如果你既有才华又有关系，你就会在食物链上走得很远。即便你只是有才，现在建立联系也比以往任何时候都要容易。我读到过一些答案，描绘出一幅悲伤的“永远不会”的直白画面。而且我必须说，当你说永不的那一刻，你永远也得不到它。 这是事实。 因为当你说“永不”时，你就会停止思考，停止朝着那个目标努力，这是一条简单的出路。 你需要设定疯狂的目标，有计划地朝着它努力，在你尽了最大努力之后，你会感到自信，结果并不重要。我要直截了当地说，不管你在世界上的什么地方，联系才是重要的。

Kevin Dam
Never.To escape the middle income trap and achieve first world status the following are the absolute prerequisites:
Education: Vietnam’s education is in crisis. While its primary and secondary enrollment ratios are good, there are serious concerns about quality. Vietnam''''s universities are moribund and cannot even be compared with South East Asia''''s unremarkable universities. Vietnamese science and technology are a failure as illustrated in the following graph. The track record of Vietnam’s research institutes is as shameful as its universities. In 2017 researchers in Vietnam published 76 articles in international journals. By contrast, tiny Singapore, with a population 20 times smaller than Vietnam, published 1,100 articles during the same period. A single university in China, Fudan University in Shanghai, published 504 articles in 2017, almost seven times more than Vietnam! Source Country outputs | Nature Index, Fudan University

永远不会。要摆脱中等收入陷阱，达到第一世界国家的地位，以下是绝对的先决条件:
教育:越南教育陷入危机。 虽然它的小学和中学入学率不错，但质量问题令人严重关切。 越南的大学已经奄奄一息，甚至无法与东南亚那些不起眼的大学相提并论。越南的科学和技术是一个失败，如下图所示。越南研究所的成果与越南大学一样可耻。2017年，越南研究人员在国际期刊上发表了76篇文章。 相比之下，人口比越南少20倍的弹丸之地新加坡，同期却发表了1100篇文章。中国单一高校上海复旦大学2017年发表文章504篇，几乎比越南多7倍！--来源国产出自然指数，复旦大学

Infrastructure and Urbanization: in Vietnam, traffic jams are an all too frequent occurrence. Infrastructure investments are often wasteful and riddled with corruption. This leads to inefficient and costly services. According to the World Bank, exporters pay US$701 to ship a 20-foot container from Vietnam, compared with US$335 from China and US$382 from Singapore. Ambitious plans have been announced to build deep water ports in no fewer than six central provinces. There''''s no economic rationale for these plans. A country of Vietnam’s size needs at most 3 ports. The entire West Coast of the United States (more than 1900km long) features 3 major international ports.

基础设施和城市化:在越南，交通堵塞是经常发生的事。基础设施投资往往是浪费的，而且充斥着腐败。 这导致服务效率低下，成本高昂。 根据世界银行的数据，出口商从越南运一个20英尺长的集装箱要支付701美元，而从中国运一个20英尺长的集装箱要支付335美元，从新加坡运一个20英尺长的集装箱要支付382美元。越南已经宣布了雄心勃勃的计划，要在不少于6个中部省份建设深水港。 这些计划没有经济理由。 像越南这么大的国家，最多需要3个港口。 整个美国西海岸，长1900多公里，也只有3个主要的国际港口。

A related challenge concerns urbanization. In some urban areas land prices in Vietnam are as high as comparable locations in Japan, a crowded island with 20 times the per capita income of Vietnam. That means many Vietnamese will be unable to own a house or even be able to rent decent housing. Poorly planned urbanization is a potential source of social and political instability. People need decent housing, clean environment, quality healthcare and education services for their families. All this is sadly beyond the reach of most ordinary Vietnamese. Moreover, because of the immense profit from land speculation, a large part of Vietnam’s resources are being shifted away from more productive areas. Why build a factory and wait 10 years to recover your investment when you can double or triple your capital within a few years by investing in real estate?

一个相关的挑战涉及城市化。 在一些城市地区，越南的土地价格与日本的类似地点一样高，日本是一个人口稠密的岛屿，人均收入是越南的20倍。 这意味着许多越南人将无法拥有住房，甚至无法租到像样的住房。 规划不善的城市化是社会和政治不稳定的潜在根源。 为了家庭人们需要体面的住房，清洁的环境，高质量的医疗保健和教育服务。可悲地是，这一切都是大多数普通越南人无法企及的。 此外，由于土地投机的巨大利润，越南很大一部分资源正在从生产力较高的地区转移。 当你可以通过投资房地产在几年内将资金翻倍或三倍的时候，为什么要建厂，并等十年后才能收回成本呢？

Competitiveness of Firms: There is a basic contradiction in Vietnamese economic policy. Although the private and foreign invested sectors are the most dynamic, the state sector continues to receive the lion''''s share of credit, investment and other privileges. In the 1990s the government began to consolidate state-owned enterprises into huge conglomerates, after the model of the Japanese keiretsus and the South Korean chaebols. However, instead of becoming internationally competitive in their core businesses and competing in foreign markets as the government expected, these conglomerates were seeking quick returns in real estate and financial speculation, taking advantage of easy government credit. Many, actually all of them, could not compete in the world markets. Some are billions of dollars in the red. Vinashin (shipbuilding), Vinalines (marine transportation), Vinacomin (coal & mining) are some notorious examples. Lets take a look at some key industries. Vietnam’s highly protected steel industry deploys hundreds of micro-mills producing low quality steel at high cost. Similarly, the cement industry uses old, environmentally unsound technologies in under-scale plants. Productivity in the paper industry is less than 1/5 of that in Japan. The chemical industry makes huge losses in some key investments (fertilizer, bio-ethanol fuel, synthetic fiber)

企业竞争力:越南经济政策中存在着一个基本矛盾。 虽然私营部门和外国投资部门最有活力，但国营部门继续获得最大份额的信贷，投资和其他特权。 20世纪90年代，政府开始仿照日本经济财团和韩国财阀的模式，将国有企业整合为大型企业集团。 然而，这些企业集团并没有像政府预期的那样，在核心业务上具备国际竞争力，在国外市场展开竞争，而是利用政府宽松的信贷，在房地产和金融投机领域寻求快速回报。 许多国企，实际上所有国企，都无法在世界市场上竞争。 有些公司亏损数十亿美元。 Vinashin（造船），Vinaline（海运），Vinacomin（煤炭和采矿）就是一些臭名昭著的例子。 让我们来看看一些重点行业。 越南受到高度保护的钢铁业部署了数百家微型钢厂，以高成本生产低质钢材。 同样，在规模以下的水泥工厂中使用旧的，对环境不利的技术。越南造纸业的生产率还不到日本的1/5。 化学工业在一些关键投资（化肥，生物乙醇燃料，合成纤维）方面也亏损巨大

East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, China) possess the long-term strategic vision and political will to anticipate and respond to development challenges. Time and again, however, Vietnam has failed to respond adequately to problems that were recognized years in advance. For example, the traffic gridlock that threatens to paralyze Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City was foreseen by city planners decades ago, yet to date very little has been done. The widespread flooding that afflicts both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City during the rainy season was also predicted years ago, yet again the response has been singularly ineffective. Many cities in developing countries have successfully addressed these problems and Vietnam could learn from them. Yet it didn''''t. That begs the question: if the Vietnamese government cannot effectively respond to predictable challenges, how will it react to unforeseen crises?

东亚国家（日本，韩国，中国）具有预测，和应对发展挑战的长期战略眼光和政治意愿。 然而，越南一次又一次地未能对几年前，就已认识到的问题作出充分的反应。 例如，有可能使河内和胡志明市陷入瘫痪的交通堵塞，是城市规划者几十年前就预见到的，但迄今为止却几乎没有采取什么措施。在雨季期间影响河内和胡志明市的大范围洪水，也是几年前就预测到的，但应对措施仍然是极其无效的。许多发展中国家的城市成功地解决了这些问题，越南可以向它们学习，但事实并非如此。这就引出了一个问题:如果越南政府不能有效应对可预见的挑战，那么它将如何应对不可预见的危机？

In the World Bank''''s latest governance study, countries are uated according to 6 criteria: accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. With the exception of political stability, Vietnam scored lower than ALL East and South East Asian countriesSo yeah, Vietnam is facing huge challenges. Improving education and health care, addressing the infrastructure crisis, meeting the challenges of urbanization and environmental degradation, overhauling the financial system, improving government effectiveness will require much better leadership than the bunch of corrupt and incompetent idiots we have in Hanoi right now

在世界银行最新的治理研究中，根据六个标准对各国进行评估:问责制，政治稳定，政府效力，监管质量，法治，腐败。 除了政治稳定之外，越南的得分低于所有东亚和东南亚国家。所以是的，越南正面临着巨大的挑战。 改善教育和医疗保健，解决基础设施危机，应对城市化和环境恶化的挑战，改革金融体系，提高政府效率，这些都需要比我们现在河内这群腐败无能的白痴们更好的领导

G Sharp
Vietnam’s GDP has been growing at 6% a year, which puts it just below what China’s growth rate was a decade ago. Currently Vietnam is now vying with China for status as the world’s manufacturing center. It’s now a little cheaper to manufacture in Vietnam than China, as Chinese wages are rising. In the future, manufacturing will naturally migrate to Vietnam, as Chinese manufacturing costs increase.China knows this and is now on a governmental level trying to add value to its products beyond that of just cheap manufacturing costs.One would hope Vietnam would follow China’s growth trajectory, but there is a chance we are entering a “paradigm shift.” Robotics is advancing at such a rate that within a few decades the “race to the bottom” w/r/t to cheap labor may come to an end.

越南的GDP一直以每年6%的速度增长，略低于中国十年前的增长率。 目前，越南正与中国争夺世界制造业中心的地位。 现在在越南生产比在中国生产要便宜一点，因为中国的工资正在上涨。 在未来，随着中国制造成本的上升，制造业自然会转移到越南。中国知道这一点，现在在政府层面上正试图为其产品增加价值，而不仅仅是廉价制造产品。人们可能希望越南会跟随中国的增长轨迹，但我们有可能进入一个“模式转变”时代。机器人技术的发展速度如此之快，在几十年内，廉价劳动力的“逐底”竞争时代可能会终结。

Meaning, it might become cheaper to have robots perform manual labor manufacturing tasks than to have VN people do it.If that happens, Vietnam could find itself perpetually a 3rd world country.Robotics would bring manufacturing back to industrial countries. Industrialized nations would no longer have any need of cheap human labor.And so no development of manufacturing could happen in Vietnam and VN’s progress to a 1st world country could be permanently stunted.To me, that is the question: will Vietnam raise enough capital to lift the country to 1st world status before robotics overtakes all of the manufacturing sector?

这意味着，用机器人来完成体力劳动的制造任务，可能会比用越南人来做更便宜。如果那样的话，越南将会发现自己永远是第三世界国家。机器人技术将把制造业带回到工业化国家。 工业化国家将不再需要廉价的人力资源。因此，越南不可能发展制造业，越南跻身第一世界国家的步伐将永远受到阻碍。对我来说，这就是问题:在机器人技术超越所有制造业之前，越南能否筹集到足够的资金将国家提升到第一世界的地位？

Tor Iver Wilhelmsen
Did you mean “stop being a developing nation and be classified as developed”? In that case, the definitions are somewhat muddled as to what constitutes where to draw the line: For instance, a rich country with significant impact on the world economy like China is still classified as “developing”, which grants it several advantages (e.g. subsidized mail costs which makes it amazingly cheap to buy goods from there).If you really meant to use the old terms used to classify USA-aligned (“1st world”), Soviet-aligned (“2nd world”) or unaligned (“3rd world”) countries, it is likely to remain a 2nd world country.

你的意思是“不再是发展中国家而成为发达国家”吗？ 在这种情况下，定义就有些混乱了:例如，像中国这样对世界经济有重大影响力的富裕国家，仍然被归类为“发展中国家”，这给了它几个优势（例如邮费补贴，使得从那里购买商品非常便宜）。如果你真的打算使用过去用来划分美国结盟国家（“第一世界”），苏联结盟国家（“第二世界”）或不结盟国家（“第三世界”）的术语，那么它很可能仍然是第二世界国家。

Huynh An
When every single country standing above Vietnam’s rank all of sudden falls to the knee before Vietnam.Sounds a bit “commie fictional”, doesn’t it?

当每一个站在越南头上的国家，突然在越南面前跪倒的时候。听起来有点“虚构故事”，不是吗？

Robert Nguyen
Not long time ago, Singapur was much pourer than Vietnam now. If any one had asked or just thought that it soon would be the richest city state, every one would have thought and said loudly that he or she was crazy or stupid. So, don’t count Vietnam out! Just like Vietnam/US war. 1955, who would have thought the US couldn’t win the war?

不久以前，新加坡比现在的越南多得多。 如果有人问过，或者只是认为它很快就会成为最富有的城邦，那么每个人都会大声地认为他或她是疯子或傻子。 所以，别把越南算在内！ 就像越南/美国战争一样。 1955年，谁能想到美国打不赢这场战争？

Anonymous
It will never become a 1st world country.Unless the assholes in the Vietnamese government decided to refresh their pathetic minds, Vietnamese are hopeless.

越南永远不会成为第一世界国家，除非越南政府的混蛋们，决定重新振作他们可怜的脑袋，否则越南是没有希望的。

Da Den
Vietnam will not become a first world country. As China moves from a low-income country to a medium-to-high income. A large number of low-end labor industries have moved to Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. Vietnam may become the next world factory. Vietnam may become a medium-to-high income such as Thailand and Malaysia, reaching the current level of China. But it is difficult to become a developed country. Although Vietnam has a Confucian culture similar to East Asia. But I found that most Vietnamese are not as diligent as Chinese Koreans and Japanese. So I am not optimistic about Vietnam.

越南不会成为第一世界国家。 随着中国从低收入国家迈向中高收入。 大量低端劳动力产业转移到东南亚，特别是越南。 越南可能成为下一个世界工厂，可能会成为泰国，马来西亚这样的中高收入，达到中国现在的水平， 但越南很难成为发达国家。 虽然越南有着与东亚相似的儒家文化，但我发现，大多数越南人不如中国人，韩国人和日本人勤奋。 所以我并不看好越南。