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Why did the USSR help the Chinese develop their own nuclear arsenal capabilities instead of just gua

为什么俄罗斯帮助中国发展核武器,而不是用自己的核武器保护中国?

-------------译者:熊猫的狮子-审核者:龙腾翻译总管------------

restricteddataNuclear Technology | Modern Science 41 指標 3 月 前
Why would any state help another state acquire nuclear weapons? This is a general question (it has happened many times — the USSR and the PRC, France and Israel, China and Pakistan, Pakistan and lots of people, etc.), and has many different possible answers.

为什么一个国家会帮助另一个国家获取核武器?这是一个普遍的问题(已经发生了很多次——苏联和中国,法国和以色列,中国和巴基斯坦,巴基斯坦和很多人,等等),并有许多不同的合理答案。



But wait, wouldn't it complicate things with the USSR in that region? Kroenig's argument is that in the period that the USSR was willing to help China become a big player in East Asia, the USSR had more or less given up on its imperial ambitions over there. If the USSR had had more global ambitions, it would have been much more wary.

但等等,那它岂不是也混乱了苏联在该地区的事务?Kroenig的说法是,在苏联愿意帮助中国在东亚成为一个大国的那个时期,苏联已经或多或少地放弃了其在那里的帝国野心。如果苏联曾经有过更大的全球野心,它会更加谨慎。

-------------译者:熊猫的狮子-审核者:龙腾翻译总管------------

(This theory gives a good, easy explanation of why the USA was extremely unwilling to help any nation acquire the bomb — it always had global, hegemonic ambitions. It did assist some nations with furthering their arsenals once they had "proven" they already knew how to make them, though.)

(这个理论很好且简单解释了为什么美国非常不愿意帮助其它任何国家获得炸弹——因为美国总想称霸全球。尽管,有些国家在“证明”自己已经知道如何制造核武器后,美国也确实帮助这些国家增强了核武库。)

The Chinese started to push for nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s, during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, after President Eisenhower explicitly used the tactic of "nuclear blackmail" against them — if they invaded Taiwan, he might use nuclear weapons as a response (even though the Chinese were not nuclear armed). Mao realized that if China lacked nuclear weapons the USA would continue to do this sort of thing indefinitely.

上世纪50年代中期,中国人开始研发核武器。第一次台海危机期间,艾森豪威尔总统明确地表示要对中国使用“核讹诈”战术——如果中国大陆侵袭台湾,美国可能会使用核武器作为回应(即使中国人没有核武器)。毛意识到,如果中国缺乏核武器,美国将无限制地继续做这样的事情。

The Chinese had no confidence in the Soviet nuclear umbrella. They were right not to — it wasn't clear the Soviets would actually go to war over them, and the Soviet nuclear umbrella was much more paltry than the American one until the 1970s. China, incidentally, was targeted by early US nuclear war plans, whether they were part of whatever conflict the sparked it or not (there was not a "don't nuke China" option in the early plans), so they certainly would have suffered the negative side of being under the umbrella.

中国人在苏联的核保护伞下没有信心。他们有权没有信心——因为尚不清楚苏联是否会为了中国而走向战争。另外上世纪70年代以前,苏联的核保护伞与美国的相比,简直微不足道。不知何故,中国成为了美国早期核战争计划的目标,无论中国是否涉及冲突激发(在早期计划中没有“不以核武器攻击中国”这一选项),所以在保护伞下,中国肯定会遭遇消极的一面。

What's kind of amazing about the Soviet assistance to China is that it started rather late — not until 1955 did they formally begin helping the Chinese. They did this in spite of many leaders in the Soviet Politburo, notably Khrushchev, thinking that there were going to be inevitable conflicts with the Chinese over matters of doctrine and policy (e.g. Khrushchev was already planning to break with the Stalinist past; Mao continued to embrace Stalin).

令人惊讶的是,苏联对中国的援助起步较晚——直到1955年,他们才正开始帮助中国。尽管许多在苏联政治局的领导人,特别是赫鲁晓夫,认为将要与中国在理论和政策问题上有不可避免的冲突(例如赫鲁晓夫已经打算与前任斯大林决裂;毛则继续信奉斯大林),但苏联还是这样做了。

-------------译者:smallbear-审核者:龙腾翻译总管------------

What advantages, at this stage, would it be for the Soviets to give assistance? OK, there is the ostensible one of helping an "ally" against a common foe — necessary but perhaps not sufficient. Part of the motivation may have been to keep the Chinese somewhat dependent. If the Soviets were supplying the technological know-how, if they had the "keys to the factories" so to speak, then the Chinese would be reliant on them.

那么在这种情况下,苏联给予支持还将取得什么好处?当然,有个显然的帮助“盟友”对抗共同敌人的好处——这个条件必要却可能不充分。部分动机可能是想让中国保持某种依赖。如果苏联当时提供了各种技术知识,手中掌握着关键的“钥匙”,那么中国就会对苏联产生依赖。



At first the Chinese technicians simply tried (under political pressure) to run Soviet equipment without understanding it deeply, and caused hundreds of accidents in the process. Later they endeavored to completely understand the technology first, and had much more success, but their path to the bomb took 10 full years to complete, no quick acquisition. (On the Chinese side of things, there is still no better source than John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, 1988.)

起初中国技术人员只是简单的尝试(在政治压力下)运转苏联设备,而并没有深刻理解,这也在过程中导致了数百起大小事故。后来他们首先尝试对技术进行完全理解,于是获得了更多的成功。但是他们通向原子弹的道路走了整整10年,并非是很快获得的。(在有关中国方面的事情上,没有比John Wilson Lewis 和 Xue Litai,所著的1988年出版的《中国核武器始末》(China Build the Bomb) 一书更好的资料了)

-------------译者:相忘江湖-审核者:龙腾翻译总管------------

We are preconditioned to see "atomic assistance" as furthering a nuclear program; it may do the exact opposite. Political scientist Alex Montgomery has argued in a wonderfully-titled paper, "Stop Helping Me", that in fact, most instances of foreign nuclear assistance slows indigenous nuclear programs.

我们会自然而然的认为“核援助”就是为了促进核项目的发展;但是也有可能起到反作用。政治学家Alex Montogomery在一篇标题极恰当的论文《求别帮》中谈到,事实上,大部分事例证明来自外国的原子弹研究协助反而会拖慢本国的研发进度。

This is counter-intuitive unless you study technological transfer and organizations deeply, but the essential argument is one that any student has experienced: if you are simply given an answer, you may have solved a single problem easily, but you are far less ready to tackle new problems than if you had struggled through the process of education yourself. Similarly, if you go to a country, give them a complicated factory they do not know how to use, staff it with your own employees (who do not tell them how it works), then withdraw all of the staff (and some of the key pieces of equipment that are portable), you will have actually dragged out arguably longer the time it will take for them to get it working, as opposed to if they had, from the beginning, invested their time and labor into learning how to develop it all indigenously.

如果你不是学习技术转移和组织结构的专业人士,你会觉得以上说法是违反常识的,但是核心的原理很多学生一定能够理解:如果简单粗暴地给你答案,你或许能够快速解决问题,但是和依靠自己的努力找出答案相比,你将不具备解决新问题的能力。同理,假设你到了一个国家建造一个当地人不懂得运作原理的复杂工厂,然后用你自己的雇员,在不教当地人的情况下,组建好之后撤出所有你带来的员工,带走一些小型可携带的关键零部件。这样下来,和自己从零开始投入时间和精力建工厂相比,当地人绝对会花费更长得多的时间。

While I don't think the Soviets thought that their help would actively slow the Chinese bomb program, I do think they concluded that it was better for them to be involved with it, and to have the Chinese be dependent on them. If the Soviets were involved, they could monitor its progress, and (as they did) potentially pull out if they weren't happy with the Chinese.

虽然我认为苏联没想到他们的协助会拖慢中国原子弹项目,但我认为他们觉得他们能够参与到中国的研发项目中,得到中国人的依赖对他们更为有利。如果苏联介入其中,他们就可以操控进度,如果他们和中国人有了矛盾就可以随时撤出(确实是退出了)。

It could be a bargaining chip, in other words, as well as an excuse to see what the Chinese were doing on this front. (The US did similar things with non-military nuclear programs in European states.)

换句话说,这种介入会成为一种谈判筹码,在这方面也能成为密切关注中国进展的托词。(美国在欧洲国家的非军事核项目上的策略如出一辙)