每人一小段,翻译我也行!
每日新素材,等你来认领! http://www.ltaaa.com/translation.html

-------------译者:cyber power-审核者:龙腾翻译总管------------

As the two giants stare each other down in the Himalayas the real conflict may erupt at sea.

Right now China and India are glaring at each other across Doklam the contested ground along the Sino-Indian frontier high in the Himalayas. It was the Himalayan border that prompted their last serious fight when China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dealt the Indians a short sharp defeat in 1962. But any future war might not be fought on the high mountains but the high seas.

当前,中印两国在喜马拉雅山边界存在争议的洞朗地区对峙。在1962年的两国间最近的一次激烈战争正是发生在此地,中国人民解放军(PLA)快速猛烈地将印度击败。但是,未来任何的战争不一定会出现在高山上,倒有可能发生在公海上。。

A Sino-Indian naval war seems improbable for sure — but so do most wars before they happen. It’s certainly not unthinkable and so it behooves Asia-watchers to lay out the odds now rather than be guilty of a failure of imagination should the worst transpire.

中印海军之间的较量似乎不大可能发生——但是大多数战争在发生之前往往都是如此。这肯定不是不可想象的,所以亚洲问题观察家理应更新评估机率,而不是在最坏的结果来到时才接受失误的判断。

Bottom line: Don’t be taken in by numbers indicating that China would steamroll India in a sea fight. Martial enterprises are seldom that neat.

重点:不要单看数字就认为中国将在海战中碾压印度。战争这种东西可没有百分百的确定性。

-------------译者:haleyyen-审核者:osmond------------

China has settled its border disputes with most in the region — but it prefers to leave the contest with some of its neighbors simmering especially India. A spokesman for China’s defense ministry Col. Wu Qian warned Indians not to “push your luck” in the Doklam dispute. For good measure Wu added that the Indian Army would find it “easier to shake a mountain than to shake the PLA.” Beyond the present conflict Chinese and Indian media have a long history of competing to see who can shout “By jingo!” in the other’s direction the loudest.

中国与区域内大部分邻国都已经解决了边境问题,但仍然与其中几个留有争议,尤其是印度。中国国防部发言人吴谦上校警告印度不要在洞朗争议问题上得寸进尺。另外,吴补充道,印度军方到最后一定回发现,撼动一座大山也比击退中国人民解放军更容易。除了现有冲突,中国和印度媒体也有很长的斗争史了,互相喊话“我们说的才是真相”。

History shows that rancor on land or in the air can easily sprawl out to sea. Or a saltwater conflict could ensue independently of events ashore. Both contestants take a proprietary view of waters off their coasts. China thinks about the South China Sea as a zone of “indisputable” or “irrefutable” sovereignty where Beijing ought to make the rules and others ought to obey. In a similar vein India models its foreign policy and strategy in part on the Monroe Doctrine and thus regards the Indian Ocean as an Indian preserve.

以史为鉴,陆地或空中的对抗很容易蔓延为海战,即使与岸上事件无关的海上冲突也可能接踵而至。对抗双方都认为远离海岸的水域的所有权属于自己。中国认为南海是中国无可争辩的主权的一部分,在这片区域,中国说了算,其他国应该服从。同样地,印度某种程度上复制中国这种充满门罗主义色彩的对外政策,把印度洋视作印度领海。

-------------译者:haleyyen-审核者:osmond------------

Such claims should have a familiar ring to Americans. During its own rise to regional and world power the United States sought to exclude powerful outsiders from the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico — its outlet to the Pacific Ocean. The Monroe Doctrine started off as a joint defense of the Americas against European imperial powers. It ended up with Washington proclaiming that its “fiat [was] law” throughout these waters and that it could exercise an “international police power” there — meddling in fellow American states’ affairs to preclude European seizures of territory in the Western Hemisphere.

这样的声明对美国人来说应该是有些耳熟的。在美国崛起成为地区霸主和世界霸主的过程中,美国设法将强大的局外国家驱逐出加勒比海和墨西哥湾,打通了它通往太平洋的通道。门罗主义始于美洲针对欧洲帝国主义列强所进行的一次共同防御,美国在这些海域宣布了“政令即法律”声明,并且在那里执行他“国际警察”的职责--- 干预、管辖其他美洲国家事务,阻止欧洲对西半球领土的占有。

The sense that nearby seas constitute a rightful mare nostrum — ancient Romans thought of the Mediterranean as “our sea” — means that Indians and Chinese are predisposed to resent and oppose apparent encroachment by outsiders in these seaways. Fishing disputes or undersea drilling take on particular resonance; natural resources concentrate minds in Asian capitals. Indians look askance at China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative which aims to build infrastructure and aid economic development along Eurasia’s historic silk roads land and sea.

我附近海域就是属于我的合法的海域---古罗马认为地中海就是“我们的海”---这种观念意味着印度人和中国人可能在海上航道被所谓外来者侵犯时感到气愤并抵制。渔业争议或者海底钻井激起了特别的共鸣,自然资源是亚洲各国的关注焦点。印度带着怀疑的目光看待中国提出的的“一带一路“政策,尽管”一带一路“旨在加强基础建设,促进欧亚古丝绸之路上的国家的经济发展。

-------------译者:奔走的兔子-审核者:jumpingiruka------------

And Chinese courtship of South Asian coastal states looks suspiciously like an effort to construct a “string of pearls” or network of naval bases in the Indian navy’s traditional operating grounds. Most recently Beijing negotiated a 99-year lease of the Sri Lankan seaport of Hambantota lodging itself firmly in the subcontinent’s environs while Chinese engineers have fortified their naval station in Djibouti in the extreme western reaches of the Indian Ocean.

而且中国跟南亚沿海国家的交往看起来甚为可疑,像是要在印度海军的传统作战区域建设“珍珠链”或海军基地。最近,北京方面议定了位于汉班托特的斯里兰卡港口的99年租约,将自己牢牢安置在印度次大陆的周边地区,同时中国工程师在印度洋最西端的吉布提加强了他们的海军基地。

In short the kindling for marine conflict is increasingly in place while any number of quarrels between New Delhi and Beijing could strike the match. So who would come out on top in an armed conflict? Well the two navies are roughly comparable in aircraft-carrier aviation operating one modest flattop apiece. That parity in numbers appears set to persist for some years but carrier aircraft aren’t the whole of naval striking power.

总之,海上冲突的导火索逐步就位,新德里和北京之间的任何争议都可能将其点燃。那么谁会在武装冲突中占优势?两国海军在航母操作方面实力相当。这一平衡可能会持续数年,但航母并不是全部的海军打击力量。