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Countries’ 5G networks have become the subject of intense debate—and the Australian government can take some of the credit for that. Its decision to exclude high-risk vendors in August 2018 was marked by a refreshing openness about the grounds on which it was made. The thinking about risk and security was very similar to that in the EU security assessment of 5G released in October 2019.

各国的5G网络的建设如今已经成为激烈辩论的主题——澳大利亚政府可以为此承担部分责任。2018年8月,澳大利亚决定将高风险供应商排除在其5G网络的建设之外,这一决定的特点是,它在制定依据上出现了令人耳目一新的开放态度。其关于风险和安全的思考与2019年10月发布的欧盟5G安全评估非常相似。

Two core factors in these assessments are that 5G providers that have legal and other imperatives to cooperate covertly and deeply with their home governments pose a greater security risk than providers without these obligations and imperatives—and that governments do not want to be beholden to the governments of states with which they do not share values or interests. Both these factors apply in the case of the Chinese state and its two 5G ‘national champions’, Huawei and ZTE.

这些评估的两个核心因素是,具有与本国政府秘密深入合作的法律和其他义务的5G提供商,和没有这些义务的5G提供商相比,它们构成了更大的安全风险,而各国政府不希望被那些与它们没有共同价值观或利益的国家政府所束缚。这些因素都适用于中国及其两家5G“国家领军企业”,华为和中兴。



If, as some experts predict, Huawei and ZTE win the race to build and operate much of the world’s 5G infrastructure, US tech firms will be dependent on them to transmit their services and products. American big tech will live in a Chinese walled garden of technology and be subject to the curators’ choices about what it can and can’t do, at least in major markets like Southeast Asia, Africa and chunks of Europe.

如果正如一些专家预测的那样,华为和中兴在建造和运营全球大部分5G基础设施的竞赛中胜出,美国科技公司将依赖它们来传输服务和产品。美国的大型科技公司将生活在一个有中国围墙的科技花园中,由花园的园长决定它们能做什么,不能做什么,至少在东南亚、非洲和欧洲大部分地区会是这样。

On the flip side, China’s non-5G tech giants Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) will ride on the digital infrastructure of Huawei and ZTE. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s digital authoritarian model of fused state–corporate cooperation, this puts BAT in an advantageous position—not just in the China home market, but wherever the Chinese 5G champions provide the digital infrastructure.

另一方面,中国的非5g技术巨头百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯(BAT)将受益于华为和中兴的数字基础设施。考虑到中国融合国有企业合作的数字威权模式,这会让BAT处于有利地位——不仅在中国本土市场,而且在任何由中国5G领军企业提供数字基础设施的地方。

The worst-case scenario for big US tech is that Apple, Facebook and Google in effect become apps inside a Chinese global information ecosystem. Chinese state policies and BAT, Huawei and ZTE would decide which of their products and services can be hosted on Chinese digital infrastructure and services. That looks like a very bad business plan, unless entering bankruptcy or becoming CCP-compliant in your global operations is the end goal.

对于美国大型科技公司而言,最糟糕的情况是,苹果、Facebook和谷歌在实际上变成了中国全球信息生态系统中的应用程序。中国的国家政策和BAT,华为和中兴将决定他们的哪些产品和服务可以托管在中国的数字基础设施和服务上。这看起来是一个非常糟糕的商业计划,除非你的最终目标是破产或在全球运营中遵守CCP的指令。



Maybe they all think the competition between the US and China is just the business of governments and therefore doesn’t concern them. If so, they’re failing to see that the same factors which are driving renewed great-power competition mean that they too are in strategic and economic competition not just with BAT, Huawei and ZTE, but with their chief supporter, the CCP.

也许他们都认为美中之间的竞争只是政府的事,因此与他们无关。如果是这样的话,他们就没有意识到,推动重新崛起的大国竞争的那些因素,也意味着他们不仅要与BAT、华为和中兴通讯展开战略和经济竞争,还要与它们的主要支持者CCP展开竞争。

Or maybe they’re stuck in a mindset that governments around the world already know is dead: the idea that globalisation is a process that ‘de-states’ the world, rendering state boundaries and powers less relevant. According to this long-gone vision of globalisation, companies and consumers could be ‘country agnostic’ about where services and products came from because global supply chains and capital would move and reconfigure in ways that had no little or connection with individual nations.

或者他们陷入了一种世界各国政府都深知已经不复存在的思维模式:全球化是一个世界“去国家化”的过程,使国家边界和权力变得不那么重要。根据这一早已消失的全球化愿景,企业和消费者可能对服务和产品的来源地持“国家不可知论”态度,因为全球供应链和资本的转移和重新配置方式,将与个别国家几乎没有或根本没有联系。

That was the arc of logic operating in much of the world politically and economically until the return of assertive authoritarian power—Russia, and now, most particularly, the Chinese state under . And the truly globalised world was the dominant paradigm when many of the leaders of US big tech rose to prominence, so it wouldn’t be surprising if they’re finding it hard to let go. For all their genius, they too are products of their environment and their times.

这曾是世界上大部分地区在政治和经济上运作的逻辑之弧,直到独断专行的威权政权的回归——俄罗斯,尤其是现在习领导下的中国。当许多美国大型科技公司的领导人崭露头角时,真正全球化的世界是主导范式,所以,如果他们发现很难摒弃这一观念,也就不足为奇了。尽管他们都是天赋异禀,但他们也是自身的环境和时代的产物。

and great-power competition—along with ‘Made in China 2025’, the Digital Silk Road and military–civil fusion—have killed that vision.

和大国竞争——以及“中国制造2025”、数字丝绸之路和军民融合——扼杀了这一愿景。



Even without supportive policies and regulation from their home governments, it makes sense as a simple matter of future corporate existence, success and competition for the US tech giants to be able to live on alternative digital infrastructure to that brought to them by China Tech Inc.

即使没有本国政府的支持性政策和监管,美国科技巨头未来的企业生存、成功和竞争也很会容易,它们可以依靠中国科技公司提供的数字基础设施生存。

Who from Alphabet, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft will be the first to get this party started?

Alphabet、亚马逊、苹果和微软之中,谁将首先开始这一进程呢?