原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译:三变ps 转载请注明出处

The Deployment of THAAD


Since 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense has considered deploying THAAD in South Korea,8 but until recently,Seoul has been reluctant to proceed with the system. South Korean officials raised concerns about the cost of hosting THAAD; uncertainty about THAAD’s effectiveness against the North Korean threat; and South Korea’s existing plan to develop an indigenous missile defense system. Seoul also may have been concerned that THAAD would contribute to the U.S.-allied regional ballistic missile defense network—which it seemed averse to join because of longstanding frictions with Japan—and, perhaps most importantly, may have been reluctant to antagonize China due to their close economic ties.


The increased security threat posed by continued North Korean missile development, however, changed Seoul’s calculus on THAAD. Hours after North Korea’s February 2016 satellite launch testing ballistic missile technology, South Korea said it would pursue formal talks with the United States about the system.In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in a joint statement the alliance decision to proceed with the deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea by late 2017, at an estimated cost of $1.6 billion.


In March 2017, the United States began delivery of the first major THAAD components, amid U.S. and South Korean defense officials’ calls for an accelerated deployment schedule in response to increased North Korean missile launches and additional nuclear tests.On April 26, U.S. Forces Korea began delivering major THAAD components to the deployment site and installing them, including the X-band radar, launchers, and interceptors. A week later, U.S. Forces Korea announced that THAAD “is operational and has the ability to intercept North Korean missiles and defend the Republic of Korea.”As of the writing of this report, U.S. and South Korean officials have confirmed the THAAD battery is at initial operating capability with two launchers installed, in addition to the X-band radar and other equipment.


二 China’s Stated Concerns about THAAD


China has consistently expressed its strong opposition to THAAD since the initial February 2016 announcement of formal talks between South Korea and the United States. On the day of the announcement, Beijing summoned the South Korean ambassador to China to formally protest the move. Hours after the July 2016 decision to deploy THAAD, Beijing demarched the U.S. and South Korean ambassadors to China to lodge a formal protest and convey its strong disapproval. Beijing has also undertaken an aggressive public campaign to denounce the deployment through official statements and state-run media.


In the months since the decision to deploy the system was announced, Beijing’s opposition to THAAD has been a consistent theme in official statements, as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone has spoken out against it more than 50 times. Beijing appeared to be intensifying its anti THAAD campaign as the system moved closer to deployment, reflected in the uptick in foreign ministry remarks and heightened rhetoric of Chinese media commentary as well as rising economic retaliation against certain segments of South Korea’s economy. In addition to its own remarks, Chinese officials have issued multiple joint statements with their Russian counterparts expressing opposition to THAAD.


Beijing’s stated concerns about THAAD include the following:


THAAD’s X-band radar weakens China’s nuclear deterrence: In February 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “The coverage of the THAAD missile defense system in the ROK, especially the monitoring scope of the X-band radar, goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula. It will reach deep into the hinterland of Asia, which will ... directly damage Chinese strategic security interests.” Several Chinese missile defense experts argue that the radar could detect most Chinese missile tests in northeast China and strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles in the western part of the country targeted at the United States. According to Li Bin, a professor at China’s Tsinghua University, the X-band radar allows the United States to detect the radar signature from the back of the warhead and could discern between a real Chinese warhead and a decoy, which would “[undermine] China’s nuclear deterrent capability.”

1 萨德的x波段雷达削弱了中国的核威慑力量:2016年2月,中国外交部说,“在韩国部署的萨德反导系统,特别是x波段雷达的监测范围,远远超出了朝鲜半岛的防御需求。”它将深入到亚洲腹地,那里将……直接损害中国的战略安全利益。几位中国的反导导弹专家认为,x波段雷达可以探测到中国东北地区的大多数导弹试验,以及位于中国西部地区的,瞄准美国的洲际弹道导弹。根据中国清华大学教授李斌的说法,x波段雷达让美国可以探测到弹头背面的雷达信号,并能分辨出真实弹头和诱饵弹,这将“削弱中国的核威慑能力”。

THAAD provides only minimal defense against North Korean missiles and therefore must be targeted at China: Chinese experts and media commentaries (as well as some in South Korea who oppose THAAD) also argue that THAAD is designed to intercept high-altitude missiles, which would be ineffective against North Korea’s short- and tactical-range missiles that would likely be employed against South Korea. An October 2016 People’s Daily editorial authored by “Zhong Sheng”* asserts that given THAAD’s radar range of 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and minimum intercept altitude of 40 kilometers (25 miles), and accounting for the “geographic environment of the Korean Peninsula,” the system is not a genuine “response to the North Korean threat.”


THAAD causes instability on the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a regional arms race: In an October 2016 speech to the UN, Ambassador Wang Qun, Director-General of the Arms Control Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “The deployment of global missile defense systems by the U.S. ... will impede the nuclear disarmament process, trigger [a] regional arms race, and escalate military confrontation. Particularly the deployment of the THAAD system ... will in no way ... realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.”36 Other Chinese media commentaries and experts have echoed these concerns and argued that the THAAD deployment will lead to further escalation of tensions and military buildup.37 One month after the announced deployment in July 2016, Fan Gaoyue, a retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior colonel and former researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Science, argued the system will most benefit North Korea by providing a justification for developing new missiles and speeding up development of its nuclear weapons program, among other things.

3. 萨德导致朝鲜半岛的不稳定,并将引起地区军备竞赛:在2016年10月联合国的一次演讲中,中国外交部军控司司长王群大使说,“美国部署全球导弹防御系统……”将阻碍核裁军进程,引发区域军备竞赛,并使军事对抗升级。特别是部署萨德系统……决不会...实现朝鲜半岛无核化,维护半岛和平稳定。其他中国媒体评论和专家也表达了同样的担忧,他们认为,萨德的部署将导致紧张局势以及军事竞赛进一步升级。2016年7月,韩国宣布部署萨德系统之后,樊高月—— 退休的中国人民解放军(PLA)大校兼前中国人民解放军军事科学院研究员——认为,部署萨德最有利于朝鲜,这为其发展新型导弹和加快其核武器项目建设等等提供了很好的借口。

三 China’s Economic Coercion and Other Measures Directed against South Korea
In response to South Korea’s decision to install THAAD, the Chinese government launched an aggressive public campaign of economic retaliation. Since the July 2016 announcement that the THAAD system would be deployed in South Korea, China blocked market access of South Korean goods and services in a range of sectors, including:

三 中国针对韩国的经济制裁和其他措施

· Entertainment: Shortly after the THAAD announcement, several events featuring South Korean pop music(K-pop) and actors were suspended or cancelled without any explanation. China Central Television(CCTV), a state-owned TV channel, reported that the government’s broadcast regulator had banned the airing of South Korean TV shows, another popular cultural export, effective September 2016. A performance by a South Korean soprano was cancelled in January 2017.South Korean video games were also caught in the dragnet: in March 2017, Chinese regulators stopped granting South Korean online videogames regulatory approvals, essentially banning their sale in China.

1 娱乐业:在宣布“萨德”入韩后不久,韩国流行音乐(K-pop)和韩国演员的几场活动被暂停或取消,没有任何解释。中国中央电视台(CCTV)——中国国有电视台——报道说政府的广播监管机构从2016年9月开始禁播韩剧——另一个韩国出口的流行文化。一位韩国女高音歌唱家的表演在2017年1月被取消。韩国的视频游戏也被牵扯进来:2017年3月,中国监管机构停止了对韩国在线视频游戏的审批,实质上禁止了其在中国的销售。

· Consumer products: In January 2017, Chinese regulators banned the sale of some South Korean products, including certain types of air purifiers, high-tech toilet seats, and cosmetics, citing safety concerns. South Korean exports of food products to China fell 5.6 percent year-on-year in March 2017 as a consequence of retaliatory actions, but exports of South Korean cosmetics jumped in January and February, underscoring their immense popularity in China.Chinese sales of South Korean carmakers Hyundai and Kia dropped percent year-on-year in March 2017 as consumer boycotts hit the brands.

2 消费品:2017年1月,中国监管机构禁止销售部分韩国产品,包括某些类型的空气净化器、高科技马桶座和化妆品,理由是出于安全方面的考虑。由于采取报复行动,韩国对中国的食品出口额在2017年3月同比下降5.6%,但韩国化妆品出口在1月和2月大幅上升,突显出它们在中国的巨大人气。随着消费者的抵制,韩国汽车制造商现代和起亚2017年3月在中国的销量同比下降52%。

· Tourism: Chinese regulators rejected several applications from Korean airlines to add charter flights between the two countries. In March 2017, the Chinese National Tourism Administration ordered travel agencies to stop selling package tours to South Korea. This is a significant hit to South Korea’s tourism industry—according to the Korea Tourism Organization, visitors from China accounted for 47 percent of all tourists and 70 percent of sales at duty free shops in South Korea in 2016. June 2017 data from the Korea Tourism Organization shows only 254,930 Chinese tourists visited South Korea, down from 758,534 in June 2016—a66 percent drop.

3 旅游业:中国监管机构拒绝了韩国航空公司的几份,关于增加两国之间的包机航班的申请。
2017年3月,中国国家旅游局命令旅行社停止出售韩国行旅游套餐。这对韩国旅游业来说是一个巨大的打击——根据韩国旅游发展局( Korea Tourism Organization)的数据,2016年中国游客占了韩国所有游客的47%,中国游客消费额占韩国免税店的销售额的70%。韩国旅游发展局在2017年6月的数据显示,只有254,930名中国游客到韩国旅游,低于2016年6月的758,534人,降幅达66%。

No South Korean company has been more subjected to China’s economic retaliation than Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate.* In November 2016, Lotte agreed to give one of its golf courses to the South Korean government for the THAAD deployment site; in exchange, Lotte received a plot of military-owned land. The next month, Chinese authorities launched an investigation of Lotte operations in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenyang, and Chengdu. In March 2017, construction of a chocolate factory jointly operated by Lotte and Hershey was suspended. That same month, Lotte announced its Chinese website came under a cyberattack from unidentified Chinese hackers (more than two months later the website was finally back online). By early April 2017, Lotte reported that 75 of its 99 Lotte Marts in mainland China had been closed by Chinese regulators for safety violations.These actions were accompanied by Chinese state media editorials attacking Lotte and demanding it reject the land-swap agreement or face economic repercussions.


According to private cyber security experts, Lotte was not the only target of Chinese hackers, with a notable uptick in the number and intensity of intrusions since South Korea said it would deploy THAAD. On April 21, 2017, John Hultquist, director of cyber espionage analysis at FireEye, a U.S. cybersecurity firm, noted in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that “two cyber espionage groups that [FireEye] lixed to Beijing’s military and intelligence agencies have launched a variety of attacks against South Korea’s government, military, defense companies and a big conglomerate,” without naming the targets. Mr. Hultquist also said “patriotic Chinese hackers acting independently of the government” have joined the government-led cyber intrusions against South Korea. In a separate interview, Mr. Hultquist noted China uses cyber espionage “pretty regularly” to gather information


China also appears to have used diplomatic levers to punish South Korea. All official interactions between the South Korean and Chinese militaries, including at low levels (such as military academy visits), were reportedly frozen during the second half of 2016. In November 2016, Beijing suspended high-level defense consultations with Seoul and postponed a planned meeting between defense ministers. Organizers of the Boao Forum for Asia, China’s response to the Davos Global Summit, cancelled a March 2017 panel originally scheduled to include South Korea’s trade minister.


Thus far, South Korea has resisted China’s economic coercion, staying committed to THAAD. In April 2017, South Korea filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese retaliation, citing restrictions on the sale of baby formula and medical equipment. China did not offer a direct response to South Korea’s complaint. When South Korea first lodged an informal complaint with the WTO in March, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman only said, “We support normal business and other exchanges between China and South Korea, but everyone knows this needs a corresponding basis in public opinion.” Seoul may find it challenging to prove Beijing’s actions are deliberate retaliation. The Chinese government has not publicly acknowledged any of its retaliatory actions, citing safety regulations or routine investigations as justifications for various bans. Beijing has also tacitly stoked consumer boycotts of South Korean products, which are rationalized as actions of patriotic Chinese protesting foreign aggression.


With the election of President Moon in May 2017, signs that China’s retaliation against South Korea is easing started to appear. Although nearly all Lotte Mart stores remain closed, three South Korean musicals were scheduled as early as June, and K-pop music became available again on QQ Music, one of China’s biggest music streaming sites.81 Chinese budget airline Spring Airlines said it would restore flights to South Korea, while South Korean carriers are reportedly preparing for a return of Chinese travelers.82 Nonetheless, during the Commission’s trip to Seoul in May 2017, some South Korean interlocutors expressed concerns about China’s continued use of economic coercion against South Korea.

随着2017年5月韩国总统大选月的到来,有迹象显示中国开始减缓对韩国的报复行动。尽管几乎所有的乐天百货商店仍然出于关门歇业状态,但三部韩国音乐剧预计最早于6月上演,而在QQ音乐——中国最大的音乐流媒体之一 ——上又可以听韩国流行音乐了。中国廉价航空公司春秋航空表示,将恢复飞往韩国的航班,而据报道,韩国航空公司正准备迎接中国游客的回归。尽管如此,在本委员会(译者注:撰写该报告的委员会)于2017年5月访问首尔期间,一些韩国的谈判人员仍然担心中国会继续制裁韩国。

South Korea’s economic dependence on China makes it particularly vulnerable to retaliation. China is South Korea’s largest export market: China has, on average, accounted for about 25 percent of South Korea’s annual exports over the past decade (see Appendix Table 1).89 In 2016, South Korean exports to China reached $124 billion, nearly twice as much as exports to the United States, South Korea’s second-biggest export market.90 Such economic leverage means a prolonged clash would be very problematic for South Korea. At the same time, China’s reliance
on exports from South Korea has been declining since 2014.91 Part of the reason for this decline—independent of any political motivations—is the changing nature of China’s domestic manufacturers, which are increasingly